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Introduction
In the years 1964–68, the Labour government of Harold Wilson coincided with
the Democratic presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. David Bruce, US Ambassador
to London 1961–69, regarded the relationship between Wilson and Johnson as
an especially interesting one, because ‘seldom if ever have two heads of state
been such long-time master politicians in the domestic sense as those two’.1
Many writers have commented on the Wilson–Johnson relationship, usually
highlighting the undoubted strains therein. Ritchie Ovendale, for example, ar-
gues that although they were ‘initially effusive in their reciprocal praise’, the
two leaders soon ‘viewed each other with some suspicion’. The President ‘thought
that Wilson was too keen to cross the Atlantic to bolster his domestic position’,
and believed ‘that the British Prime Minister was too clever by half’.2 British
Ambassador to Washington in the 1980s, Robin Renwick, states that ‘no per-
sonal rapport developed between Johnson and Wilson, hard as Wilson tried to
cultivate the impression that there was one’.3 According to Raymond Seitz, US
Ambassador to London during the 1990s, Johnson ‘could barely conceal his
disdain for Harold Wilson. He once referred to him as “a little creep”.’ Yet
Wilson ‘thought his friendship with Johnson was harmony itself’.4 John Dickie
maintains that ‘Even the most ardent Atlanticists were surprised at the sudden
cooling of the Special Relationship so soon after the end of the Kennedy–
Macmillan era’. In particular, Wilson’s prime ministership ‘set the scene for a
decline which continued for fifteen years until Margaret Thatcher rekindled the
special warmth of the partnership with Ronald Reagan’.5
The literature of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’
For the purpose of this work the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ is de-
fined as unusually close institutional bonds, frequent consultation and concerted
policies between the governments of Britain and the United States, and, in the
most rarefied sense, to regular, cordial and productive mutual dealings between
prime ministers and presidents. The field of Anglo-American relations has at-
tracted much attention from academics, among whom it is accepted that the
world wars, especially the second, enabled the United States to displace Britain
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as the leading ‘great power’. David Dimbleby and David Reynolds note that in
both conflicts Britain was among the first to become involved, and both times
‘at the point of exhaustion she [was] saved by the United States … although
undefeated, Britain’s power [was] diminished and her economy weakened’.6 There
is some uncertainty about the precise origin of the term ‘special relationship’ as
a reference to Anglo-American bonds, but Winston Churchill certainly used the
expression in February 1944 when he wrote that it was his ‘deepest conviction
that unless Britain and the United States are joined in a Special Relationship
including Combined Staff Organisation and a wide measure of reciprocity in
the use of bases – all within the ambit of a world organisation – another destruc-
tive war will come to pass’.7 The expression entered the public domain as a
result of Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech of March 1946, when it was used as a
‘prescriptive’ reference to close cooperation between Britain and the United States.8
In their coverage of the relationship over first two post-war decades, most writ-
ers do tend to regard the adjective ‘special’ as at least partially warranted. The
American academic and foreign policy practitioner Henry Kissinger, for ex-
ample, notes how effectively British diplomats brought their influence to bear
upon American policymakers. There were ‘meetings so regular that autono-
mous American action somehow came to violate club rules’.9 John Baylis argues
that the US–UK ‘partnership became so close, intimate and informal in such a
wide spectrum of political, economic and especially military fields that terms
like “exceptional”, “unique”, or “different from the ordinary” can be applied’.
The relationship was exceptional ‘because of the degree of intimacy and infor-
mality which was developed during the war’ and endured well beyond 1945.10
Anglo-American ties had a number of distinctive features. Firstly, notes Reynolds,
there were the consultative ties between the two bureaucracies, which expressed
themselves in regular and informal consultations between Washington and Lon-
don. Secondly, there was the intelligence axis created during the Second World
War and revived under the UKUSA agreements of 1947–48. There was a global
division of labour in signals intelligence between the United States, Britain,
Australia and New Zealand. Thirdly, there was the especially close contact
between the two navies, centred on their shared interest in the security of the
north Atlantic. Finally, the relationship also featured cooperation on atomic
and nuclear matters. This cooperation emerged in 1940–41, declined in 1945–
46, and was revived by Eisenhower and Macmillan in the late 1950s in response
to the Soviet Union’s development of intercontinental missiles.11
Scholars have reflected upon the role of shared political, strategic and eco-
nomic interests on one hand and that of sentiment, history and culture on the
other in shaping Anglo-American bonds. Churchill, who was half-American
and who in his lengthy career played the roles both of historian and of states-
man, saw the relationship foremost as a matter of culture and sentiment, a
‘fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples’; he regarded Britain and
the United States as essentially two halves of the same community.12 In 1966
intro.p65 08/06/2004, 14:382
3Introduction
Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance invoked alliance theory to reach
the conclusion that the apparent closeness of the diplomatic ties between Britain
and the United States derived in large part from history, tradition and mutual
affinity.13 It was around this time, however, that Churchillian notions of an
implicit Anglo-American harmony of interests and personalities were beginning
to wane, not least because of the advent of President Johnson and the promi-
nence of various policy differences between London and Washington. One reason
for this was that, as Kissinger pointed out in 1965, the memory of Britain’s
wartime effort was fading. More and more ‘influential Americans have come to
believe that Britain has been claiming influence out of proportion to its power’.14
New, documentary based interpretations of the Anglo-American relationship
underlining the unifying impact of culture and sentiment are less common than
those emphasising shared political interests, periodic crises and frequent com-
promise – what Alex Danchev calls the ‘functionalist’ model. He points out that
the British have been inclined to ‘sentimentalise’ and ‘mytholigise’ Anglo-Ameri-
can bonds for reasons of self-interest.15 The relationship was primarily the outcome
of a coincidence of self-interest on both sides of the Atlantic.16 Although John
Dumbrell stresses the importance of cultural ties, he contends nonetheless that
‘the cultural interpretation of the “special relationship” should not be pushed
too far. The ebbs and flows in transatlantic closeness tend to reflect interests
rather than sentiment.’17 Nigel Ashton hones the functionalist orthodoxy by
emphasising the importance not only of national interest but also of factors such
as ‘ideology, culture, bureaucracy, domestic politics and public opinion’. He
suggests that the Anglo-American relationship in the early 1960s was highly
complex and subtle: ‘To understand this relationship one needs to grasp the
differences in perception between London and Washington, differences that were
informed by all of the factors listed above, not simply by diverging concepts of
national interest.’18 Cultural affinity and calculations of national self-interest
are not mutually exclusive, because bonds deriving from political calculation
can be supported by the influence of history, language, and sentiment.19 While
institutional ties are the foundation of the Anglo-American alliance, it must be
remembered that they are not automatic and self-creating; they are the products
of human agency and intervention, and therefore individual personalities can
frequently exert a considerable degree of influence.
Harold Wilson noted in 1970 that Britain could not ‘compete with American
power, whether in defence terms, nuclear and conventional, or in military and
industrial terms’.20 By most material measures the United States has for decades
greatly overshadowed Britain, but nonetheless historians have differed in their
views of how far the relationship may be regarded as a partnership of equals.
Dickie writes that ‘the phrase “special relationship” from the outset has been
almost entirely in English accents’, implying that the connections are of far
greater import to London than to Washington.21 Mark Curtis’s recent analysis
describes Britain crudely as ‘largely a US client state’ whose ‘military has become
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an effective US proxy force’.22 Few writers would support such an unvariegated
view. While accepting American predominance, most scholarship emphasises –
quite rightly – the extent to which the two countries were linked in balanced
connections of mutual benefit. London sought close bonds with Washington in
order to retain a place at the ‘top table’ of world affairs and because of the belief
that Britain’s foreign policy aims could best be fulfilled as chief ally of the
United States. For its part, Washington needed a reliable and powerful partner
to further the interests of the western alliance as the Cold War developed. British
leaders shared the American commitment to upholding democracy and capital-
ism, and containing the spread of communism.23 Crucial links in the fields of
defence and economics ensured the interdependence of the Anglo-American re-
lationship.24 Speaking of the late 1950s, D. Cameron Watt notes Britain’s
importance to the United States. The country was:
still the only power solidly established in the Indian Ocean. Britain still guarded
physically the oil of the Gulf. Britain was one of the powers occupying Berlin. Britain
was a nuclear power soon to explode her own thermonuclear device. The Foreign
Office could still produce a remarkable array of negotiating skills. Britain still had a
very considerable fund of know-how. The sterling area still played a major role in
world trade.25
Ashton provides a more nuanced angle on interdependence, arguing in his study
of the Kennedy–Macmillan years that ‘the whole concept of Anglo-American
interdependence was ironic’ because:
The American defence research and development budget dwarfed that of Britain by a
factor of about ten to one. Yet British concepts of interdependence were founded on
notions of partnership and equality. In terms of the simple balance of the power
relationship between the two countries these notions were unrealistic and were doomed
to disappointment. For the US administration, interdependence meant greater coor-
dination in the Western defence effort and, effectively, the greater centralisation of
control in Washington. As Kennedy himself saw matters, ‘there had to be control by
somebody. One man had to make the decisions – and as things stood that had to be
the American President’.26
In this scenario, the more the British sought interdependence by aligning them-
selves with American designs the less freedom they would have to pursue
independent policies in the wider world. Although the United States was clearly
the senior partner, Britain was still an important ally with much to offer, with
the result that the relationship is more accurately gauged in terms of interdepen-
dence and mutuality instead of the mere domination of a weaker power by a
much stronger one. A further dimension to these issues is provided by Harold
Macmillan’s famous Greeks and Romans analogy developed during the Second
World War. In an oft-quoted comment of 1942, Macmillan is supposed to have
said that ‘These Americans represent the new Roman Empire and we Britons,
like the Greeks of old, must teach them how to make it go.’27 The thinking is
that the weaker but wilier British could exploit the diplomatically inexperienced
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Americans, but most historians do not regard this as a persuasive image of
Anglo-American relations. The strategy underestimates the political sophistica-
tion of American leaders, and if Macmillan had ever believed in its efficacy
then it would hardly have been prudent to broadcast the strategy.28 Ovendale
comments of the Macmillan–Kennedy years that to accept the idea of ‘an elder
statesman educating a younger politician is to underestimate Macmillan’s so-
phistication in handling the Americans, and to denigrate what appears to have
been a sincere friendship which guaranteed the nuclear alliance between Britain
and the United States that endured for three decades’.29 There is little to com-
mend the Greeks and Romans model, as much as British leaders, confident in
their diplomatic ingenuity, might find it appealing.
The institutional bonds between Britain and the United States
A 1968 State Department analysis reflected that Britain and the United States
were linked ‘in an unparalleled [number] of spheres – nuclear strategy, disarma-
ment, multilateral alliance, weapons technology, intelligence, and arms sales
and purchases’. The connections were closest ‘in the fields of nuclear weaponry
and intelligence. Each government provides the other with material and infor-
mation that it makes available to no-one else.’30 During the Second World War,
Britain and the United States collaborated on the production of the atomic bomb,
but while in an isolationist mood in 1946 Congress passed the McMahon Act
prohibiting all further collaboration. There was an agreement in 1948 known
as the Modus Vivendi providing for a limited renewal of cooperation which
prevailed until 1957, when the connections were reinvigorated by Macmillan’s
consent to the siting in Britain of sixty American ‘Thor’ intermediate range
ballistic nuclear missiles. In 1958, Congress, growing concerned that the United
States was losing its nuclear lead to the Soviet Union, amended the McMahon
Act to permit the pooling of additional nuclear data with the British. That year,
under the terms of the new legislation, Britain gained preferential access to the
data, and in 1959 a further arrangement enabled the country to buy from the
United States component parts of nuclear weapons systems and to exchange
plutonium for enriched uranium. In 1960, when Macmillan offered Eisenhower
base facilities at Holy Loch in Scotland for the new Polaris missile submarines,
the President responded by offering in exchange to sell Britain the land-based
Skybolt missile, after Britain’s own Blue Streak programme ran into difficulties.
In 1962, in a meeting on the island of Nassau in the Bahamas, after the cancel-
lation of Skybolt, President Kennedy agreed to provide Britain with Polaris. The
State Department analysis of 1968 summarised the degree of US–UK nuclear
cooperation by noting that as well as Polaris the United States had sold Britain:
fissionable materials and non-nuclear equipment to be used in nuclear weapons; and
a power plant and fuel load for a nuclear powered submarine of the Skipjack class. It
has furnished the UK information on the design of certain nuclear warheads and
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selected data on underground nuclear tests. While the UK has undoubtedly benefited
more than has the US from cooperation in this field, it has nonetheless provided the
US with numerous benefits. Among these have been various contributions to weap-
ons technology, notably an improved high explosive atomic weapons trigger,
independent analyses of new weapons designs, and the use of Christmas Island as a
base for certain atmospheric tests.32
The same assessment noted that in the field of intelligence relations ‘the US and
UK give each other a greater volume and wider variety of information than
either does to any of its other allies’. The arrangements provided for the ‘ex-
change of information gathered from both overt and covert sources; for the
swapping of estimates; and for the preparation of joint estimates’, and a ‘divi-
sion of labour in certain geographic and functional fields, and on some areas
and subjects, each nation is dependent for its intelligence mainly on the other’.33
The 1948 UKUSA agreements, which Dickie describes as ‘the most fruitful joint
venture of the Anglo-American partnership, with extraordinary dividends for
both sides’,34 coordinated the signals intelligence (SIGINT) apparatus of Brit-
ain, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. There was extensive
cooperation in this field between Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) in Cheltenham and America’s National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort
Meade in Maryland, with officers of the NSA working alongside their British
counterparts in Cheltenham, as well as at SIGINT facilities at Menwith Hill in
Yorkshire. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked with Brit-
ish intelligence operatives and mounted operations from the US embassy in
London.35 Britain also provided the United States with ‘diplomatic reports from
capitals where it has no representation. In the intelligence field, as in the field of
nuclear weaponry, the UK gets more than it gives, but what it gives is not
insubstantial.’36
There were numerous bilateral defence links between Britain and the United
States remaining from the Second World War, and many were expanded later.
These included an Agreement on Security Classifications in 1948, an agreement
establishing a US–UK Military Information Board in 1949, and a series of five
agreements reached in Washington in 1950. There were also numerous infor-
mal arrangements from 1950 onwards providing for the exchange of technical
information on weapons systems.37 Britain and the United States were leading
members of the NATO alliance, centred on the defence of Western Europe. In
1962, Britain had over 50,000 troops stationed in Germany in the form of the
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). It has been pointed out that London had
resisted making major cutbacks to the BAOR partly on the grounds that to do so
would undermine British influence both within NATO and in relation to the
United States.38 In 1964, Britain’s armed forces of around 400,000 personnel
were deployed all over the world as well as in Europe, including at numerous
bases described loosely as ‘East of Suez’ – in locations as widespread as Gibraltar,
Malta, Cyprus, Aden, Bahrain, Gan in the Indian Ocean, Labuan in Borneo,
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Singapore and Hong Kong.39 The Foreign Office noted that in Asia ‘The Ameri-
cans are anxious not to appear as the only western power in the area (apart
from Australia) and thus particularly value our support for SEATO’ (Southeast
Asia Treaty Organisation).40 Britain had some twenty-four formal defence com-
mitments, involving nearly one hundred countries and dependent territories.41
There was consequently an appreciation in Washington of the British position
as ‘the only Western power beside the US that had worldwide responsibilities’ –
numerous ‘far-flung dependencies and Commonwealth affiliates’ providing ‘an
unrivalled network of bases and other military facilities that served US foreign
policy interests’. The bonds were further cemented by the UK’s ‘provision of
extensive real estate for US military forces. Airfields in England accommodate
the US squadrons that had to be moved from France when the latter withdrew
from NATO. Holy Loch in Scotland provides a base for our Polaris submarines.
The Fylingdales early warning station is directly linked to NORAD [North
American Air Defence Command] … only the UK provides all three types of
installation.’42
Economic connections also strengthened the Anglo-American relationship.43
Cooperation between the two countries at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944
devised the framework for the operation of the Western international financial
system, including a scheme of fixed exchange rates. The International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) was established to maintain international liquidity, to lend to
governments in economic difficulties and, through various sub-groups and sepa-
rate meetings of the most powerful countries (including Britain), help to integrate
the international economic policies of countries concerned. Trade policy was
discussed in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which sought to expand free trade.44 There was also cooperation through the
World Bank. In the years after Bretton Woods both Labour and Conservative
governments were committed to retaining a strong pound and to preserving the
sterling area as symbols of continued preeminence, despite having only limited
reserves. However, maintaining a sterling parity of $2.80 and preserving the
sterling area and relatively high domestic spending frequently required finan-
cial bailouts from the United States and other international sources. Until around
1960, when it became clear that the economies of West Germany and France
were overtaking that of Britain, the pound was the leading currency for interna-
tional transactions. A devaluation of sterling would disrupt the entire global
economic system and, in turn, the international trading patterns of the United
States.45 Economic links between London and Washington were also strength-
ened, as the Foreign Office noted in 1964, by ‘important and close’ trade relations:
the United States was ‘the most important single customer and supplier of the
United Kingdom while the United Kingdom is the United States’ fourth best
customer and fourth biggest supplier’.46
Although there was interdependence in the various fields of cooperation, there
was a distinct imbalance of power between Britain and the United States. The
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Foreign Office noted in 1962 that ‘Seen from the United States, Britain looks
fairly small in the world and will look smaller as her capacity to influence
events declines.’47 Another Foreign Office analysis noted that Britain’s standing
in the United States depended ultimately on ‘our practical contribution to the
Western Alliance rather than on any particular feeling of United Kingdom/United
States interdependence’.48 It was commented in 1964 that the ‘alliance with the
United States’ was ‘the most important single factor’ in British foreign policy:
‘As much the weaker partner, dependent on overseas trade and with world-wide
responsibilities, we find American support for our overseas policies virtually
indispensable, while they find our support for theirs useful and sometimes valu-
able.’49 A State Department paper that year commented that whereas the ‘close
US–UK association [was] the most important single factor in British foreign
policy’, for the Americans it was enough simply to assert the value of the ‘asso-
ciation’.50 In February 1964 the Conservative prime minister Alec Douglas-Home
managed to antagonise Johnson over the question of British trade with commu-
nist Cuba,51 but at the elite level the UK–US partnership had flourished under
Harold Macmillan and John F. Kennedy. Dickie, for example, argues that the
‘Kennedy–Macmillan days of the transatlantic partnership revived a relation-
ship between the two leaders which was underpinned by a degree of personal
friendship such as had not existed since Roosevelt and Churchill forged the
original bond’.52 David Nunnerley adds that Kennedy trusted the British Am-
bassador to Washington, Lord Harlech, ‘as much as the members of his own
Cabinet’. As a result, Harlech enjoyed ‘almost unlimited access to the President’.53
This view is confirmed by Ashton’s more recent research, which confirms that
Harlech ‘enjoyed remarkable access to the president’.54 Such intimacy led the
Foreign Office to conclude that the Anglo-American ‘association goes so deep, is
felt at so many levels and yet is so intangible that neither are fully conscious of it
… Though there are German, Irish, and Scandinavian lobbies in the United States,
there is scarcely more need for a British lobby than an American one’.55 Anglo-
American ties were also facilitated by the activities of US Ambassador Bruce,
who, according to the Foreign Office in 1965, was a figure ‘much respected’ both
in London and Washington and with whom it was ‘always worth talking’.56
Harold Wilson
Harold Wilson has provoked a range of feelings among his biographers. Of the
most recent works about him,57 Austen Morgan is the least sympathetic. He
notes that the Labour Party:
secured a healthy mandate in 1966, and it looked as if Wilson’s government might go
from strength to strength. He had more administrative experience than any of his
colleagues, but it was precisely in the area of public policy, both domestic and foreign,
that he failed so disastrously. There were considerable setbacks in foreign and domestic
affairs – Vietnam, Rhodesia and, especially, devaluation in 1967.58
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According to Morgan, Wilson was ‘a careerist in the main, his opportunism
being apparent in his failed attempt to modernise Britain through the archaic
institutions of the state’.59 Ben Pimlott’s assessment is more favourable. Wilson
was not unprincipled; far from it, ‘he had principles which often incited consen-
sual fury because they were unfashionable ones … This was true of his attitude
to sterling; and later of his position on trade union reform.’60 Moreover, the
Labour government ‘had come to office with serious national and international
problems unresolved, and it left with a number of difficult decisions taken’.
These included the devaluation of sterling, and, furthermore, by 1970:
the ‘East of Suez’ posture had largely been given up; and critical steps had been taken
to prepare Britain for EEC entry. Wilson had failed to prevent an escalation of the
American military operation in Vietnam but he had avoided committing British troops
to the conflict without losing US financial support. No new British wars or military
entanglements – no Korea, Suez, Falklands or Gulf adventure had been initiated.61
Philip Ziegler also presents a broadly positive verdict of the Labour govern-
ments of the 1960s, and waxes lyrical about Wilson himself: ‘it can fairly be
said of him that he strove to render less the sum of human wretchedness. He did
not always succeed, sometimes he did not seem even to push his efforts to the
uttermost, but it was a worthy and consistent goal. For holding to it he can be
counted as being on the side of the angels, if never quite a champion in the
angelic host’.62
In 1964, the State Department provided a cooler assessment of Wilson. ‘An
economics don at twenty-one, a junior minister at twenty-nine, President of the
Board of Trade at thirty-one, Wilson is today at 48 above all a pro … a first-rate
administrator and a brilliant debater’. At the same time, he had ‘gained a repu-
tation among some observers for being a scheming opportunist and an egocentric
… a consummate politician’. Throughout the 1950s, Wilson ‘shifted and
temporised on a host of issues’. He ‘followed Nye Bevan out of the Attlee gov-
ernment in 1951 in disapproval over its rearmament policies, but when Bevan
resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in 1954 because of foreign and defence policy
differences, it was Wilson who took his place’. In 1955, Wilson supported Hugh
Gaitskell in the contest for the Party leadership, but after the 1959 general
election, ‘when the fundamentalists and the unilateralists went after Gaitskell’s
scalp in the bitter intra-party fight over nationalisation and defence policies,
Wilson not only did nothing to help Gaitskell but gave aid and comfort to his
enemies’. In 1960 Wilson ‘ran against Gaitskell for the Party leadership, the
first such challenge in nearly 40 years, but was defeated’. Nonetheless, when
Gaitskell died in January 1963, ‘the centre and right-wing members of the Par-
liamentary Labour Party eventually elected Wilson, whom they disliked and
distrusted, as Leader’. They believed that ‘he, more than another Labour MP,
had the qualities necessary to lead the party – and possibly the country’. Wilson
then ‘astounded one and all by his ability to hold the party together’. He did so
by disregarding ‘the extreme leftists and conciliated the centre and right-wing
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Labourites’. He succeeded ‘in finding the highest common factor uniting the
diverse elements in the party and the trade union movement’. Within months
Wilson was ‘firmly and indisputably in control of his party, and there he has
remained’, presenting ‘the impression that he is businesslike and moderate, a
man who understands the necessity of compromising between socialist and egali-
tarian instincts’. He had demonstrated ‘only a minimal commitment to
nationalisation, but he has consistently emphasised the importance of NATO’.
He had ‘talked some unions out of calling strikes, but he is much more trusted
than Gaitskell ever was by the powerful left-wing head of Britain’s largest union,
Frank Cousins’.63 It emerged that Wilson felt a deep-rooted dedication to the
United States, as a means of preserving Britain’s status as a ‘great power’, and
of bolstering his own political standing by means of conspicuously close ties
with Washington. He reflected in March 1964 that as Secretary to two Anglo-
American-Canadian combined boards during the Second World War he enjoyed
the ‘swirl of informality between London and Washington’.64
In May 1964, the Labour MP Anthony Wedgwood Benn noted Wilson’s be-
lief that a Labour government ‘would be able to establish a much more informal
relationship with the American President than Home has been able to do’. Wil-
son ‘imagines that he can telephone and fly over as and when necessary, without
the usual fuss of top-level meetings. He also hopes to have an Ambassador there
who is in and out of the Administration’s meetings all the time.’65 The Harvard
political scientist and White House adviser, Richard Neustadt, commented in
1965 that the Prime Minister felt a strong ‘emotional commitment to the US’,
which he ‘personified … in LBJ’. Indicating the extent of Wilson’s self-regard,
this commitment ‘was a matter of identification with and admiration for’
Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy. Furthermore, Neustadt argued, Wilson’s
attitude derived partly from the loneliness of high office: his position of ‘isola-
tion at the apex of … government, feeling different from his colleagues and
having none as confidantes’ led him to look to President Johnson as ‘one “king”
to another’. Britain’s economic difficulties and the difficulty in maintaining the
country’s position in the world meant that the Prime Minister was ‘a small king
on a tight rope looking towards the big king with the power and the leeway to
extend a steadying hand’.66
American observers expressed interest in the Labour Party as well as its leader.
The State Department commented in October 1964 that Labour was ‘a demo-
cratic non-Marxist socialist party that aims to bring about a more egalitarian
society by evolutionary, constitutional, and practical means’, and that some
members of the Parliamentary Labour Party did not favour the association with
the United States: ‘50 or more of the roughly 260 Labour MPs in Parliament just
dissolved could be described as left-wing, and about a dozen are considered
extreme leftists’. Although these ‘extremists are noisy and a nuisance … they
have little influence in the party and would probably have even less in a Wilson
led government’. Fortunately for Wilson, Washington thus felt no antipathy to
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the idea of a Labour government: ‘We do not expect a Labour government to
make basic changes in Britain’s foreign policy. We believe that the foreign poli-
cies of a Wilson government, like those of the last Labour administration
(1945–1951), will be more British than Labour.’67 In a similar vein, Secretary of
State Dean Rusk commented soon after Labour’s election that ‘Great Britain
pursues a national foreign policy’, evident ‘during the previous Labour Govern-
ment when NATO and the Berlin blockade had been dealt with’.68
Lyndon B. Johnson
Not least because the 1960s was a period of social and political tumult, the
presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson has attracted the attention of numerous histo-
rians, most of whom tend to praise his success with regard to the ‘Great Society’
programme of civil rights, welfare and educational measures.69 Paul Conkin,
for example, writes that ‘For almost two years, from November 1963 to the late
summer of 1965, his presidency was an unalloyed success story. No president
before or since achieved as many legislative goals or seemed as fully a master
of the whole spectrum of tasks that go with such an almost monarchical of-
fice.’70 Robert Dallek contends from a broader perspective that while ‘many of
the laws spawned by Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty have either fallen into
disrepute or command little support from most Americans … the spirit and
some of the substance behind Johnson’s reform programmes maintain a hold on
the pubic imagination that endures’.71 Yet Johnson’s reputation remains blighted
by the Vietnam War, inclining many writers to depict him as what Thomas
Schwartz describes as the ‘ugly American’ – crude, provincial and lacking subtlety
in his conduct of foreign policy.72 Philip Geyelin wrote in 1966 that Johnson was
‘a swashbuckling master of the political midstream, but only in the crowded,
well-traveled familiar inland waterways of domestic politics. He had no taste
or preparation for the deep waters of foreign policy’. He was ‘king of the river
and a stranger to the open sea’.73 Waldo Heinrichs contends that Johnson’s ‘ap-
preciation of foreign nations was shallow, circumstantial, and dominated by the
personalities of heads of states he had met. Lacking a detached critical perspec-
tive, he was culture bound and vulnerable to clichés and stereotypes about world
affairs … this master of domestic politics seemed to lack a sense of power in
world politics’. He was ‘aware of change but slow to discard early Cold War
assumptions and unsure how to deal with new realities’.74 According to Dallek,
Johnson’s expansion of the American commitment in Vietnam rested on ‘a com-
bination of noble and ignoble motives that little serve his historical reputation’
and led to ‘the worst foreign policy disaster’ in American history.75
In 1963, before Vietnam became such a nightmare, the Foreign Office sketched
Johnson’s life to date. He had become President on 22 November that year
following the assassination of President Kennedy, and was ‘55 years old …
married, with two daughters, comfortably off, but not wealthy, has qualifications
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in law, and is a Presbyterian churchgoer’. As Senate Majority Leader ‘for six
years during the Eisenhower administration’, he ‘controlled the Senate and domi-
nated its actions as few legislators ever have’. Unlike most of his predecessors in
the vice-presidency, ‘he had active political experience during his tenure there.
He attended most sessions of the National Security Council, went on diplomatic
missions as a negotiator, visited some 27 countries, and was Chairman of the
Aeronautics and Space Council and of the Committee on Equal Employment.’ He
had been ‘active and outspoken in President Kennedy’s campaign against segre-
gation and poverty, and his first proclamation announced his intention to continue
“his work”’. In the light of ‘the proximity of the Presidential election [November
1964], and the urgency of the outstanding problems of Civil Rights and taxation,
he will have to devote most of his time and energy’ to domestic matters. Johnson
was ‘relatively inexperienced’ in foreign affairs. He had ‘shown an occasional
tendency to go beyond his brief, but he responded in friendly fashion to Mr
Khrushchev’s message of condolence’ at Kennedy’s death. Despite his ‘desire for
social reform’, Johnson had ‘firm ideas about the pre-excellence [sic] of the American
Way of Life, and tends to regard it as the only possible form of democracy’. The
analysis maintained that ‘We cannot expect United Kingdom views to obtain the
ready hearing and almost automatic acceptance that the late President gave them.’76
Lord Harlech, the British Ambassador to Washington 1961–65, wrote that Johnson
‘basically has no feeling for world affairs and no great interest in them except in
so far as they come to disturb the domestic scene’. He had ‘little sensitivity to the
attitude of foreigners, as witness a statement of his that on the basis of his globe-
trotting as Vice-President he was convinced that every country he visited the people
would prefer to be Americans’. Harlech doubted ‘whether we shall be fortunate
enough to see the style and intelligence, the gaiety of the Kennedy era reproduced
under Mr Johnson’.77 Nigel Ashton has suggested that Johnson ‘boasted none of
the European social or personal connections of his predecessor. Indeed, it is arguable
in a broader sense that Kennedy was the last of the “European” presidents.’78
There is much truth in these assessments. In May 1965, the Foreign Office noted
that Johnson had no ‘instinctive feeling for Britain. As a Texan there is nothing in
his background that suggests that he should.’79 His ideas about the United King-
dom were generally benign but distinctly limited. Referring to himself in the third
person, he told a journalist in 1965 that:
the United Kingdom has never had a more genuine friend in the White House than
they now have … The President has known since he entered Congress in the thirties
that he thinks the mother country is the rock of Gibraltar, the one great friend we
have in sunshine and sorrow, and it was Churchill’s voice that kept him from being a
slave … He feels a very deep and compassionate and highly respected [sic] interest in
the British people and their system.80
A 1968 Times article by Louis Heren indicated that Johnson was:
a great admirer of the British people. For him it is blood that counts. There is no
substitute and naturally he buys his Hereford cattle from England … He has also
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been known to observe that the island race could work a little harder, but as long as
there is a United Kingdom and a United States relationship his assumption is that
they will be united by a close working relationship. It may be an itty-bitty place, but
that is where his mother came from.81
In practice, Johnson demonstrated scant commitment to a ‘close working rela-
tionship’ with the UK. To him, Britain was but one American ally among many,
an assessment based on calculations of utility and relative power. Harlech’s
successor, Patrick Dean, noted in June 1965 that on the domestic scene Johnson
was ‘a power politician in the sense that he has worked for ends that he calcu-
lates he has the power to achieve’, and had transferred this pragmatic concern
with relative power ‘to the international field’. Hence ‘consultation with his
allies rates below necessary action with his major potential enemies’. Although
Johnson retained most of Kennedy’s foreign policy advisers when he entered
office, his lack of interest in Britain was likely to shape their thinking, regard-
less of their respective personal inclinations. Dean commented that as Johnson
‘has a very powerful personality, it seems more than likely that those of his
entourage who disagree with him either do not speak up or are brusquely over-
ruled’. The Ambassador had been ‘interested to learn’ since he took up his post
‘how much less willing [Robert] McNamara and [McGeorge] Bundy, two very
prominent and talkative members of the Kennedy Administration, are now to
express views which might be thought to be at variance with the President’s
views’. McNamara and Bundy were thus ‘virtually silenced in policy making
meetings at the White House, except insofar as they conform to Mr Johnson’s
ideas’.82 After one of Wilson’s frequent visits to Washington he commented that
it was not worth spending two days with a British prime minister because Brit-
ain ‘was not that important anymore’. Given Johnson’s outlook and the growing
disparity of power between Britain and the United States, the omens did not
portend a close relationship between him and Wilson.
The Wilson–Johnson relationship, 1964–68
The release in recent years of British and American government documents has
enabled primary research on the Anglo-American relationship under Wilson
and Johnson.84 The growing literature includes Sylvia Ellis’s account of the
relationship of the two leaders in the context of the Vietnam War. She argues
that ‘no country’s verbal support was more important’ to American policy in
Vietnam than that of Britain, which was ‘the US’s closest ally’ and ‘a leading
social democratic nation whose example was important, not least to the Com-
monwealth nations and in American liberal circles’. However, the Labour
governments of 1964–70 ‘found it exceedingly difficult to balance the demands
of their transatlantic ally, who during a series of sterling crises was also their
banker, with the outrage in their party and country at American action in Viet-
nam’. Wilson’s ‘hopes for a close working alliance with the Americans, which
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he expressed during his first trip to Washington as Prime Minister, soon came
under threat’. There was ‘no personal chemistry or ideological common ground
between Wilson and Johnson … the relationship was not a happy one’.85 Tho-
mas Schwartz confirms that Wilson and Johnson had ‘a very testy relationship
over Vietnam’, but they ‘compartmentalised their relationship and learned to
live with their differences over Vietnam and work together effectively in matters
where they shared a similar outlook’. This period saw ‘an extraordinary degree
of interaction, involvement, and influence between the US and British govern-
ments … with intense US involvement in such matters as the British budget
process and subsequent reciprocal British influence, especially on US approaches
to the alliance’.86 According to Saki Dockrill, ‘the Wilson–Johnson association
demonstrated how close Anglo-American interests became as a result of financial
considerations and the Vietnam War’.87 Dumbrell characterises the mutual deal-
ings of Wilson and Johnson as a ‘complex combination of respect and irritation,
of occasional British sycophancy and American temper, of subtle acceptance of
the unequal power relationship’.88 Despite the growing literature, there remains
scope for a fuller examination of the Wilson–Johnson relationship, a gap that
the present work tries to fill. By exploring the relationship of the two leaders in
the years 1964–68 (in 1964 Labour came to power, while 1968 was Johnson’s
last year in office), it seeks to examine their respective attitudes to the Anglo-
American relationship and to one another; how they approached the matters of
mutual interest and the extent to which their personal relationship was in any
sense a ‘special’ one; and, finally, to chart broader developments in the Anglo-
American relationship. There were several key matters between Britain and the
United States in this period: the Vietnam War, British economic weakness and
the UK’s inability to maintain the traditional ‘great power role’. These were
substantial issues, with the result that other matters salient to the Anglo-Ameri-
can relationship, such as the question of Rhodesia’s UDI from Britain in 1965
and the matter of ‘offsetting’ the cost of British forces in West Germany, are not
addressed.89
As well as a contribution to the historiography of Anglo-American relations,
the work may also be seen in the context of the literature on summit diplomacy,
that is, multilateral or bilateral meetings between international leaders.90 The
Paris Peace Conference of 1919, attended by David Lloyd George, Georges
Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson, was the first summit conference of the twen-
tieth century, and during the Second World War the ‘Big Three’ conclaves between
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill helped to institutionalise meetings between states-
men. In the early 1950s the process was further consolidated by Churchill’s calls
for a three-power gathering to ease the tensions of the Cold War, and before
long it was the case that bilateral meetings (usually held in Washington) had
become integral to the Anglo-American relationship.91 Summits provide leaders
with the opportunity to appraise their foreign counterparts person-to-person and
can offer a means of symbolising close bonds between the countries involved,
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but the dangers include the possibility that the leaders simply may not get along
with one another as well as they might.92
This study is based mainly on government sources, namely material from the
White House (including President Johnson’s taped telephone conversations), State
Department, Foreign Office (FO), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO),
Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) and Cabinet (CAB). Private papers consulted
include those of Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown and
Undersecretary of State George Ball. Memoirs, diaries, including the unpub-
lished diaries of David Bruce, and secondary works are also used. The work is
arranged chronologically, with each chapter exploring a period of the Wilson–
Johnson relationship, and usually culminating in a summit meeting. Chapter 1
considers the seven weeks from Wilson’s election until he went to see Johnson on
7–9 December, a formative period in which Britain cultivated American finan-
cial support and which saw pre-summit diplomacy over the NATO Multilateral
Force (MLF). Chapter 2 covers the summit in detail, examining the diplomatic
exchanges over the Vietnam War, the British commitment East of Suez and the
MLF, as well as the interplay of personality between Wilson and Johnson. Chapter
3 spans the months January–April 1965, looking at the impact on the Wilson–
Johnson relationship of developments over Vietnam, the reemergence of UK
economic difficulties, and Wilson’s second trip to Washington since becoming
prime minister. Chapter 4, covering May–December 1965, assesses the signifi-
cance of an alleged Anglo-American strategic-economic ‘deal’, Wilson’s
‘Commonwealth Peace Mission’ to Vietnam, and another Wilson visit to Wash-
ington. Chapter 5 covers January–July 1966, and considers why the personal
relationship between Johnson and Wilson suffered such strain when the Labour
government ‘dissociated’ the UK from the latest American measures in Viet-
nam, and seeks to explain why Johnson’s regard for the Prime Minister rose so
dramatically with the next summit. Chapter 6 addresses the period from August
1966–September 1967, during which Wilson launched an intense but abortive
effort to initiate peace negotiations over Vietnam, and London announced plans
to withdraw from military bases East of Suez. Both of these issues exerted a
notable influence upon the ties between Wilson and Johnson. Finally, Chapter 7
explores the further impact on these ties of the devaluation of sterling in No-
vember 1967, the British announcement of an accelerated withdrawal from East
of Suez, and of Wilson’s final visit to the White House in February 1968.
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1The approach to the summit
On 16 October 1964, Harold Wilson became Britain’s new prime minister,
when the Labour Party gained power after thirteen years in opposition and by a
slim margin.1 Wilson promptly turned to President Johnson for help in the Brit-
ish economic crisis which occurred soon after Labour assumed power, and he
gained American assistance in obtaining a major bail-out for sterling. Labour’s
handling of the British economic crisis occasioned a great deal of concern on the
part of the President, given the possibility that sterling might have to be deval-
ued or that any rise in the Bank of England lending rate could precipitate a run
on the dollar. There was also concern about the Multilateral Force (MLF), a
matter due to be discussed at the planned summit meeting in Washington early
in December. The MLF was a US-sponsored plan to create a mixed-manned
NATO fleet of surface vessels armed with Polaris nuclear missiles under an
American veto.2 The basic idea was to give West Germany a greater sense of
integration with the Western alliance, lest it seek a more independent and poten-
tially destabilising course; National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy described
the need for a ‘civilised way of keeping the Germans from getting more danger-
ous’.3 However, the project had effectively been on hold until the British general
election, and a variety of military and political opposition meant that the MLF
had garnered little support in the UK from any quarter, and Wilson expressed
the opposition by presenting plans for a diluted version of the project known as
the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). By this means the MLF project might be
disabled without antagonising President Johnson. Several emissaries came from
Washington to London to try to win Wilson over on the MLF, some of whom
tried to exploit his commitment to the White House by asserting that the Presi-
dent was resolutely in favour of the project. However, in a critical meeting the
day before he was due to see Wilson, Johnson’s growing weariness with the
project led him to assert his will over the scheme’s supporters in the State De-
partment. This was a formative period in relations between the Labour govern-
ment and the United States, characterised above all by Wilson’s determination
to secure his ties with the White House, in keeping with his personal inclina-
tions and his view that close cooperation with Washington was fundamental to
British foreign policy.
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The Labour victory
President Johnson had never feared a Labour victory in Britain, but he felt it
necessary to ease any concern in the world at large (especially in financial
markets) about the British ‘socialists’ entering office. Although the news that
China had detonated an atomic bomb and that Khrushchev had been ousted
from power stole the international headlines in the United States, Johnson af-
firmed on television that Labour ‘are our friends, as the Conservatives before
them are our friends, and as governments of both parties have been our friends
for generations’. The response of official Washington to Labour’s success, noted
a Foreign Office assessment, was ‘almost routine and without surprise’. Most
US officials had long ago ‘conquered their earlier doubts about dealing with
socialists on major foreign affairs problems’.4 Johnson telephoned his congratu-
lations to Wilson as soon as the results were out, and suggested that they ‘would
have to meet with each other as soon as possible’, to discuss defence issues.5 The
President had not felt much enthusiasm for contacting the British leader; he was
merely following Bundy’s suggestion to ‘make a phone call suggesting a meet-
ing after the US election, since Harold Wilson couldn’t be kept away from the
White House anyway and the President might as well take the initiative’.6 But
Wilson responded effusively: ‘my colleagues and I are convinced that close
friendship and cooperation between us is just as essential now as it has been in
the past’. He looked forward ‘to continuing the close and confidential commu-
nication which you have already begun and which has existed between succes-
sive Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom’.7
The Labour victory prompted Bruce to assess Wilson’s ‘possible attitude to-
wards Anglo-American negotiations’. Washington would find him, Bruce said,
‘desirous of personally controlling all important aspects of British policy, foreign
and domestic … The charge during the campaign that Wilson was a “one-man
band” was fully justified’. As he was ‘intrigued by the manner in which the American
President is served by a small personal staff, Mr. Wilson is likely to make a small
scale adaptation of it for his own use’. Wilson would have, in the figures of
Patrick Gordon Walker (Foreign Secretary), James Callaghan (Chancellor of the
Exchequer), and Denis Healey (Minister of Defence), ‘appointees on whose judg-
ment in affairs vital to their own departments and to the national security, he will
not completely rely’. Washington should prepare itself ‘for a greater degree of high-
level negotiation with the British than has been our previous experience’. Callaghan,
Healey and Gordon Walker ‘may eventually be replaced by stronger individu-
als’, said Bruce, ‘but for the present their field of manoeuvre will be restricted’.8
Towards the summit
Wilson and Johnson had met in March 1964, when the then leader of the oppo-
sition had visited Washington partly in order to, as Rusk told the President,
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‘enhance his public image in Britain’.9 During the meeting Johnson tried to
browbeat Wilson for the fact that Britain was selling a fleet of British Leyland
buses to communist Cuba.10 The President was never placated on this matter,
regarding it almost as a betrayal by the British. As late as February 1968,
Michael Palliser, Wilson’s Foreign Office Private Secretary, had cause to say
that ‘The President was obsessional about Cuban buses and in any conversation
with anybody about Britain they always came up.’11 But a date had to be set for
the next meeting with Johnson, and after negotiation it was finally arranged
that Wilson would arrive in Washington on the evening of Sunday 6 December,
with the Monday and Tuesday to be spent in talks with Johnson. The US Em-
bassy noted on 4 December that the summit was more important to London
than to Washington. The discussions were ‘regarded by Labour leaders as of
[the] utmost importance to Anglo-American relations and the future of Western
strategic planning and cooperation’.12 In particular, Wilson had long looked
forward to meeting Johnson in the capacity of Prime Minister. Early in 1964,
for example, he told the academic and White House adviser Richard Neustadt
that if Labour won the election:
we assume that the first thing we were to make our numbers one another [sic], that
we make the first visit to establish broad lines of policy which is always done. It was
done very successfully between Macmillan and Eisenhower, for example. And from
that stage on, to work out what the other arrangements would be …13
Wilson gave much thought to how he was going to speak to the President. He
told Bruce on 19 November that he was interested in discussing the problems of
‘political management … and how the British parliamentary system worked’,
as a means of opening up cordial discussions. In addition to the MLF, Wilson
wanted to discuss with Johnson ‘the general question of Britain’s role in the
world’.14 Defence talks at Chequers on 19–22 November15 had ‘highlighted the
fact that Britain was trying … to fulfil three roles – the independent nuclear
deterrent role, the conventional role in Europe, and a world role East of Suez –
without the necessary economic resources’. Knowing how to please the Ameri-
cans, Wilson indicated that ‘the most important role for Britain for the future
would be in the defence of Western interests East of Suez’. He thought that ‘the
President and the Defence Department in Washington would have similar views’.16
His aims for the meeting were grandiose. He sought to make a plea for US–UK
unity which would, he hoped, create an impact like that produced by Winston
Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. Burke Trend,
Secretary to the Cabinet, for example, suggested to the Prime Minister on 2
December that:
the overriding purpose of your visit … is to secure a broad meeting of minds between
yourself and the President on what the world is going to look like from 1965 on-
wards and what the United States and United Kingdom jointly should do about it.
Your object, as I see it, should be to sell to the President the basic philosophy of the
Chequers weekend, your view of the world scene as a whole, both because it is right
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and because it is by worldwide collaboration that we shall preserve, unspoken, the
‘special relationship’.17
Wilson was delighted by Trend’s arguments: he jotted on the margin of the
memorandum that ‘This is the best sense I have seen on this.’ He would keep the
document on the top of his Washington briefs, ‘ready for quick reference’.
British economic difficulties
Britain’s role in the world would depend in large part on the country’s economic
health. David Bruce recognised that Wilson would be ‘confronted immediately
with [the] over-hanging problem of difficult British balance of payment pay-
ments’. According to Bruce, these problems ‘may assume grave proportions,
although much of it now seems suppressed, dealt with by short-term borrowing
and hidden from public eye and consciousness’.19 Bruce also suggested that the
slim Labour majority ‘may impede swift action aimed at eliminating sectors of
the free enterprise system’, but, all the same, Labour’s ‘anticipated proposals for
taxation are awaited with fear in the City’. If there were ‘radical changes … in
fiscal management, as advocated by some of [Wilson’s] advisers, there will be a
further diminuition of confidence, already impaired by a Labour victory, amongst
Britain’s creditors’.20 On 24 October, Wilson confided his worries on such mat-
ters to Johnson, and in doing so he tried to assuage the President’s own concerns
for the dollar. Wilson’s ‘first task on assuming office’, he stated, had been ‘to
undertake … a thorough review of our present financial and economic situa-
tion’. The situation ‘is even worse than we had supposed’, with a ‘probable
deficit on external account for this year which may be as high as £800 million’.
Wilson was therefore ‘determined to take firm remedial measures’, and had
‘considered and rejected two alternative courses of action’. He would not even
refer explicitly to the first alternative, which was to devalue sterling (then set at
a parity of $2.80). Devaluation had been ‘rejected … now, and for all time’. He
also opposed the second option, an increase in the Bank of England lending
rate, ‘in principle both because of its restrictive effect on the economy and be-
cause of its impact on your own problems, especially at this time’, he told
Johnson. The following Monday, Wilson told the President, ‘the government
will be telling the nation what the situation is and announcing an eight point
programme to set the economy moving on the right lines’. The plan’s key mea-
sures were a surcharge on certain imports and various export rebates, despite the
fact that these actions contravened the terms of Britain’s membership of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA). Wilson ‘thought it right’ to tell Johnson
‘what we propose in advance of any public statement, first, because I set great
store by close and continuing co-operation with the American administration over
the whole international field, economic and commercial’. Britain’s measures were
‘essential if we are to have a strong economy as a basis for playing our proper
part in international affairs’ and retaining close bonds with the United States.21
chap1.p65 08/06/2004, 14:3823
24 A ‘special relationship’?
The exigencies of the British economic situation were such that in his letter
Wilson was not consulting but informing Johnson of the measures – so that
‘public statements’ by the US Government about them were ‘necessarily some-
what optimistic’ since it was ‘faced by [a] fait accompli’.22 Yet the President was
pleased that sterling had not been devalued, for the move might cause serious
disruption to the world trading system and undermine the United States’s own
economic position. He believed that devaluation could ‘easily throw the world
economy into the kind of vicious cycle that had been so disastrous between 1929
and 1933’.23 However, in late 1964 Wilson had overrated Johnson’s ability to
help with the British economic crisis, as there was no intimation of any unilat-
eral US government bail-out, which, it can plausibly be suggested, the Prime
Minister had sought from the President. Lord Cromer, the Governor of the Bank
of England, told Wilson on 18 November that ‘a precipitate appeal to the United
States for direct help might prejudice next month’s talks in Washington’.24 In his
dealings with Congress, whose consent would be needed for a unilateral US
Government loan to the British, Johnson gave priority to his ‘Great Society’
programme of social legislation. But the initial British economic measures did
seem to strike the right note in the White House. In a telephone conversation
with the President on 24 October, Bundy expressed satisfaction that London had
made no move to devalue the pound or to increase the Bank rate, and was
pleased that the import surcharge was only a temporary measure: all told, the
British were ‘playing ball’.25 Johnson sent Wilson a brief but supportive letter
(drafted by Bundy) the same day, regretting ‘the recourse to restrictive mea-
sures’ but recognising ‘the need for strong action in defence of sterling’. The
success of ‘protecting the pound … will reinforce the position of the whole free
world’.26 Thus fortified, Wilson responded that his economic plan had ‘been
very well received both at home and abroad’. Most commentators, he said,
regarded it as a ‘sensible start to a vigorous attack on our problems’. Sterling
was ‘already strengthening and the stock market is more than steady’. There
had been ‘a few squeals from overseas, but these are mostly for the record’.27
Despite Wilson’s optimism, the British economic measures produced only a
short-lived improvement. A British analysis noted that ‘the size of the [balance
of payments] deficit and the hostile reception abroad of the import surcharge’
worried financial analysts. Various ministerial statements, including one from
Gordon Walker on 27 October, indicated that the Government had no plans to
raise the Bank rate. This, said the report, ‘seemed to confirm that the Govern-
ment did not intend to deal with the payments problem by restraining domestic
demand’. Reports spread of imminent devaluation, while the budget of 11 No-
vember was not deflationary enough to please the bankers.28 Referring to the
renewed outflow of sterling, on 22 November Johnson suggested to Gardner
Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, that the ‘thing that
kicked it off’ was ‘a billion dollars worth of expenditure’ in the budget, which
‘just scared everybody’. Ackley responded by saying that the British had ‘handled
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it pretty ineptly’, including the fact that Wilson had intimated that the Bank rate
would be raised but then failed to make an adjustment when expected.29 Two
days later, Johnson commented of the Labour government’s indiscretions that it
‘Looks like we ought to get them to quit talking’.30 Wilson told the President on
19 November that sterling had been ‘under strong pressure for several days’,
and that Britain intended ‘to draw at the beginning of next month enough of our
IMF standby to repay the short-term credit we have received from the Federal
Reserve and the other central banks’. Contrary to the Prime Minister’s previous
assurance, it was also necessary to raise the Bank rate. He was ‘very reluctant
to do this since it would run counter to the long-term policies we are developing
for dealing with our basic economic problems’, and knew that ‘an increase in
our Bank rate would be as unwelcome to you as it would be to us’.31 It would
oblige the United States government to do likewise in order to prevent an out-
flow of dollars – Johnson noted in a telephone conversation a few days later that
‘When you agree to pay your investor 7 per cent in England he’s not very
interested in 4 per cent in America.’32
In the letter of 19 November, Wilson told Johnson that ‘if we are to
outmanoeuvre the speculators over the short term and to give our longer term
policies the chance to mature, we need substantial reinforcement for sterling as
rapidly as possible’. The British government therefore intended to ‘approach the
IMF for a further standby of $1,000 million; and we shall greatly value your
support’.33 The Bank rate was duly raised from 5 to 7 per cent on 23 November,
and the lending rate in the United States also had to be raised. Johnson com-
plained on 25 November that ‘our short-term’s gone up from 3.6 to 3.8. Every
time you go up a point it costs us many millions and our interest on our debt’s
going to go way up … money’s going to get tighter and our prosperity’s going to
dip and our tax money’s going to dip, our expenses going up … we got a real
serious thing on our hands’.34 That day Britain took a $3 billion short-term loan
from, as Bruce noted in his diary, ‘European central banks, the United States,
and others, which should be sufficient to put to rout speculators against the
pound’. The United States ‘is providing $1 billion of these credits, a quarter
from the Export-Import Bank, the rest from the Federal Reserve’.35 It was the US
Treasury and the Federal Reserve that made the running to help Britain obtain
the bailout;36 but Wilson bore an exaggerated sense of gratitude to Johnson
himself, telling Bruce that ‘the support of President Johnson and the whole of the
United States Administration … had been absolutely magnificent’. Britain’s fi-
nancial crisis had ‘made clear’ just who were Britain’s ‘friends’. Wilson even
invoked the analogy of nuclear war: the prospect of devaluation was like
‘look[ing] down into the abyss … much as President Kennedy had done in the
nuclear context at the time of Cuba’.37
Some of Wilson’s colleagues disdained his efforts to gain American help for
Britain’s economic problems. Housing Minister Richard Crossman noted in his
diary in January 1965 that ‘By getting Lyndon Johnson firmly on his side [Wilson]
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has convinced himself at least that we can get through without the devaluation
of the pound because we are now built into the American system’.38 Paymaster
General George Wigg recorded in his memoirs Wilson’s argument that to de-
value the pound would transfer Britain’s problems ‘without warning, to the
Americans’, an approach which would have ‘angered President Johnson and
endangered future Anglo-American relations’. Wigg contended that Wilson’s
solicitude about Johnson’s reactions to the British economic measures was a
‘misjudgment’, as there was ‘no sign’ that Johnson ‘ever regarded Wilson’s poli-
cies with the respect they were supposed to have earned’. Wilson’s continued
postponement of the devaluation of sterling until 1967 meant that Britain ‘paid
a high price, a very high price in economic terms, for nothing’.39 But Wilson
was sometimes less confident about the wisdom of refusing to devalue than he
tended to appear. Economist Walter Heller told the President on 19 November
1964 that the Prime Minister had stated ‘somewhat wistfully’ that ‘we couldn’t
devalue on the first day but it was then or never’. Wilson ‘sounded as though he
wishes he’d done it the first day … that would have put [Britain] in a stronger
competitive position’.40 It is clear, though, that Wilson’s desire to avoid devalu-
ation was intimately connected with his interest in close Anglo-American rela-
tions and a continued major international role for the UK.41 In August 1965, for
example, Wilson ‘reminded’ Richard Neustadt of his ‘concern’ for the United
States ‘last October; [sic] Bank rate and devaluation decisions were influenced,
he said, by Johnson’s situation politically’.42 Francis Bator of the National Secu-
rity Council told Johnson in June 1967 that Wilson’s continued opposition to
devaluation ‘reflected, in part, ‘our repeated warnings during the rough period
in 1964–1966 that we regard devaluation as a mortal sin’.43 But while Wilson
was keen to bolster his standing in the eyes of American policymakers there
were concerns in Washington about the economic competence of the Labour
government – in a conversation with Johnson on 24 November Secretary of the
Treasury Douglas Dillon questioned whether Wilson and his colleagues ‘know
what they are doing’.44
The MLF
In the early days of his government, Wilson discussed the MLF, the planned
mixed-manned NATO fleet of nuclear-armed surface vessels, with Denis Healey
and Patrick Gordon Walker.45 In his role as Foreign Secretary the unexciting
Gordon Walker was not likely to upset the Americans nor was he likely to steal
the spotlight from Wilson’s own diplomacy. He stressed to Bruce on 19 October
that ‘The traditional close relationship between the US and the UK would be the
cornerstone of British foreign policy’.46 While in Washington, on 27 October,
the Foreign Secretary outlined the tentative British counterproposal to the MLF,
the ANF. The ANF was a diluted version of the MLF, a ‘nuclear force consisting
of British V-bombers, British Polaris submarines, and in which a mixed manned
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element … which would play a less conspicuous role than originally planned’.
The British would ‘not participate in the mixed-manned MLF element’.47 Later,
Richard Neustadt told Johnson of Wilson’s problems with the MLF: ‘The British
separate the principle of mixed-manning from the principle of the surface force’.
They ‘argue that the force is too vulnerable, expensive, and difficult to man’,
since the fleet lacks ‘popular appeal’ among the armed forces. The ‘British want
the least number of surface ships and the smallest manpower and financial
contribution they can get away with’. But despite the technical arguments, the
main British inhibitions related to Wilson’s domestic position, the analysis noted:
the Prime Minister ‘has set the highest priority on forging a unified government
and a unified party’. So far he had succeeded, but he remained vulnerable: ‘the
surface ship problem could undo much of what has been accomplished’. There
was ‘no influential support for the surface ships in the United Kingdom’. In fact,
there was ‘outright hostility toward the concept from the public (the press), the
military, the Tories, and within the Labour Government, with George Brown,
the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, being the most vehement opponent’.48
The ANF proposal was not badly received in Washington. Bundy told Johnson
on 8 November that the UK proposal represented ‘a much more flexible and
interested posture’ than the one that Labour had taken in opposition.49 At the
defence discussions at Chequers on 21–22 November Wilson soon obtained a
mandate for the ANF.50 However, on 19 November, Trend had told him of the
continued vigorous support in the State Department for the MLF.51 The main
concern was that British failure ‘to participate in the mixed-manned element’
was effectively a form of national chauvinism which ‘could be taken by the
Germans as a form of discrimination – [the] MLF was considered good enough
for Germany but not good enough for the UK’.52 Wilson knew not to disparage
the Germans, because Johnson was especially concerned that West Germany
must be treated equitably in Atlantic affairs. He made this point in an address at
Georgetown University in Washington on 3 December. Oliver Wright, Wilson’s
Foreign Office Private Secretary, told him on 5 December that ‘in this speech
the President was probably trying to set the tone for your visit to Washington’.53
In the run-up to the conference the State Department pushed the case for the
MLF, not least because Johnson himself had indicated in July that it would be
important ‘to move ahead promptly with this major undertaking in the last
months of 1964’.54 On 25 November, Richard Neustadt visited London to speak
to Wilson about the MLF. The Prime Minister told Neustadt that as he and the
President were ‘politicians’, they could deal with one another as such about the
project, pragmatically and with due consideration to one another’s needs. But
all the same Wilson expected a clash with Johnson over the MLF: they were on
a ‘collision course’. At least in the presence of Neustadt, though, he was reso-
lute, saying that he had ‘no intention of tearing up my papers and going home
if the President should respond with a “no”’. He anticipated a similar posture
from the President, who, owing to the United States’s previous declarations of
chap1.p65 08/06/2004, 14:3827
28 A ‘special relationship’?
support for the MLF, could not ‘tear up what the American government had said
before in the past two years’.55 Undersecretary of State George Ball, who visited
London on 30 November, reinforced Wilson’s perception that Johnson was firmly
in favour of the MLF. Wilson lamented to him that he faced ‘political problems
– both domestic, and in the field of foreign affairs’, in contrast to Johnson, who
had ‘smashed’ the opposition in his election. Wilson told Ball that ‘it was popular
to take a Gaullist line in Britain’, so he ‘had to come back from Washington in
a very strong position, not perhaps next week but at least at the end of January’.56
The Prime Minister’s version of the encounter with Ball is more dramatic than
the official State Department record, indicating that, in effect, Ball presented an
ultimatum: he must accept the MLF or face a rift with Johnson. This was an
attempt to exploit Wilson’s personal commitment to the President. According to
Wilson, Ball made it clear that if Britain was going to reject the MLF ‘it would
be better if I cancelled my visit. I said I would begin the negotiations when I
reached Washington, not before.’57
Wilson’s account is overdramatised in order to show his resolution and single-
mindedness against Ball’s pro-MLF zeal, and to demonstrate his resistance to
the implicit threat of damaged relations with Johnson. Yet Wilson’s record that
Ball indicated that ‘it would be better if I cancelled my visit’ if Britain was not
willing to join the MLF rings true, not least because the Undersecretary was a
keen supporter of the mutually reinforcing goals of the MLF and European
political unity. Moreover, Wilson was right to doubt that Ball’s ‘line … had
been authorised by the White House’.58 In his tough message to Wilson, the
Undersecretary did not represent Johnson’s views, who at best saw the discus-
sions of the American emissaries with Wilson as fact-finding missions. George
Brown realised that Ball was overstepping the mark. He wrote to Wilson on 30
November to say that Ball had seen him, to ‘talk chiefly about the MLF’. Ac-
cording to Brown, Ball said that ‘on the authority of the President, he … did not
foresee the possibility of any scheme going forward that did not involve UK
participation in a mixed manned nuclear surface fleet’. Ball elaborated to say
that Johnson ‘would not be interested in any development from your forthcom-
ing talks if the UK did not accept such participation, and that no agreement was
likely … unless this condition was met’. Prompted by David Bruce, who was
present, Ball said that ‘he had not meant to imply that the talks were condi-
tional on our acceptance of this outcome, but he did not really withdraw from
the position he had taken’.59 Pressure from Ball and other figures for Wilson to
give way on the MLF occasioned some criticism in London. Trend argued to
Wilson on 2 December that ‘the recent reconnaissance trips of Neustadt and
Ball … have obscured the wood by highlighting particular trees … advice on
how to handle the President, the present rate of his pulse etc. etc. is useful’ but
‘too much of the recent toing and froing has smacked of lobbying by one interest
or another no less insidious for being less fanatical’. It ‘should be strenuously
resisted’.60
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Johnson and the MLF
On 13 November Nicholas Henderson, Foreign Office Private Secretary to
Gordon Walker, told Oliver Wright of developments in the White House’s han-
dling of the MLF. Chester Cooper, ‘a member of the CIA, who now works with
Mac Bundy in the White House’, had indicated that ‘from now on the White
House staff would be taking a much closer interest than hitherto in the multilat-
eral force, and the responsibility for this subject which [Walt] Rostow and his
co-fanatics in the State Department would be correspondingly diminished’.
Johnson’s ‘interests, experience and preoccupations had inevitably lain in the
domestic field since he became President, but now that he had secured an over-
whelming public mandate it was likely that he would turn his attention to the
foreign field’. The President was ‘thought to want to make an important move
about the Atlantic alliance’. The ‘next few weeks would be crucial ones for him
in shaping a policy’, and Wilson’s visit was ‘therefore most timely’.61 In a meet-
ing at the White House on 10 April 1964, Johnson had warned against trying to
‘shove’ the MLF ‘down the throats of the potential participants’62 – a warning
that seemed to have little impact upon Ball and other State Department advo-
cates of the scheme. In a memorandum of 17 December, Johnson noted the
MLF’s theoretical benefits:
1 … it will lead the UK out of the field of strategic deterrence and thus reduce by one
the number of powers aiming at this kind of nuclear strength.
2 … it will greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the
Germans.
3 … it will advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defence, as
against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents.63
Although he accepted that the MLF might benefit the Western alliance, the
pragmatic Johnson grew less and less convinced that it was worth pursuing. His
ambivalence precipitated a power struggle among his advisers to win him over
on the best approach. Among those advisers Bundy was the most active in dis-
seminating his views. On 25 November, he wrote to Dean Rusk, Secretary of
State, expressing some pragmatic and well-considered views. In an influential
paper, Bundy argued that Johnson should be persuaded to let the MLF ‘sink out
of sight … we should now ask the President for authority to work toward a
future in which the MLF does not come into existence’. It seemed ‘increasingly
clear’, said Bundy, ‘that the costs of success would be prohibitive’. Bundy sur-
mised correctly that Johnson ‘does not feel the kind of personal Presidential
engagement in the MLF itself which would make it difficult for him to strike out
on a new course if we can find one which he finds better’.64
Later, Johnson asked Bundy why Kennedy had been ‘tentative about the MLF’.
Bundy responded that ‘there were different reasons at different times, but in the
last half of 1963 the reasons were, I think, dominated by his feeling that if he
could only get the MLF by major and intense US pressure, it was not worth it’.
chap1.p65 08/06/2004, 14:3829
30 A ‘special relationship’?
Bundy told Johnson that he felt ‘we have not given you a full, fair statement of
the case against pressing hard now for the MLF’, and then went on to outline
some objections to the MLF similar to those he had presented to Rusk, including
the argument that the MLF would ‘make very heavy demands on Presidential
leadership, and there are better things for the President to do’. It was ‘all very
well’ for people such as Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence, to talk of
‘converting the Senate, but the man who will really have to do it is the Presi-
dent’. Even if Wilson said ‘yes’ to British membership of the MLF ‘there will be
further problems of timing and tactics’ and ‘there will still be quite a political
charade to be played out’. Bundy confronted the President with two options: on
the one hand, ‘If you go full steam ahead, you face a long, hard political fight,
a major confrontation with de Gaulle, and the possibility of defeat or delay
which would gravely damage the prestige of the President’. On the other hand,
‘if you go half speed ahead, there will probably be no MLF, but it will not be
your fault alone’. Johnson would have ‘kept to the letter and spirit of the Kennedy
readiness to move if the Europeans wanted it’, rather than simply abandoning
the initiative in the face of British intransigence. There will be ‘plenty of oppor-
tunities for debate, discussion and delay, and for a gradual and ceremonial
burial’, said Bundy, suggesting this course. The President’s ‘wisdom, caution
and good judgement will have the praise of liberals, of military men, of the
British, of the French, and of many Germans – and you will have freedom to
make a different choice later if you wish’.65
Johnson supported these pragmatic ideas about the MLF more than he did
the views of ideologues such as Ball and Rostow. He had never been keen on the
MLF; he had told Bundy that ‘I don’t want to bring any more hands on the
[nuclear] button than we already got if we can avoid it’.66 The President’s politi-
cal savvy and experience gave him other reasons to question the wisdom of the
scheme. On Sunday 6 December, when Wilson was already settled at the British
Embassy in Washington, there was a rambling meeting about Wilson and the
MLF attended by the President, Ball, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and Bruce. Ball
argued that if the President failed to ‘push Wilson hard, this would be a great
surprise … after what the President’s emissaries had said in London’ (Ball was
clearly thinking of his own representations to Wilson). Failure to push Wilson
would ‘confirm’ for the Prime Minister ‘a treasured suspicion that Washington
was not really intent on a success for [the] MLF’. But Johnson was not per-
suaded. He had been ‘reading and thinking hard’ about the MLF, noting that
William Fulbright, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had ar-
gued that there was ‘no need for it’. The MLF ‘would command only a minority
of votes in the Senate’, especially if Britain was ‘dragged’ into the project.
Invoking the analogy of the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations in 1920,
Johnson feared that he might end up ‘in the position of Woodrow Wilson, and
discover that a treaty he had advocated was repudiated by the Congress’.
Johnson’s election victory over Barry Goldwater was ‘a defeat for screw-ballism
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and an endorsement of sanity’ in foreign relations, but it was not enough to
justify pursuing the MLF. He urged his advisers to be more ‘prudent about what
you press me to go for’.67
Johnson certainly had no desire to antagonise Congress over the MLF, as the
support of the legislature was essential for his vision of a ‘Great Society’. Some
leading senators had warned Johnson that:
we are much concerned that instead of cementing the Alliance, the MLF might create
further rifts and tensions within it … the proposal could at best be an Anglo-Ger-
man-American force. But with the Labour Party in staunch opposition … British
participation is at least uncertain. To coerce Great Britain into participation out of
fear of a German–American pact is hardly consistent with an Alliance of sovereign
and friendly states sensitive to mutual interests and viewpoints. Alternatively, with-
out British participation, the MLF would become a German–American force whose
potential implications would decidedly be drastic.68
In the 6 December meeting, Johnson upbraided his advisers, saying that nobody
outside the administration ‘from right to left’ of the political spectrum at home
or abroad wanted the MLF: the ‘French weren’t for it; the Italian position was
obscure; and the British weren’t for it … one cannot push a thing if everyone’s
against it’, he said. Johnson did not intend to have ‘a showdown’ with Wilson
because if the Prime Minister and his European counterparts did not support the
MLF, ‘then to hell with it’. However, the President would at first try to get
Wilson to accept: ‘He’ll say no and then we’ll shove him a bit and agree that
both have to talk with the Germans’, who would not support the British ANF
proposals.69 Johnson had turned away from the MLF irrevocably, and the meet-
ings with Wilson would surely reflect this.
American reservations towards Wilson
There was little enthusiasm in Washington for Wilson’s visit. Richard Neustadt
wrote that he expected the Prime Minister to ‘arrive … with recollections of the
Anglo-American relationship and hopes for his own personal relationship which
are quite different from perceptions of reality held by many American offi-
cials’,70 who regarded the ties between Britain and the United States in purely
functional rather than sentimental terms. On 29 November, Neustadt told Derek
Mitchell, Wilson’s principal private secretary, that ‘the Prime Minister should
not bank on everything going his way when he got face to face with the Presi-
dent’. Although there was much goodwill in Washington ‘towards the UK and
its representatives’, Johnson was ‘not looking forward to the talks with anything
approaching the same eagerness as the Prime Minister’. The President had ‘many
other problems on his mind, for example Southeast Asia and a number of per-
sonnel matters. Thus preoccupied he looked forward to next weekend as more
of a chore than a major act of policy’.71 The White House understood, said
Neustadt:
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that the Prime Minister had received a strong impression from his personal meeting
with the President which he had when he was leader of the Opposition; and that he
had been moved by the warmth of the message which was sent to him when he took
up office. But the President himself had not the same recollection of the earlier meeting
and the warm message of greeting was no more than the result of an instruction to
officials to draft a warm message of greeting.72
No one in Washington was ‘quite sure what kind of treatment the President
would offer’. It might be the ‘overwhelming friendliness treatment’, either ‘genuine
or simulated’. It could also be the ‘arm around the shoulder, talking eyeball-to-
eyeball treatment’. In this approach ‘the President’s gaze usually went through
the other persons head’. Alternatively, Johnson could dispense the ‘Gary Cooper
Treatment’, rocking back and forth in his chair and listening ‘with such gruel-
ling patience that his opponent was usually driven into the sands of silence’.
Regardless of Johnson’s personal approach, the White House feared that Wilson
would “do a Macmillan” on the President; that is to say, that he would lead the
President up the garden path in the way that his predecessor had been led up the
garden path over Skybolt’ in 1962 – the view was that in the run-up to the
Nassau conference Macmillan played up the crisis caused by the American
cancellation of Skybolt in order to put pressure on the Administration, and there
were fears that Wilson might in some comparable way try to exploit the vulner-
ability of the White House on the matter of the MLF. Mitchell responded to
Neustadt by explaining that Wilson ‘assumed he had a personal affinity with
the President and that if he were disabused of this in too rude or unfeeling a way
he might take it very hard’. This could result in ‘a disillusionment about Anglo-
American relations which would be damaging to both parties’.73
On 5 December, Bundy underlined to Johnson the importance of the visit in
the eyes of the Prime Minister. Wilson had ‘staked a great deal on having a
“successful” visit’. As it had been the ‘habit of American Presidents for the last
ten years … to portray all visits of Prime Ministers as “successful” … if Wilson
does not have a success with you, it will be extremely damaging for him’ at
home, especially with his small majority in the Commons. Personal factors
exacerbated the delicacy of the situation: ‘both he and his Cabinet are great
admirers of your Administration, as exemplified at the Cabinet level by
McNamara, and at the political level by your own massive achievement and
victory’ in the presidential election. Yet despite the Prime Minister’s vulnerabil-
ity, Bundy advised the President that Wilson was not to be disparaged, for he
had a number of weapons at his disposal. Remembering the Prime Minister’s
previous associations with the Labour left, but overrating the extent to which
these were authentic convictions, Bundy argued that Wilson was ‘a man whose
background has made him genuinely hostile to conservatives and to many of
the values which Socialists normally attach to our own great industrial society’.
When ‘you joke about Ivy League types’, Bundy told the President, ‘at least
nowadays – you are playing a game’. But when Wilson ‘gets angry at Tories
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and bankers, he is not. You are strong and he is weak, and you have a much
longer experience of real power’. If Wilson came to ‘feel that there was no way
for him to get a success, he might choose to exploit failure and to move in an
emotionally anti-American way’. Wilson’s commitment to Johnson led Bundy
to regard this ‘as a low probability and one which can be prevented entirely by
your own personal dealings with him, but you may want to have it in mind’.74
Prior to the visit, Bruce warned Washington that the Prime Minister was ‘too
steeped in the early fifties, too devoted to outmoded dogmas, too suspicious of
the motives of others. It may well be that he believes in the necessity for class
warfare to extirpate residual privileges’. ‘Certainly,’ argued Bruce, ‘he detests
the Conservative Establishment, and regards bankers, financiers, industrialists
and large landowners as leagued in the desire to oppress the commonality’.75
Equally misplaced was a bizarre report to Bundy from Richard Helms of the
CIA, ‘concerning the rumours current in London of the impending divorce of
Harold Wilson’s personal secretary [Marcia Williams] and its possible political
implications’.76 One writer indicates that Johnson revelled in this hearsay about
Wilson.77 Bruce, however, noted that when discussing the Prime Minister’s im-
pending visit on 30 November, the President ‘made no allusion to what I had
been confidentially told was his prejudice against the Prime Minister, largely
founded on gossip that he had conducted an irregular connection with his secre-
tary’.78 But the salaciousness of the CIA report could only have exacerbated
Johnson’s reservations towards Wilson.
An aide in the administration, Douglas Cater, was concerned that Johnson
should assert himself vigorously over the MLF, otherwise Wilson would exploit
the opportunity to claim himself as a victor in the talks. Cater recognised that
Wilson was keen to present himself as a statesman as well as a politician, and
used as a parallel the alleged opportunism of Harold Macmillan, who:
tried to create an image of himself as mediator and world statesman. He was not
particularly successful – as when he tried to claim credit for getting talks going on the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. But he had to compete with President Kennedy, who
effectively asserted the natural dominance of the United States in Western affairs. The
longer the President delays demonstrating his grasp of the problems of the Alliance
… the greater the chance that Wilson will gain an advantage in the mass media –
possibly even making the President look like a ‘me-tooer’ before he has a chance to
get his own initiative going.79
On 6 December, Bundy advised Johnson to warn Wilson ‘about the destructive
effects of painting [it] his way’, as did Conservative Prime Minster Alec Dou-
glas-Home on the Cuban buses issue earlier that year. The key principle ‘on
every issue should be that it is a matter of exploration and discussion without
decisions’. Thus Wilson could not say that he had torpedoed the MLF, nor would
the United States’s other European allies gain the impression of an Anglo-Saxon
conspiracy to achieve the same end. There was little affection for Wilson in
Washington, but how this attitude would influence the summit meeting would
soon be revealed.
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On 6 December 1964, Harold Wilson, along with an unusually large entou-
rage, travelled to the United States to see President Johnson for discussions about
a number of issues of mutual concern. These included Britain’s military role
East of Suez, the preservation of which the White House urged in support of the
United States’s own role in keeping the peace in Asia. For reasons of prestige
and to strengthen the Anglo-American relationship, Wilson affirmed Britain’s
intention to retain its traditional position as a world power. The second main
topic of the Wilson–Johnson summit concerned the war in South Vietnam, with
Johnson requesting a British troop presence, to support the anti-communist ef-
fort of the United States. As there was no constituency in Britain for committing
troops, and because he wanted to reserve the option for the UK of trying to
initiate peace negotiations, Wilson rejected Johnson’s request. Britain’s partici-
pation or otherwise in the Multilateral Force (MLF) was the final key topic of
the summit. The British maintained opposition to the scheme by putting for-
ward the diluted version of the project known as the Atlantic Nuclear Force
(ANF). Johnson, in order to avoid any impression of an Anglo-American ‘fix’ to
kill the scheme, used the summit as the starting point of a new, more passive and
low-key approach towards the American initiative. Washington would now leave
the matter to be addressed primarily by the Europeans. The Washington summit
was useful to Johnson mainly because it allowed him to impress upon the British
the need for them to retain their traditional ‘great power’ role and also to allow
him to bring the MLF to a conclusion. For Wilson, however, the gathering had
a broader, longer-term purpose beyond pushing the MLF off the agenda: he saw
it as an initial means of creating the closest of ties with the White House.
The summit begins
To exert the maximum impact on the Americans, Wilson is said to have consid-
ered travelling to Washington by warship as Winston Churchill had during the
war, but he realised that such a journey would be too time-consuming, not to
say anachronistic, so he flew instead.1 Upon arrival, Wilson told press reporters
that ‘this will be the beginning of our fruitful cooperation, the beginning of a
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series of discussions which, we hope will lead to the strengthening of the Alli-
ance’.2 But American observers had less faith in the importance of the visit.
News of Wilson’s arrival ranked only second on a major TV news broadcast,
with a report of the impending visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
taking first place. Similarly, some of the American journalists in attendance at
the White House on 7 December appeared less interested in the Prime Minister’s
arrival than in the possibility that Johnson might make a speech to commemo-
rate Pearl Harbor Day.3 Though the direct discussions between Wilson and
Johnson would occupy centre stage, Wilson had felt it expedient to bring a large
troop (at least thirty-five) of supporting ministers, officials and others – mainly
for effect. David Bruce, US Ambassador to Britain, wrote in his diary that the
British delegation ‘consists of almost everyone except hod carriers’.4 Wilson
had brought this large retinue despite the reservations of Lord Harlech, UK
Ambassador to Washington, who had seen the ‘rather formidable list of those
intending to descend on Washington’ and was ‘not quite sure what they will all
do’.5 Duly, Wilson and the President entered the Oval Room for their first dis-
cussions. Meantime, Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Robert McNamara (Secre-
tary of Defence) and other leading members of the Administration entered the
Cabinet Room with Patrick Gordon Walker (Foreign Secretary), Denis Healey
(Defence Secretary) and other members of the British delegation, to begin ‘open-
ing up the various subjects they would want to discuss during the week’.6
In contrast to the general fanfare of the summit there was something almost
conspiratorial about some of the Wilson–Johnson meetings. Bruce noted in his
diary that the principals were ‘closeted alone for an hour or more’ in Johnson’s
private office ‘before they joined the rest of us in the Cabinet room. What they
had said to each other was not disclosed.’7 The verbatim content of some of
Wilson and Johnson’s conversations went unnoted, though there are accounts
which capture the substance of their talks. Many of the private discussions con-
cerned the British political system. Johnson was ‘intensely interested’, as Bruce
had told Wilson, ‘in the problems of political management’.8 Johnson and Wil-
son also discussed more substantial matters. In a telephone conversation with
Bundy at 1.30 p.m. on 7 December, just after he had left the Cabinet Room talks
with Wilson, Johnson presented a frank, blow-by-blow account. In essence, he
had launched a bullying tirade upon the Prime Minister, to make it clear who
was in charge, arguing that ‘there were a lot of problems which did not show in
the US [electoral] returns, especially with respect to international affairs’. The
United States was ‘damned tired of being told that it was their business to solve
all the world’s problems and to do so mainly alone’. So far as the MLF or any
other major foreign policy initiatives were concerned, the President was ‘very
wary of taking any tall dives’.9
He also mentioned Britain’s economic problems, rebuking Wilson for Labour’s
apparent profligacy: ‘the impression which had been created by the British bud-
get [on 11 November], with its heavy emphasis on social security, and the pressures
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created against the pound had combined to make the President’s own budgeting
process very difficult’. The repercussions for the dollar generated by the British
budget were such that although he had ‘originally planned on a budget of $107
or $108 billion’ of public spending ‘now he was forced to think in terms of
$101–102 billion, which would make it very difficult to carry out the programmes
he wanted’. Labour’s budgetary commitments to the welfare state ‘had shaken
us up some’. The President then complained about Wilson’s broken pledge that
he would not raise the Bank rate: the British ‘had made trouble for themselves
and others by sounding as if they did not believe in the instrument of the bank
rate and then using it very heavily and suddenly’ to try to ease the pressure on
sterling.10 Finally, Johnson ‘talked to the Prime Minister about the difficulties
created by his speech on Atlantic nuclear defence in the House of Commons’ on
23 November, when Wilson had described the MLF as a ‘divisive force in Eu-
rope’. Johnson told Bundy that by now the Prime Minister ‘was almost on the
ropes’. Considering that he was himself backing away from the MLF scheme,
Johnson’s attacks on Wilson over the Commons speech were surprisingly heavy.
He also reminded him ‘of the difficulties Sir Alec Douglas-Home had given him
on commenting on Cuban buses from the White House steps’ in February 1964.
Drawing a parallel with this and Wilson’s Commons speech, Johnson said that
this time Wilson ‘had given him trouble ten days before the visit’. He com-
plained that ‘all his best advisers’ had ‘the temperaments of Rhodes Scholars,
dangerously sympathetic to the UK’.11
Britain’s global role
After lunch, and in more measured terms, Wilson and Johnson discussed Britain’s
global defence role, especially the position East of Suez. During the recent crisis
of sterling Chancellor James Callaghan had argued that ‘There would not have
been a sterling crisis if we did not have to bear so much of the burden of defence
abroad. We would have restored our balance of payments if we had not had to
bear this heavy load.’12 Britain’s defence expenditure was increasing, from £1,596
million in 1960–61 to an estimated £2,141 million in 1965–66 and an estimated
£2,400 million by 1969–70.13 Wilson had told Bruce that ‘The defence talks at
Chequers [19–22 November] had highlighted the fact that Britain was at the
moment trying to fulfil three roles – the independent nuclear deterrent, the con-
ventional role in Europe, and a world role East of Suez’.14 Britain spent about
the same on defence as did France or Germany, but their military commitments
were confined mainly to Europe. The United Kingdom carried ‘world-wide com-
mitments on the basis of expenditure which is only one-tenth of that of the only
other country (i.e. the USA) which plays a world role’. This also exacerbated
Britain’s chronic balance of payments problem (£800 million when Labour as-
sumed power), with some £300 million spent overseas each year on ‘defence
and related activities’.15
chap2.p65 08/06/2004, 14:3939
40 A ‘special relationship’?
However, given the American commitment to an international ‘policing’ role,
Johnson and his colleagues were concerned that Britain should continue to main-
tain the world power stance. On the afternoon of 7 December, Rusk informed
Wilson that the UK had an important role in the world, complementary to that
of the United States. Britain, ‘by virtue of both historical and geographical
connections fulfilled a strategic function in many parts of the world which the
United States could not attempt, and because they could do so, even with rela-
tively small forces, the value of their contribution extended beyond the immedi-
ate local impact’. In particular, ‘it had a kind of multiplier effect by enabling
the greater power of the United States to be deployed in areas which might
otherwise be largely inaccessible to it’.16 Johnson underlined the comments. The
importance of Britain’s world role, he said:
had been dramatically illustrated by the manner in which the United Kingdom’s offer
of facilities at Ascension Island had enabled the United States and Belgian Govern-
ments to mount an operation to rescue the hostages in the Congo, an operation
which they would otherwise have found it difficult, if not impossible, to arrange.17
Wilson accepted the American view that Britain should preserve its current
position in defence, telling the Cabinet on 11 December that ‘the most encour-
aging fact about the conference was America’s emphasis on Britain’s world
wide role’.18 But Johnson’s exhortations that Britain should remain in force East
of Suez did not suggest any understanding that Britain’s ailing economy could
not sustain large global commitments; he criticised the social spending of the
Labour government but seemed oblivious to the greater strains imposed on the
British economy by UK spending abroad on defence.
Vietnam
Johnson not only wanted Wilson to maintain Britain’s defence commitments,
but to extend them into South Vietnam. But on 5 December Bundy had told
Johnson that Wilson had little freedom of manoeuvre on the Vietnam War: ‘the
British will find it very, very difficult indeed to increase their commitment in
Vietnam’. Although this had not precluded the President ‘hit[ting] them hard
while Wilson is here,’ it did mean that ‘we cannot expect a definite and affirma-
tive answer’. There was ‘no political base whatever in England, in any party,
for an increased British commitment’. For a decade, Bundy explained, Wash-
ington had accepted ‘a situation in which the British give political support, but
avoided any major commitment on the grounds of their other interests and their
position of co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreements of 1954’. All Wilson ‘could
possibly do at this stage would be a slight enlargement of the Thompson advi-
sory mission and of their police training effort, with perhaps a green light to a
few bold British officers to get themselves in the line of fire as our men do’.
Wilson would have to do this ‘quietly’, as there was ‘no workable basis for a
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public change in British policy at a time when there is no public change in ours’.
The President ‘might press him to go from the current level of seven Britishers to
about a hundred, but we would be lucky to get fifty in this first phase’. ‘When
and if’ the United States opened a ‘second phase and need to land a mixed force
of US and other troops, we might conceivably get a small British contingent
along with larger ones from Australia and New Zealand’. The United States’s
‘own commitment would have gone up and there would be a better case for
asking the British to join in’. But there was, conversely, the problem that ‘if the
British Co-Chairman sends troops in, that might be the trigger, or at least the
excuse, for the Soviet Co-Chairman to help Hanoi’. Finally, Bundy underlined
to Johnson ‘how hard it will be for Wilson to do as much for us in South Viet-
nam as we need him to do’.19
On the question of British defence commitments in Asia, Bundy had also
noted previously and correctly that Wilson’s ‘government (or at least its Minis-
try of Defence) is eager for joint ventures east of Suez, but they have visions of
ships steaming around the Indian Ocean, not of men getting killed in Vietnam-
ese jungles’. Yet a ‘British sacrifice of men is just what we need most’.20 Bundy
was right to argue that the Vietnam War was a matter of growing controversy
in Britain and within the Labour Party. Shortly before Wilson had left Britain, a
group of Labour backbenchers had written to him, worried about alleged Brit-
ish complicity in the American policy of ‘creeping escalation’ in Vietnam, and
proposing that Britain and Russia should re-convene the Geneva Conference.
On his return from Washington the Prime Minister was obliged to ‘nail the lie’
that he was proposing to send British combat troops to Vietnam, and to draw
attention to the summit communiqué of 9 December, which declared, inter alia,
that ‘the President and the Prime Minister recognised the particular importance
of the military effort which both their countries are making in support of legiti-
mate governments in South-East Asia, particularly in Malaysia and South Viet-
nam, which seek to maintain their independence and resist subversion’.21
The State Department noted that President Johnson had a ‘deep personal
concern’ to obtain ‘increased third country contributions’ towards the American
effort in Vietnam from US allies.22 Yet advisers such as Bundy ensured that he
was not insensitive to political realities in Britain. Consequently, on the after-
noon of 7 December he made his request to Wilson for a British troop commit-
ment in Vietnam with relative forbearance: ‘a United Kingdom military presence,
on however limited a scale, might have a significant effect. A few soldiers in
British uniforms in South Vietnam, for example, would have a great psycho-
logical and political difference.’23 The President’s restraint was inconsistent with
his earlier tirade that the United States was ‘damned tired’ of trying to solve the
world’s problems alone, but he was after all seeking a favour from the British.
But Wilson was unable to make a commitment, responding that:
we fully recognised the United States interest, particularly since we faced exactly the
same problem ourselves in Malaysia. We were already providing some reinforcements
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to the United States effort in Vietnam by maintaining the Thompson advisory mis-
sion, by training Vietnamese troops in jungle warfare in Malaysian schools and by
providing police in Saigon. We might be able to increase our effort in these directions
to some extent; but the United States Government must remember that our position
as co-chairman of the 1954 Conference implied that we might find ourselves in a very
embarrassing international position if United States action in Vietnam compelled us
to activate our co-chairman role.24
Wilson noted that Johnson seemed unaware of the extent of the British commit-
ment to the former colony of Malaysia, which Britain was defending against the
territorial predations of Indonesia (‘Confrontation’) – there were some 54,000
British troops there.25 But Confrontation was low in intensity and loss of life
compared to the situation in Vietnam.26 Although in general terms Wilson sup-
ported the American efforts in the former Indochina, he was never inclined to
commit, or ‘sacrifice’, British troops even for a possible collaborative quid pro
quo with the United States East of Suez, because British forces were already
overextended and therefore it was not fitting to undertake new commitments,
however nominal in scale; because there was no support for doing so in the UK;
and due to the UK’s position as co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference.
Yet the Americans were persistent in their entreaties: they tried again the next
day to obtain a British commitment. Rusk indicated that ‘the US was appealing
to a number of countries for assistance, both for its practical effect as well as for
its political impact, to demonstrate to Hanoi and Saigon the degree of free
world solidarity’. But again, the appeal yielded nothing.27 As Wilson later put it
to his Cabinet, ‘We … continued to resist [American] pressure for a United
Kingdom military presence in Vietnam and had merely undertaken to increase
slightly the various types of support facility which we already provided in the
form of training facilities for South Vietnamese troops, etc.’28
Moreover, invoking Britain’s position as co-Chairman would allow Wilson
greater latitude to try to act as an intermediary to help bring peace to Vietnam.
The response also fitted in with the Foreign Office line. A document from the
Foreign Office noted that as well as ‘technical assistance and a small amount of
capital aid’, the British contribution to the American effort was confined to
training Vietnamese policemen ‘in counter-insurgency techniques in Malaysia
and to keep the British Advisory Mission in Saigon’. President Johnson ‘would
obviously like … a token British military force … but we cannot provide this
without violating the 1954 Geneva Agreement ban on the introduction of fresh
troops, military personnel, arms and munitions’. The best compromise might be
to ‘train more Vietnamese in Malaysia; to provide more police officers in Saigon;
[and] to announce publicly that we are doing this as a token of our support for
South Vietnam’.29
On the evening of 7 December, there was a State dinner at the White House,
with, as Bruce noted, ‘a couple of hundred people, of several colours, and many
occupations … the reception was elegant, the dinner even more so’.30 Wilson
commented later that Johnson:
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made the most eloquent, elegant speech about our common Anglo-American links
through many of our citizens’ kinship … through the common origin of our legal
system right back to Saxon times, through Norman law, Magna Carta and the great
battles for the sovereignty of Parliament over the monarchy in Stuart times; our
comradeship in two world wars, and in our efforts to create conditions of lasting
peace following those wars.
But Wilson, as he noted later, had ‘prepared no speech, and had to speak, as
they say, right on’.31 In his impromptu address he used the expression ‘close
relationship’ instead of the established formulation ‘special relationship’.32
The new phrase, probably thought of well in advance of the dinner, suggested
that although committed to close bonds with the United States the Labour
government did not carry the Churchillian baggage of the Conservatives. This
example of verbal dexterity also represented an effort to avoid antagonising
the Labour left and yet it favoured the ‘close’ Anglo-American relations to
which Wilson was personally dedicated. But the speech did not generate any
excitement among Johnson and his colleagues, who had no real emotional
commitment to the ‘close’ Anglo-American relations of which Wilson had
spoken.
The MLF
The morning of 8 December was left open to allow the British party to exchange
notes, but Wilson also used the interlude to lay wreaths at the National War
Memorial and the grave of John F. Kennedy at Arlington National Cemetery.33
Bruce noted that in the meantime on the American side there were:
meetings in the President’s office of a small American contingent, joined by Hubert
Humphrey [Vice-President], who has told the President there would presently be no
chance of getting the MLF approved by the Senate. Mac Bundy, McNamara, George
Ball, Dick Neustadt and I went to the White House War Room to revise a paper
replying to the British paper [on the ANF] delivered to us yesterday. We ate hamburg-
ers, drank coffee, added and deleted phrases. After approval by the President, it was
turned over to the British.34
Wilson’s approach that afternoon was to try to cause doubt and delay by criticising
the American counter-proposals to the formal British outline of the ANF submit-
ted the previous day. These American proposals covered, for example, a range
of technical and political questions, such as nuclear dissemination, voting ar-
rangements and periodic meetings of the defence ministers of the contributing
nations.35 Demonstrating a precise grasp of the issues – a precision verging on
downright pedanticism – Wilson assailed the American counter-response to the
ANF: he ‘had nineteen points to raise in connection with the American paper’.
He asked, for example, about paragraph ten which referred to the United States
‘surrendering its veto on the use of the force’s nuclear weapons in the event of a
politically unified Europe’. He ‘regarded with horror any possibility of the
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emergence of a completely separate European force’, because of its implications
for nuclear non-proliferation.36 He also contended that:
the mixed manned surface fleet issue could bring the Labour Government down.
Even though the Tory Government had given equivocal support to this concept, the
Tories were now ready to bring down the Labour Government on this issue. There-
fore the US position was most important and the British attitude toward the force
would be governed by the permanence of the American veto.37
Johnson listened quietly, and after the discussion he said that he would instruct
his delegation at NATO to enter into full discussions with the British and other
colleagues to prepare a study of what was involved. Johnson had wanted to let
the MLF ‘sink out of sight’, to use Bundy’s words, though without antagonising
the United States’s other European allies by giving the impression of an Anglo-
American ‘fix’. The summit communiqué – presented for the approval of Wil-
son and Johnson at the end of the final meeting at 4.00 p.m. – was especially
bland and non-committal with regard to the MLF. It signified a new low-key
approach on the part of the Americans: the matter had been discussed ‘as a
preliminary to further discussions among interested members of the Alliance’.38
At 6.00 p.m. that evening Wilson gave a reception in ‘honour of the President …
and Mrs. Johnson’ at the British Embassy.39 Two hours later Dean Rusk held a
dinner for the British. Bruce presented in his diary an image of sheer opulence:
‘Good food, good oratory. We had consommé with sherry, filet of sole with
lump crab meat, roast capon with wild rice, cheese, pistachio ice cream and
brandied peaches, consorting with Pinot Chardonnay, Chateau Lynch Bage, Piper
Heidseck 1959, and liqueurs.’40
Soon the MLF was no longer a major issue in the Anglo-American relation-
ship, though its demise was not immediate. The Economist wrote in January
1965 that ‘President Johnson, Mr Wilson and Herr Erhard [of West Germany]
cannot afford just to stand by and blame one another for collective failure [on
the MLF] … the responsibility lies first with President Johnson’.41 Johnson told a
press conference at his ranch in Texas on 17 January 1965 of his continued
interest in the MLF, and on 9 February he told the German Ambassador that had
not agreed with Wilson’s assertion that any ‘favourable views … expressed in
Europe’ about the MLF ‘had been coloured by US insistence’.42 In a telephone
conversation of 11 February, Johnson badgered Wilson, saying that he was ‘still
waiting for the Prime Minister to carry out his agreement’ in December ‘to go
and talk with the Germans’ about the MLF/ANF. Johnson said he had been
‘very careful not to be domineering, and he had wanted to give the British Prime
Minister time to talk with the Germans on this matter, although he had not
changed his own strong views’ in favour of the MLF.43 This was an odd stance to
take considering that in December Johnson had expressed his disillusionment
with the MLF, but it was in keeping with his desire not to make any obvious
concessions to the British because of the effect that this might have on other
European allies. On 26 February Rusk reminded Johnson of his ‘suggestion in
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December to Prime Minister Wilson that the best next step’ on the MLF ‘should
be discussions among the interested European countries to determine how wide
a consensus could be reached’. Rusk recommended to the President that he send
a letter to Wilson pressing for action and trying to give the impression that the
United States had not abandoned its own project. But Johnson declined to send
any such message.44 Finally, on 11 March Wilson wrote to Johnson about his
recent talks in Bonn. It had become clear, said Wilson, that ‘Erhard was not
going to have anything to do with nuclear matters this side of the German
elections … I would judge that there is no progress to be made on this.’ Without
fuss Johnson said that he shared Wilson’s view that ‘the Germans do not want to
do anything serious between now and their election’. He indicated that there
should be ‘a very careful review of the whole problem, so that we can be ready to
move ahead in whatever way seems most likely to be effective after September’.45
Throughout 1965 the MLF gradually became moribund, due to a mixture of
practical and political objections from the European allies, including worries
about nuclear non-proliferation, plus hostility from Moscow. In particular, Brit-
ish reservations, advanced by Wilson and quietly adopted by Johnson during
the British visit to Washington in December 1964, had been the critical blow.
Johnson told a journalist on 29 April that ‘I didn’t shove [Wilson] on the MLF.
All of my advisers said I ought to demand that he move right then and there but
he only had a three man majority, and I tried to treat him like I’d like to be
treated if I were in the same situation … I told him to … talk to the Germans, get
their views and we could work it out’.46 Moreover, Wilson had avoided the
invidious situation outlined by the Foreign Office in August 1964, whereby ‘If
eventually we decide not to join, and the Force nevertheless comes into being,
our influence with the Americans will surely decline’.47
After the summit: Washington
Johnson expressed satisfaction to Andrei Gromyko on 9 December that ‘we now
had the UK discussing the [nuclear weapons] problem with the Germans rather
than Uncle Sam having to indicate any particular conduct’.48 Yet the President
needed Bundy to try to persuade him that the Wilson visit had been worthwhile.
On 10 December, Bundy wrote that ‘A couple of times over the last few days
you have strongly expressed to me your doubts about the value of having Harold
Wilson here. Since I think that this was without doubt the most productive and
useful two days that we have had in foreign affairs since President Kennedy
went to Berlin, I would like to urge the opposite view.’ Bundy stated the ‘nega-
tive fact that there is just no way in the world that a President of the United
States can avoid reasonably regular visits from the Prime Minister of Great
Britain’. If Johnson had ‘said to Wilson that you were unwilling to see him in
December, the reaction everywhere would have been critical’. Meetings with
the British can bring ‘real inconvenience … because there is no way of predicting
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what issues will come up’. The Nassau conference of 1962, Bundy reminded the
President, ‘was not set up to deal with Skybolt, which broke over its head’,
because of the timing of the budget of the US Department of Defence. ‘There
was no such difficulty’ with Wilson, Bundy told the President, ‘because we knew
that the Atlantic nuclear problem would be at centre stage, but the handling of
the matter was certainly difficult’. Prior to the visit Johnson had ‘received a
very strong recommendation to force Wilson to a decision [on the MLF], and
you carefully walked around that and took a different and better course’ of
allowing the matter to be worked out between the British and the Germans. This
was a ‘major achievement’. Firstly, argued Bundy, ‘We have had a very straight
and honest talk with the British … on the hard elements of the problem, and
they have gone off to talk on their own with the Germans.’ This presented the
President ‘as the firm but patient leader of the alliance’.
Secondly, Bundy suggested, Johnson had laid the ‘basis for political educa-
tion and political leadership with Congress as the progress of the enterprise
justifies it’. The Administration had ‘a major problem of communication with
the Leadership and the relevant committees, but we have won time in which to
go about it’. Thirdly, the meetings had ‘forced discussions between you and
your advisers which has for the first time given both you and them a clear
understanding of the problem and the way you want it treated’. Fourthly, ‘From
now on … the progress of this Atlantic negotiation will need your own contin-
ued personal command’. Bundy would ‘make sure that the state of play is before
you at every stage and that every significant decision is signalled as far ahead of
time as possible’. Finally, Bundy concluded that ‘the Wilson meeting has not only
been a modest success in its own right, but a turning point in the process by which
you take the effective command of a major issue of foreign policy’. This was ‘a lot
for two days’, and there was also the ‘fringe benefit that at least a hundred of your
warmest political supporters were given a thank-you dinner of the most fashion-
able sort, because glamour is one thing the British still bring with them’.49
Other observers in Washington had a favourable verdict of the talks. Robert
Schaetzel of the State Department said on 11 December that ‘the general im-
pression was that the visit was highly useful and certainly achieved its principal
purpose’ of helping bring the MLF to a conclusion.50 Ball told a journalist that
Wilson had made a good impression on Johnson: ‘They spent a lot of time just
the two of them together. No-one was involved in that. I think Wilson made an
impression of a highly capable politician and a shrewd man.’ Ball also held the
view that the President was ‘impressive’ in the talks – he showed great percep-
tion of the key issues and exuded ‘a strength that had a big impact on Wilson’.51
(Later, though, he said that while Johnson ‘had been impressed by [Harold]
Macmillan’, Wilson ‘lacked Macmillan’s consummate ability to deal on a friendly
but slightly condescending basis. He wore no patrician armour, was too ordi-
nary, too much like other politicians with whom LBJ had to deal, and Johnson
took almost an instant dislike to him’.)52
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Although they had spent much time together talking ‘man-to-man’, Wilson
had not won over the President. The Prime Minister had undertaken that he
would ‘say nothing outside the White House’ that he had told Johnson inside,53
but the President still feared, in Bundy’s words, that Wilson ‘might be tempted
to put words in the President’s mouth for press purposes or to advocate his
standpoint from the White House steps’; in other words, ‘to sell buses from the
front steps of the White House’ as had Douglas-Home earlier that year.54 Conse-
quently, Johnson asked Bundy to ‘make his position very clear’ to Lord Harlech
in order ‘that there be no misunderstanding of the forbearance and restraint
with which he conducted his discussions of the Atlantic nuclear problem with
Mr Wilson’. Bundy in turn asked David Bruce ‘to say these things to the Prime
Minister, although not on the basis of a direct Presidential instruction’. Johnson
‘wants to be very sure that the Prime Minister does not misunderstand his posi-
tion on the nuclear force problem’. He was a political man who knew what ‘a
close election was like’. It had seemed to Johnson that it would have been ‘un-
fair to force an immediate decision … on a man who has been in power for less
than two months, with a four-seat majority and a very grave economic and
financial crisis on his hands’. The President therefore ‘decided not to force the
pace with the Prime Minister, but rather to allow his advisers to explain Ameri-
can thinking as clearly as they could within a framework which the President
deliberately set as one of discussion and not of decision’.55
Johnson also ‘recognised and understood the importance of giving the British
a free hand in finding out for themselves the real position of the government in
Bonn’ on the MLF. The ‘Labourites have been telling us for a very long time
that we do not properly understand the Germans’, but ‘there is every reason for
the Prime Minister to satisfy himself directly on this point, and if we have been
wrong in our estimate of the Germans, no-one is more interested than we in
finding out’. Meanwhile, ‘the President is gravely concerned by the risk that the
Prime Minister may give others the impression that the US has in any way
backed off in its basic assessment’ of the need for the MLF. Just because ‘the
President himself did not pursue the argument was merely an indication of his
desire not to force the judgement on the Prime Minister now’. Johnson asked
Bundy ‘to emphasise particularly to the Ambassador [Bruce] the very great dam-
age which could be done if the Prime Minister’ overstepped the mark. The
President knew ‘the temptations of debate, and he has already had one painful
experience with a speech of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons’. If
‘the impression should be created in the United States that the Prime Minister
was trying to strengthen his position by seeming to have “won a victory” in
Washington’, the President ‘would find it necessary to take a very different
attitude toward this whole series of discussions’. Bundy surmised in the message
to Bruce that ‘a man in the Prime Minister’s position would be extremely ill-
advised to run any risks of this sort with a sensitive and determined man like
President Johnson’, since the President ‘has plenty of cards to play if this becomes
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a public contest’. Bundy said he would ‘tell Lord Harlech that the President has
shown great restraint in these last days because of his concern to avoid any
appearance of running a power play against a weak opponent’. But if ‘his gen-
erosity is misunderstood, I doubt if it is likely to last’.56 But Wilson did not try to
‘sell buses from the White House steps’ or from anywhere else. Solicitously, he
told Bruce on 8 December that he had ‘thought he had handled his press confer-
ence this morning in a manner to cause no concern’ in the White House.57
After the summit: London
After Wilson’s visit to Washington, most observers, including the President, an-
ticipated that he would face a serious challenge in explaining what he had
agreed to in Washington to the House of Commons in the foreign affairs debate
scheduled for 16–17 December. The Conservatives were ready to attack him for
any undertaking to commit British nuclear weapons irrevocably to NATO whereas
the unilateral nuclear disarmers in the Labour Party would oppose any indica-
tion of British readiness to allow the Germans further access to nuclear weapons
even as part of a multilateral group and subject to an American veto. Wilson
had told the President on 8 December that he ‘expected to have a problem …
next week when there would be a parliamentary debate on foreign and defence
policy’.58 David Bruce was worried about ‘how he will deal with questions
posed him … in the House of Commons Foreign Policy Debate … He will of
course be pressed hard, and crockery may be broken… The opposition … will
query him in hope of extracting replies embarrassing to him and us.’59 But
Wilson’s ‘comprehensive’ report to the Commons on his visit to Washington
was ‘his best performance in this session’, noted the US Embassy with satisfac-
tion. The Prime Minister ‘achieved a statesmanlike level’ of debate and analy-
sis ‘by avoiding controversy and packing a long speech with closely reasoned
analysis’.60 The warnings of the administration had been noted – Wilson did not
try to portray himself as the victor in his dealings with Johnson, nor did he say
anything that might upset the United States’s other European allies. In fact, on 8
December, Wilson had arranged to have the broad outline of what he would say
in the Commons cleared by the Americans.61
While in Washington Wilson had faced no unbending urge that Britain
should join the MLF. He had not been obliged to make any concessions nor had
he antagonised the President by the force of British opposition to the project.
‘Clearly we had won the day’, said Wilson in his memoirs. He noted with
pleasure that:
One 1964 election myth had been disposed of: Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s frequent
gibe that Britain under a Labour Government with our distinctive nuclear policy
would never be invited to sit at the ‘top table’. This was because of his obsession with
what he regarded as the ‘independent nuclear deterrent’. In fact our approach, less
obsessional and more realistic, had led to a much warmer welcome at the top table.
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Both sides could feel we had laid down the basis of a satisfactory working relation-
ship for the years ahead.62
(Wilson’s approach to the MLF had in reality not differed much from that of the
Conservative government of Douglas-Home.) Wilson told the respective Prime
Ministers of Australia and New Zealand Menzies and Holyoake on 14 Decem-
ber with similar satisfaction that the talks were ‘conducted in a friendly and
relaxed atmosphere, and I feel that the visit was a really successful one’. The
‘Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary [also] had very useful talks with
their opposite numbers’. The Administration’s talk of the ‘multiplier effect’ of
British policy East of Suez evidently gratified Wilson, since he affirmed the
same idea to Menzies and Holyoake.63 To his Cabinet he presented the summit
communiqué as a token of success, saying that its wording ‘implied that the
United States Government recognised … our right to participate in all major
international negotiations’.64 Wilson claimed at the Labour Party Annual Con-
ference on 12–13 December that his meeting with the President was ‘one of the
most important international discussions since the war’. He assured delegates
that Britain was a fully-fledged partner of the Americans, still wanted at the ‘top
table’, and that ‘we shall be wanted so long as we have anything to contribute’.
At the conference, however, he was obliged to denounce ‘as a lie a press report
that he had entered into a secret agreement’ in Washington ‘concerning British
readiness to participate in the MLF’.65
Wilson’s philosophy of Anglo-American relations
Despite his private doubts about the value of the talks, on 9 December Johnson
sent a glowing letter to the Prime Minister, saying what ‘a pleasure it was for
me to meet with you these past two days’. The meeting ‘was in the long tradi-
tion of the constructive working relationship which has long existed between
our two countries’.66 Wilson was delighted by these comments, which suggested
that he had succeeded in forging close personal relations with Johnson. He
replied the same day he received Johnson’s letter, expressing gratitude for ‘the
warmth of your welcome’, and then outlining his credo for the Anglo-American
alliance: he had ‘long admired the way in which successive United States ad-
ministrations since the war have shouldered the military, political and eco-
nomic burden of the defence of liberty all over the world’. Britain had ‘an
equally essential role to play, complementary to yours, if smaller in scale, ex-
ploiting our particular advantage as the centre of the Commonwealth and as a
member of all three regional alliances and the fact of the British presence from
Gibraltar to Singapore’. Wilson indicated that this presence was ‘no longer for
imperial purposes but simply to help keep the peace, to promote a stable and
just order and to be ready to respond to United Nations calls’. He told Johnson
that he felt ‘much satisfaction to find in Washington that we saw eye-to-eye on
such matters’, and was ‘also gratified to find that both of us viewed the Atlantic
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Alliance as the essential element in our national safety’.67 On 3 January 1965,
Housing Minister Richard Crossman wrote in his diary that Wilson valued his
relations with the Americans far too highly:
in 1964 Harold Wilson was responsible for an overcommitment in overseas expen-
diture almost as burdensome – if not more burdensome – than that to which Ernest
Bevin committed us in 1945, and for the same reason: because of our attachment to
the Anglo-American special relationship and because of our belief that it is only
through the existence of this relationship that we can survive outside Europe.68
But Wilson’s future influence on President Johnson would remain to be seen, not
least because, as the Washington Embassy warned around the same time, Brit-
ain would ‘be increasingly treated on [its] merits and shall be regarded not so
much for who we are as for how we perform’, and ‘our ability to solve our own
economic problems and to bring an end to what seems to the Americans to be a
position of chronic insolvency’. Britain’s ‘unique capability of influencing Ameri-
can policy’ would be a ‘wasting asset unless we handle our own affairs with
considerable skill and attention to the correct priorities’. The Washington sum-
mit was ‘a useful start’, but ‘only a beginning’.69
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January–April 1965
From January to April 1965 the character of the Wilson–Johnson relationship
traversed the spectrum from discord to cordiality. Discord erupted over the Viet-
nam War when Wilson telephoned Washington in the early hours of 11 Febru-
ary to suggest to Johnson an urgent visit to the White House. Wilson later
claimed that he wanted to see the President to try to ensure that there was no
dangerous escalation of American actions. In truth, he was concerned above all
with convincing his critics in Britain – especially those on the Labour left – that
he had some influence over the US President. The request to visit Washington
was dismissed, as Johnson disdained advice from representatives of allied gov-
ernments unwilling to commit troops to Vietnam and realised that Wilson was
basically trying to shore up his domestic position. Subsequently, the White House
regarded the Prime Minister almost as an irrelevance and was little inclined to
consult him on American foreign policy. The President was also concerned in
this period about British economic weakness. He despatched an adviser to Lon-
don to see Wilson to try to investigate and possibly shape the British budget of
6 April so that it would harmonise with the interests of the United States. Wilson
agreed to the US initiative, even though the visit might have caused a political
storm in Britain had it become public knowledge – it would appear that the
United States was dictating British economic measures. David Bruce, the US
Ambassador to London, regarded Johnson’s initiative as a crude attempt to
exploit British difficulties. Finally, Wilson managed to visit Washington, on 15
April. The visit went well, with Johnson giving the go-ahead to investigate the
possibility of peace negotiations with North Vietnam. In these months, then,
Wilson was notably compliant with American wishes and willing to tolerate
poor treatment from Washington. A ‘close’ or ‘special’ Anglo-American rela-
tionship remained of great importance to him, both personally and as a means
of trying to magnify Britain’s influence in the world.
Wilson’s telephone call to Washington, 11 February
On 11 February, Housing Minister Richard Crossman contended that Britain
had put itself ‘in the hands of American politicians’, because of Wilson’s
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determination to ‘recreate the Anglo-American axis, the special relationship
between Britain and America’.1 Although Wilson sought close ties with the White
House, it is clear that if President Johnson wanted any such close relationship it
would be with West Germany. As he told the West German Ambassador on 14
January, ‘There was no-one … who could bring about any division between our
country and … Germany … for so long as he was President’.2 In June 1965,
Johnson told Erhard that ‘he considered Germany the most trustworthy of all
allies’.3 The President’s personal inclinations aside, West Germany was militar-
ily and economically a rising power, in contrast to a declining Britain. For
example, around this time West Germany’s armed forces exceeded those of Brit-
ain, at 430,000 to 425,000.4 On 15 March, Lord Harlech, the outgoing Ambas-
sador to Washington, commented that Britain’s ties with Washington were to
some extent a wasting asset. Although Britain was ‘still regarded as the most
dependable ally of the United States and there is a deep and widespread affec-
tion for us’, Harlech suspected that ‘this may be partly due to the fact that we
are no longer regarded as an equal and therefore as a possible rival’. The UK
had ‘a closer and more intimate relationship with the United States government
than any other country and our views are listened to with greater attention but
we too will be judged increasingly by our performance’. In Harlech’s view, ‘the
myriad of close personal friendships built up at all levels during the war and
immediate postwar years are a diminishing asset and nationals of other coun-
tries, if they care to make the effort, can establish almost equally close con-
tacts’.5 Thus the portents for a close Anglo-American relationship over the long
term were not especially good, and nor were some of the more immediate devel-
opments over Vietnam. In the House of Commons in June 1966, Wilson was
later to explain his attitude towards American involvement in the area: ‘There
are three reasons … why this fighting should cease. The first is because of the
tragedy which this war brings on the people of Vietnam, people who, after 20
years of almost continuous fighting, want to live in peace, to till their farms,
and bring up their children.’ The second reason was that ‘as long as this fighting
lasts there is the danger of escalation to the scale of a land war in Asia, or
possibly something worse’. Finally, ‘because as long as the fighting in Vietnam
casts a cloud over international relationships, the easing of tensions between
east and west, progress in disarmament and progress towards a world agree-
ment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons may be endangered by this poison-
ing of the atmosphere’. But Wilson did not support a precipitate withdrawal by
American forces, because such a measure would have ‘incalculable results, first
in Vietnam. It would have incalculable results, too, over a much wider area
than Vietnam, not least because it might bring with it the danger that friend and
potential foe throughout the world would begin to wonder whether the United
States might be induced to abandon other allies when the going got rough’.6
On 10 February 1965, Wilson learned of an ‘extremely vicious attack by the
Vietcong in the Saigon area, involving the destruction of a club largely used by
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US servicemen’.7 Fearing an exaggerated American response, he discussed the
matter with the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart,8 at 11.30 p.m. that day.
They decided that, in view of the controversy about Vietnam in the House of
Commons, Wilson ‘should fly to Washington to discuss matters with the Presi-
dent’. After consulting the former British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Harold
Caccia, Stewart suggested to Wilson that the Prime Minister ‘should first con-
sult Lord Harlech’. Wilson spoke to Harlech ‘by telephone at 1.00 a.m. on
Thursday February 11’. He ‘explained the parliamentary situation in this coun-
try and the fact that alone of the major powers Britain was appearing to keep
silent over Vietnam and appearing simply to tag along in the wake of the Ameri-
cans’. It was therefore ‘highly desirable that the Prime Minister should be seen
to be consulting the Americans in what they had to do in South Vietnam’, by
means of ‘discussions with the President of the United States’. Harlech took up
the matter with the White House, and at 2.00 a.m. he told 10 Downing Street
that he had ‘spoken to Mr. McGeorge Bundy’, the White House National Secu-
rity Adviser, ‘and that the feeling at the White House was very strongly against
a visit by the Prime Minister: it would smack too much of desperation’. The
United States’s ‘intended action in South Vietnam would be moderate, measured
and strictly relevant to the provocation’. It would look ‘very bad in the United
States if the Prime Minister was thought to be running to give the President
advice or to consult him when American soldiers were being murdered’. Harlech
concluded by telling Wilson that he ‘should certainly not propose going to the
United States unless he had beforehand made personal contact with the Presi-
dent: by personal contact Lord Harlech meant a telephone conversation’.9
With great faith in his personal diplomacy, Wilson made that ‘personal con-
tact’ in order to try to secure a visit. In his memoirs he justified the initiative by
saying that ‘the pressures on the President to escalate the war, if need be by the
use of nuclear weapons’, could mean that ‘his patience might falter and that he
would give way to the hawks in the Administration and Congress, and above
all, in the services’. Also aware of ‘the reaction that would follow in the House
of Commons’, Wilson ‘felt that this was a time for a personal discussion with
him to remind him of the attitude of his friends, and indeed the rest of the
world’. He therefore arranged to telephone the President ‘on the “hot-line” and
got through about 3.30 a.m. our time, 10.30 p.m. Washington time’.10 Wilson
told the President of the ‘high-level of concern in London’ about events in Viet-
nam, and indicated ‘that he would like to come to Washington to put himself in
a better position to deal with that concern’. Johnson refused: ‘it would be a very
serious mistake for the Prime Minister to come over … there was nothing to get
upset about, any more than it would be right for him to get upset about Malay-
sia’. Any ‘visit would be misunderstood here’. The American response in Viet-
nam ‘had been very measured and reasonable … it was not going to be any
different whether the Prime Minister came here or not … it would be a great
mistake for us to jump up and down and fly the Atlantic every time there was an
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issue of this sort’. Wilson spoke of his ‘problems in the House of Commons’, but
Johnson had ‘plenty of problems with his own Congress … it would be a mis-
take for the Prime Minister to try to use the President as an instrument in the
House of Commons’. Johnson had ‘to deal with the Congress every day, but he
did not pull the Prime Minister into it’. He did not ‘see what was to be gained by
flapping around the Atlantic with our coattails out’. Johnson pressed upon Wil-
son, once again, the desirability of British troops entering the war in Vietnam:
‘the US’, said Johnson, ‘did not have the company of many allies’ there. The
United States needed ‘British support’, and if the Prime Minister had ‘any men
to spare, he would be glad to have them’. Wilson returned to the question of a
visit to Washington, but Johnson retorted: ‘Why don’t you run Malaysia and let
me run Vietnam?’ Would Wilson think it wise for the President ‘to announce to
the American press tomorrow that he was going over to London to try to stop
the British in Malaysia?’ The Prime Minister ‘gave way and reassured the Presi-
dent of his own basic support’ for US policy in Vietnam. The conversation over,
Johnson told Bundy to ‘send off a message summarising the current situation to
the Prime Minister’s office’.11
Five years later, in a speech about Anglo-American relations, Wilson re-
turned to his telephone call: ‘Never in the whole history of Anglo-American
relationship, to my knowledge, has either a President or a Prime Minister spo-
ken to the other in language one-tenth as abusive as what concurrently many
English were saying about their Prime Minster, and many Americans about
their President’.12 Johnson’s tirade did not seem to strain Wilson’s basic loyalty
to the White House, but he was stung nonetheless – until the news broke two
days later he had wanted to keep the telephone call secret. On 29 March, Bundy
recorded that Henry Brandon of the Sunday Times had given him ‘quite an
account of Harold Wilson’s thinking’ on Vietnam. Although Wilson had told
Brandon ‘about the telephone talk’ he ‘forbade him to print it’ in case it under-
mined his efforts to present himself as a confidant of the President. Anticipating
that the message would reach Wilson, Bundy told Brandon that the White House
was not impressed when British politicians used Washington ‘as a place for
public criticism of the US in order to please their own political backbenchers’.
Bundy thought that Brandon ‘got the point, and I daresay it will have been in his
Sunday article … This should have some salutary effect’ on Wilson’s desire to
advise President Johnson.13 The Prime Minister’s Foreign Office assistant, Oliver
Wright, suggested on 12 February that Johnson was somewhat limited and heavy-
handed in his dealings with other countries: the telephone ‘conversation … to-
gether with other indications, indicate that the nature of US foreign policy, as
pursued by President Johnson, is likely to be very different (and less helpful to
British interests) than that pursued by President Kennedy’. Wilson had to accept,
said Wright, that ‘the man who is at present at the head of the United States is
basically not interested in foreign affairs’. This meant that he had ‘no particular
vision in his mind of the sort of world that Statesmen should be constructing’,
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and was thus liable to misadventure and unstatesmanlike outbursts. Wright sur-
mised correctly that Johnson was ill-disposed to the advice of foreign leaders: it
was a case of ‘you get on with your problems and I’ll get on with mine’. Yet at
this stage at least Wilson did not find the upshot of Wright’s argument palat-
able: it was suggested that given Johnson’s indifference to the British, the United
Kingdom should seek closer ties with Europe.14 Wright also commented on 12
March that he had recently attended a CIA briefing, the object of which was ‘to
demonstrate the degree of direct North Vietnamese involvement in South Viet-
nam’. For Wright the briefing simply demonstrated, though, that ‘the Ameri-
cans are in a hopeless position in South Vietnam’. They ‘cannot win and cannot
yet see any way of getting off the hook which will not damage their prestige
internationally and the President’s position domestically’. This explained Johnson’s
‘bear with a sore head attitude on the telephone a couple of weeks ago and the
current absence of any Presidential “determination” on American policy in Viet-
nam’. It appeared that ‘with his passion for “consensus”, the President is wait-
ing for domestic opinion in the United States to crystallise’. Wright advised that
it was best not to ‘badger’ the Administration.15 Wilson was in sympathy with
these views, but that did not mean he would ever tell Johnson that the Ameri-
cans were in a ‘hopeless position’ in Vietnam.
Initially, the Prime Minister tried to imply that his telephone call to Wash-
ington had gone well. He told his Cabinet the next day that he had talked for
two hours ‘with the President of the United States and he had explained our
attitude to him’. Wilson failed to mention the dismissive tone with which he
had been received in Washington. He also tried to convey to MPs that he had
real influence over President Johnson. On 11 February, the left-wing Labour
MP William Warbey reiterated the increasingly frequent suggestion to Wilson
that he should:
do what Attlee had done when Macarthur was asking for a nuclear attack on the
Chinese Yalu River power stations – ‘fly to Washington’. [Wilson’s] answer was that
this was not necessary … because there was now a ‘hot-line’ between London and
Washington. He had talked to Johnson on the hot-line today. The impression which
he had intended to convey by this information was that he had talked to Johnson as
Attlee had talked to Truman in 1951 [sic].17
Wilson tried to dismiss Warbey, telling him that Johnson was ‘having difficulty
keeping dissentient Congressmen in Washington quiet’, and ‘the fuss which some
of you are making here is not helping either’.18 Brandon noted in his memoirs
that after ‘that incident’ of Wilson’s telephone call on 11 February, Bruce man-
aged to convince the Prime Minister that ‘it was better to communicate with the
President by teletype, because a man like Johnson to whom reaching for the
telephone was second nature and principally an instrument to pressure people,
did not like others using it to put him on the spot’.19 Indeed, Wilson made few if
any more telephone calls to Johnson, relying on correspondence instead.
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Wilson’s desire for consultation over Vietnam
Wilson was anxious that Washington should keep him informed, even to consult
him, about developments in Vietnam. As well as fitting in with his own propen-
sity for diplomacy, this would help him to deal with those who charged him
with an undue commitment to the United States. The White House at least kept
10 Downing Street informed, though these efforts fell short of consultation. On
11 February, the President sent, via Bundy, an ‘account of the situation and our
current plans’, namely that ‘US and Vietnamese air units will strike two targets
in the Southern Part of North Vietnam’ – some army barracks ‘clearly associ-
ated with the infiltration programme of Hanoi’. The operation had been de-
signed under Johnson’s ‘personal and careful supervision to be prompt, adequate
and measured’. He was ‘determined to give all necessary replies while keeping
it clear at all times that he desires no wider war and that root cause of entire
situation is in the systematic campaign of aggression by force and fraud against
South Vietnam under the direction of the North Vietnamese leadership’. Bundy
told Wilson that Johnson would discuss the ‘whole situation fully with Ambas-
sador Bruce … and asks me to repeat that he welcomes consultation by cable
and telephone any time the Prime Minister thinks it useful’.20
Johnson felt a growing concern about the strength of support in Vietnam
from the United States’s allies. He questioned Bundy, whose subsequent memo-
randum on 16 February indicated that Britain was ‘with us but wobbly on nego-
tiations’. Officially, there was ‘strong public support to date, but privately’
there were ‘pressures to get a negotiating track started’. The ‘British have al-
ways put us on notice that substantial military action would create great public
opinion pressures on them to take a negotiating initiative’. Bundy told Johnson
that he thought they would ‘continue to stand firm in public, but we would need
extremely close consultation at all stages to hold them in line with what we
thought was a wise approach to any question of negotiation’. Despite ‘some
backbench pressure’, Bundy did not believe that Wilson ‘would take any nego-
tiating initiative that he had not fully discussed and cleared with us’. There
were some suspicions, though: Bundy added that ‘the British are in constant
touch with the Canadians and the Indians, and there is always a possibility that
some ill-timed diplomatic initiative would arise from the other two’.21
Domestically, Wilson faced growing pressure over Vietnam. This was all the
more critical in the light of Labour’s narrow majority in the Commons. On 24
February one Labour MP asked Wilson ‘what consultations he had had with
President Johnson on the war in Vietnam, and for a statement on the prospects
of securing a peaceful settlement’. Characteristically, the Prime Minister’s re-
sponse implied real influence over the President, and it also left the MP with
little scope for contention: ‘we have been actively engaged in diplomatic con-
sultations of a confidential nature’. These ‘consultations are still going on, and
I hope the House will understand that it would be unwise to prejudice the results
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of much patient and discreet diplomacy by any premature public announce-
ment’.22 In this guarded but sanguine statement Wilson was referring to Britain’s
tentative and unsuccessful contacts with Moscow on the prospect of reconven-
ing a latter-day version of the 1954 Geneva Conference, which had partitioned
Indochina. He was also referring to the equally unfruitful contact he had with
the Americans. The Labour MP Sidney Silverman tabled an anti-US motion
after the bombing of North Vietnam which had so alarmed Wilson. Addition-
ally, the MP Konni Zilliacus gathered signatures for a telegram of protest which
he proposed to send to President Johnson. On 22 March, it was reported that the
Americans were using napalm bombs and gas in Vietnam. This brought another
anti-US motion, now from the MPs John Mendelson and Tom Driberg.23 Warbey
pressed Wilson for an ‘outspoken dissociation of Britain from what the Ameri-
cans were doing in Vietnam’.24
Pressures of this type confirmed that the Prime Minister’s telephone call to
Johnson on 11 February derived less from a real concern about possible Ameri-
can rashness than domestic political considerations, given Labour’s thin major-
ity in the Commons and the corresponding need to maintain Party unity. Bruce
noted the intense ‘restiveness here, especially in the House of Commons, over
the British Government not seeming to play a more active part in trying to
induce negotiations over Vietnam’.25 Wilson, said Bruce, was ‘under intense
domestic pressure to intervene as mediator in the situation’,26 and was ‘accused
by many British, including a formidable number of moderate Labour parlia-
mentarians, of being a mere satellite of the US, and of subscribing blindly and
completely to policies about which he has not been consulted in advance’.27 On
12 March, Wilson explained to Bruce that when he had discussed Vietnam with
Johnson in December, ‘the British government had agreed to support any American
response that was measured and specifically related to the provocation’. This
situation ‘clearly no longer obtained, and the United States Government had
made the change without consulting their most loyal ally’. This would place the
British ‘in an intolerable position; if it were allowed to continue we should soon
be hearing stories about satellites and the 51st state’. Wilson said that his govern-
ment ‘could live with the originally planned posture of the United States: namely
that of a stick in one hand and an olive branch in the other’. The British ‘could
probably live with any degree of toughening up of United States responses, pro-
vided there was also a public recognition of a readiness to negotiate in parallel’.
But ‘if things went on as they were, they could well lead to the biggest difficulty
between Britain and the United States for many years, possibly since Suez’.28
Clearly, Wilson’s support for the Americans in Vietnam demanded a certain
amount of political ingenuity. On 14 April, George Ball, Undersecretary of
State, told Johnson that British support has been ‘skilfully conducted and stoutly
maintained by the Prime Minister’, even though there was criticism of the ‘close
identification with US policy’.29 Wilson charted a course between satisfying
both Washington on the one hand and the Labour left on the other, avoiding a
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serious break with either. But Labour criticism of US policy in Vietnam
antagonised Johnson. While speaking to the new British Ambassador, Patrick
Dean, on 13 April, he ‘strongly criticised the attitude of the Labour backbench
in Parliament and said that although he was at all times ready to listen to what
his allies had to say, he would not be deterred by purely negative opinion’.30
Johnson had little interest in keeping Wilson fully informed about the situation
in Vietnam, although Wilson told his Cabinet on 4 March that he was ‘in con-
stant touch with the President’.31 Bruce noted on 16 February that his superiors
had told him to ‘avoid seeing the Prime Minister, if this were possible, but if not,
to confine my conversation with him to generalities’. This reticent approach
was because ‘the timing and sequence of our action in Vietnam is still under
discussion … they expect to give me material for a full presentation tomorrow’.
Subsequently, Bruce explained to Wilson, in vague terms, ‘the general tendency
of our present planning’. The Prime Minister affirmed that he ‘would continue
to back the US position’, although he was not sure ‘what it was’. To elicit more
information, Wilson then told Bruce of the President’s ‘telephone message’ on
11 February that the Ambassador ‘would give him a complete summary of
proposed US action’, rather than the scant outline from Bundy. In the absence of
a full summary, Wilson had asked Bruce whether he thought ‘it might be well
for him to communicate directly with the President’ to find out exactly what
was happening. But Bruce, conscious of Johnson’s preoccupation with Vietnam,
tried ‘to advise that he not do so at the present time, but use as a channel his
Embassy in Washington’. The Ambassador thought that it was ‘obvious that
what is most desired here is a statement by the President’ to demonstrate that
Wilson’s views were important to the United States.32
Bruce told the White House of Wilson’s appeal for information about US
policy in Vietnam. Bundy pursued this and on 16 February reminded Johnson of
his obligation: ‘you promised Wilson a memo on our exact position’.33 The
President then told Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to send Bruce an update of
American policy in Vietnam, to be presented to Wilson. The update was general
and unrevealing. It said that the United States was committed to ‘continuing air
and naval action against North Vietnam when and wherever possible … limited
and fitting and adequate’. Washington would make a statement ‘after the next
military action’ – details withheld – to reflect the intensification of the ‘programme
of pacification within South Vietnam’ and the ‘execution of a joint programme
of measured and limited air action against selected military targets’ in North
Vietnam.34 On 5 March, Bruce sent another telegram to Washington trying to
encourage some sympathy with Wilson’s position: ‘Recent private conversa-
tions with British government leaders, including PM and Foreign Secretary,
reveal an increasing concern that US and UK should be able to show movement
toward negotiation on the Vietnam problem’.35
Johnson and his associates were little inclined to take the prospect of negotia-
tion seriously until the United States had consolidated a real military advantage
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in Vietnam, but by then it would be less a case of negotiation than of imposing
a peace on American terms. Johnson agreed, for example, with the view of
former President Eisenhower, whose counsel the White House had sought. In a
meeting of 17 February, Eisenhower told Johnson and his colleagues that:
if we can show a fine record of success, or real and dramatic accomplishment, we
would be in a good position to negotiate. He advised not to negotiate from a position
of weakness. He commented that Prime Minister Wilson of the UK had not had
experience with this kind of problem. We, however, have learned that Munichs win
nothing; therefore, his answer to the British would be ‘not now boys’.36
The phrase ‘not now boys’ therefore summarised Johnson’s approach to the
British on the question of negotiations in Vietnam. Practically the only action
the Americans were prepared to take with respect to the British involved the
language that Wilson should use in the Commons. On 9 March, the Prime
Minister sought American advice, via the US Embassy, on what he should say
about Vietnam in the House of Commons. Philip Kaiser, Bruce’s assistant, asked
the State Department for guidance on the contents of the statement that the
Prime Minister would make that afternoon.37 Later, Kaiser told Rusk that Wil-
son had fully accepted the American counsel, with his statement conforming
‘closely to text agreed with Washington, with Wilson calling for … an end to
North Vietnamese aggression’.38 By demonstrating his solicitude like this to-
wards American sensibilities, the Prime Minister sought to encourage reciproc-
ity on the part of the White House. He recalled to Bruce on 12 March that
‘before he answered Questions on Vietnam in the House of Commons on the
previous Tuesday, he had consulted the United States Government on what he
should say; and, indeed, in response to last minute representations, had changed
the text of his reply’. It would ‘therefore place him in a very difficult position if,
without any consultation, the United States Government were to alter their po-
sition’.39 Wilson’s recital of the American line in the Commons on Vietnam may
have satisfied Washington, but it did not enhance his standing with the Labour
radicals: Warbey described Wilson’s performance as ‘the end’ and accused him
of lying on behalf of the United States.40 After the Commons statement on 9
March, Bruce thought that Wilson deserved an acknowledgement of his loyalty
and compliance. ‘Perhaps’, he asked Rusk, ‘if the President thought favourably
of it, it might be well for him to send a personal communication to the PriMin,
expressing thanks for his support, and stating he expected to keep him closely
advised of his plans’.41 Rusk replied that he could ‘convey to PriMin President
Johnson’s appreciation for the solidarity reflected in Wilson’s statement in Par-
liament and his answers to questions’.42 Bruce did speak to the Prime Minister of
Johnson’s ‘appreciation’, though the ‘personal communication to the PriMin’
that the Ambassador had wanted was not forthcoming – casting some doubt on
the authenticity of Johnson’s gratitude. But the Ambassador’s continued promptings
did encourage some of Johnson’s advisers to realise that British support for the
US in Vietnam should not be taken for granted. Bundy told Johnson on 6 March
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that Rusk and Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence, both felt that ‘to hold
some of our allies we may need to be a little less rigid about “talks” than we
have in the last ten days’. In particular, Wilson had that day ‘been made ner-
vous by one sub-Cabinet resignation and a lot of yammering’ by troublesome
MPs. He wanted ‘to make some explorations toward the possibility of talks,
and to say that they have been in consultation with us’. But this matter was not
urgent, Bundy told the President, because Wilson was ‘safely in Bonn’ where he
was less likely to cause trouble for the Americans than if he was at large in
London.43
Economic diplomacy
During this period the White House continued to be concerned about the strength
of sterling. On 11 March, Johnson told Robert Anderson of the State Depart-
ment that Wilson should ‘quit’ telling him how to ‘concede and yield in South-
east Asia’ and should instead ‘look after his budget’.44 Some of the President’s
advisers wanted him to use his influence to ensure that the forthcoming British
budget was a cautious one. The Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, told
Johnson on 27 March that ‘Sterling has been weak over the past couple of weeks
as the impression has grown that the United Kingdom budget, which is now due
to be presented on April 6, will turn out to be inadequate’. If it appeared ‘that
the British are seriously considering devaluation, it is important that we concert
closely with them, and, if necessary, intercede at the highest levels including
conversations between yourself and the Prime Minister, in order to hold any
devaluation to the $2.50 level’.45 On 30 March, William Martin of the Federal
Reserve suggested to Johnson that he should express to Wilson the concern ‘about
the rumours of devaluation and trouble for sterling which are running around in
the New York market’. The budget ‘should be a tight one, should be recognised
as such’, and the British government should ‘advertise it to be one designed to
achieve confidence in your currency’. Martin advised Johnson ‘that the impor-
tant thing is to let the Prime Minister know of your interest and you might offer
to send Kermit Gordon’, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to London ‘to
discuss the matter in greater detail with him’.46 The President favoured Martin’s
advice that the US Government should investigate the British budget to ensure
that it was a tight one, but he was not inclined to speak to Wilson personally in
case, as he told Dillon on 31 March, it seemed ‘like I’m throwing my weight
around’. The alternative approach of Gordon was a ‘sound’ idea.47
That day, Bundy, now in London, spoke to Derek Mitchell, Wilson’s princi-
pal private secretary, and Oliver Wright in the Prime Minister’s Office, to say
that Johnson ‘would like to propose a visit … by Kermit Gordon so that there
could be close understanding before the budget debate on Tuesday on the politi-
cal as well as the financial level’. Bundy emphasised that ‘the President would
be particularly glad to have an advance notice from the Prime Minister on any
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problem which might lead to a need for US action’. Wilson responded that
Gordon ‘would be most welcome’, and a meeting was set for Sunday lunch.
Bundy noted Wilson’s desire to confer over the ‘hot-line’ directly with the Presi-
dent again – if they could not confer about Vietnam, then they might do so
about the budget. After checking with Johnson, Bundy declined Wilson’s re-
quest, saying that ‘the President was not going to be where he could talk this
evening and his own judgement was that it would be best to hold up a telephone
conversation … until after Gordon’s visit’. Wilson’s ‘failure’, said Bundy, ‘to
come back with more pressure for direct telephone conversations suggests that
he is ready to play it coolly’ in his relations with the President, and to wait until
they met face-to-face.48
The American probing of the British budget could have aroused some contro-
versy in the UK had it been publicised.49 The Foreign Office noted that there was
strictly ‘no publicity’ about Gordon’s visit. There was a ‘cover plan’, however,
that he had been ‘sent to look into questions affecting United States overseas
expenditure and while here had made informal contact with his former Oxford
tutor, the Prime Minister’.50 Derek Mitchell told Bundy on 4 April of the need
for secrecy: ‘by tradition and by necessity and security one has to conserve
complete silence before a budget’.51 However, none of the British seemed to
express any opposition to the American investigations. Wilson certainly did
not, remarking blandly to Johnson he was ‘very grateful to you for arranging
for Kermit Gordon to be in London when we came back’ from talks in Paris.52
On 6 April, Bruce urged in a telegram to be passed on to the President that it
was ‘essential that the US exercise more than usual caution and restraint in
whatever official statement or comment we make initially about the UK bud-
get’. Washington should ‘take care to avoid responding too quickly and too
enthusiastically to the British proposals’, otherwise there might be ‘suspicions
that the US and Britain had jointly planned the budget’.53 More vigorously,
Kaiser contends in his memoirs that Johnson’s action was an attempt to ‘take
insensitive advantage of the disparity of power between Britain and the United
States’, as well as Wilson’s loyalty to Washington. It was ‘a foolish act, an
abuse of the special relationship’, Kaiser wrote, noting that the ‘preservation of
the budget’s secrecy until it was presented to the House of Commons was a basic
political principle’ in Britain. ‘The Embassy was determined’, he added, ‘to
keep Kermit Gordon’s visit secret. Had it become public it might have created a
political storm’.54 The Foreign Office noted that on 4 April Gordon duly ‘spent
one and a half hours with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and they then joined
the Prime Minister for lunch’. The ‘opportunity was taken to give Gordon a run-
down on the Budgetary situation (in general terms)’. He ‘left reassured, and the
reports he will be making when he returns to Washington … will go straight to
the centre’.55
The extent, if any, to which the Americans helped shape the budget can only
be speculated. However, it is certain that the Prime Minister and his colleagues
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had little room for manoeuvre, as Dillon made clear to Johnson on 27 March. If
the budget was lax, then:
the European countries will join in forcing the British Government to choose between
substantial further restrictive action, such as increased sales taxes on consumer items,
or a devaluation of sterling. They have the capacity to do this simply by refusing to
agree to renew the support which they gave sterling last November and which runs
out in May. It had been expected that the United Kingdom would make another
drawing from the Monetary Fund in May for the purpose of paying off the bilateral
support remaining from last winter’s exercise. With an inadequate budget it is doubt-
ful if the International Monetary Fund would, or could, agree to an additional draw-
ing by the United Kingdom.56
A CIA Intelligence Memorandum noted that the British budget of 6 April 1965
was cautious and deflationary, ‘designed mainly to strengthen Britain’s external
position’. It sought to ‘restrict consumer spending, to reform corporate taxation,
and to reduce the outflow of capital’, thus easing the pressure on sterling.57
Certainly the budget did not cause any complaints in the White House. Johnson
told Patrick Dean on 13 April that the British had scored a ‘home run’. He
expressed his appreciation concerning ‘the visit of Mr. Kermit Gordon to Lon-
don … and the very satisfactory report which had been rendered to him on that
occasion’. Johnson had ensured that ‘word had been put round in Washington
and New York that the steps which HMG were taking with regard to their
financial and economic position, and particularly in respect to the budget, were
satisfactory’. Johnson also ‘spoke in high terms of the Prime Minister and the
other Ministers concerned and said that … great progress was undoubtedly
being made by the British government in this field’.58 Some of Wilson’s col-
leagues were less impressed by the budget. George Brown complained to Wil-
son that it was ‘“a soak ’em” package, the only justification for which is that
“experts” somewhere are alleged to have formed the view that there is some
magical figure of additional taxation which will restore foreign confidence and
make sterling strong’.59
The second summit
Despite the rebuff from Johnson on 11 February, Wilson still wanted to visit
Washington, for what would be his second trip there since becoming Prime
Minister. In his memoirs he indicates that the telegram from the Americans
which arrived on 11 February suggested a visit. Yet it would have been incon-
gruous for the White House to make this suggestion, as the President had just
several times dismissed the Prime Minister’s request for a meeting. The tele-
gram made no such reference.60 Wilson himself initiated the trip, circuitously to
avoid a direct refusal, through the British Embassy and on the pretext of a
planned speech in New York. Two weeks after the telephone call, White House
aide Bromley Smith sent a memo to his colleague Jack Valenti, indicating that
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the British Embassy had sent a message to say ‘that the British Prime Minister
will be in New York on April 14 to address the Economics Club on the economic
situation in Britain and, if possible, would like an hour with the President on the
afternoon of the 14th or 15th’. Would ‘the President be in town then and able to
see Wilson? … we believe the President should see him if it is at all possible’.61
Johnson was less than enthusiastic, wondering that since he had seen Wilson in
December ‘it would be enough’ for Rusk to see him.62 Yet the President’s advis-
ers felt that this would cause a crisis of protocol in Anglo-American relations ‘at
the summit’. Valenti told the President firmly that ‘there is no escape from see-
ing Prime Minister Wilson when he is here in April’. As Wilson had himself
‘asked to see the President it would be an affront and an international flap if he
didn’t have this request granted. The Secretary will meet him first and then
bring him in to see you’.63 Johnson had to comply, not least because ‘an interna-
tional flap’ would be more trouble than it was worth.
The President’s reluctance to see Wilson also stemmed from his concern early
in 1965 that a visit might suggest to the world that the Prime Minister was
telling him what to do in Vietnam. Though Johnson had agreed to a visit, he
searched in private for a way of breaking free. On 6 March, he called Ball ‘to
say that he has the feeling he is getting crowded into a corner’ over Wilson’s
visit, in part because of the pressure from some other White House advisers.
Johnson told Ball that as his ‘lawyer’ he ‘should handle it’, and find some means
of escape from the commitment. The President claimed that ‘he had received the
last Prime Minister he wanted to receive’. Johnson was ‘not ready to talk or for
peace machinery or for conferences,’ and he was ‘decidedly not ready to be used
as a floor mat by Wilson as he was used by the French Minister the other day –
or like Lord Home had done on the Cuban trade’ early in 1964. Johnson fulmi-
nated that if he had ‘to get sick and leave town he would do it’ to avoid seeing
Wilson. He mentioned the telephone discussion on 11 February when ‘he (Wilson)
had wanted to come over that night’. Now the Prime Minister was ‘coming on
the 15th [of April] but there would be no discussion of peace negotiations or a
treaty for Vietnam’. Ball agreed that the President ‘could not be an instrument
for helping Wilson with his domestic political problems’, but the Undersecretary
could do little to ease Johnson’s difficulty.64 Johnson told McNamara that he did
not know ‘how to stop this Wilson, but if he thinks I’m going to … let Wilson
use my platform to talk about consulting with him about where to have a
conference, he’s crazy as hell’.65 A few days later Johnson complained that Wilson
was coming ‘to announce from the White House that we ought to have
negotiations’ over Vietnam.66
Johnson’s feelings about seeing Wilson soon became widely known. Bruce,
for example, noted that in London ‘snide remarks are frequent to the effect that
the President does not want to see’ Wilson in April, and these comments took
Wilson’s ‘unvarying acquiescence for granted’.67 In the Sunday Times, Henry
Brandon contended that Johnson’s lack of enthusiasm for foreign visitors derived
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from the fact that while he had an ‘inspired intuition … in domestic affairs, he
lacks the same flair in the foreign field’. While President Kennedy had taken a
lively interest in international affairs and had enjoyed his contacts with foreign
leaders, Johnson felt that little could be learned ‘even from informal personal
contact, that cannot be learned from reading diplomatic cables or the newspa-
pers, both of which he spends a lot of time studying’. Brandon wrote that al-
though the President was thus well-informed about world affairs, he resented the
tactic used by ‘foreign statesmen’ whereby they would visit the United States
‘without an invitation from the White House, under the pretext of honorary
degrees, or speeches’ (as noted, Wilson had lodged his latest request to visit
Johnson on the back of a speech in New York). Johnson regarded these visits to
the United States as a cheap form of proselytising, ‘as an attempt to influence
American public opinion by the back door’. To compound Johnson’s irritation,
said Brandon, ‘it then becomes necessary for him to invite the speaker out of
courtesy to the White House’. There was no escaping this situation without
causing a crisis of protocol. Foreign visitors made great demands on Johnson’s
time, too: if a ‘statesman comes to see him for only an hour or two, the President
has to prepare himself for such a meeting for several hours in advance, because
he does not want to appear uninformed or unresponsive’. The gist of Brandon’s
article was that the President ‘tends to grumble about any unnecessary visitor,
comparing his presence with a visit from his mother-in-law just as he was trying
to get to the ball game’.68 Its humour aside, this was an apt – if understated –
characterisation of Johnson’s reaction to the news of a visit from Wilson. How-
ever, Johnson’s response might have been still harsher had Wilson not tried ‘to
discourage any belief that he is hurrying to see the President about Vietnam’, as
the US Embassy noted on 12 March.69
On 22 March, Bruce lamented that ‘The President has an antipathy for the
Prime Minister’. In particular, Johnson thought that ‘attempts on the part of the
British to insinuate themselves into Vietnamese affairs’ were ‘irrelevant and
impertinent’.70 He believed that Wilson, ‘for his own domestic, political pur-
poses, wishes to capitalise on a supposed close relationship that is non-existent’.
Bruce and Bundy, who was himself not especially enamoured of Wilson, saw
‘eye-to-eye on this situation’, believing that Johnson should at least try to give
the impression of good relations, because ‘The PM needs at least to be able to
portray to his associates, and in the House of Commons, the appearance of an
intimacy and a mutual confidence’. But the ‘intimacy and … confidence’ of
which Bruce spoke was ‘in the President’s view … not a reality’. There was ‘no
room … for lack of conventional courtesies between chiefs of allied states’.71
Bundy again responded to Bruce’s concerns that Wilson’s support for the
United States might falter. He told Johnson on 22 March of the assertions in the
United Kingdom that Wilson ‘has deserted his principles to curry favour with
the President, who in return has let it be known that the Prime Minister will be
an unwelcome visitor in April. The cooler men in the Labour Party’, said Bundy,
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‘as distinct from the left-wing wild men, are said to be losing their patience’.
This was ‘of course a wild misstatement of the existing situation’, because,
according to Bundy, Wilson’s troubles were partly self-inflicted: none of these
concerns in Britain ‘took account of the very great damage which Wilson did to
himself by his outrageous telephone call to you’. It might therefore be expedient
to let the Labour Party ‘struggle with its own political problems on the ground
that Wilson’s troubles are of his own making, not ours’, Bundy suggested. The
difficulty ‘with this course is that since Wilson prefers his own survival to soli-
darity with us, he would be mortally tempted to begin to make critical noises
about us, thus appealing both to his own party and to the natural nationalism of
many independent Englishmen’. This would not, said Bundy, ‘be helpful to Wilson
in the long run, but it would not be helpful to us either’. When the White House
fell out with Prime Ministers, ‘it’s usually portrayed as our fault’. Bundy argued
that the alternative to a public split ‘is to see what is the least we can offer the
British in return for continued solidarity in support of the essentials of our policy
in Vietnam’. David Bruce, noted Bundy, thought that ‘this necessary minimum
is simply that we should join them publicly that there is a full and continuing
exchange of views and of information at all levels between our two Govern-
ments on this important issue’. Then, said Bundy, ‘we can put some parsley out
… about how much we look forward to the Prime Minister’s visit’. In return,
Wilson should ‘undertake not to advocate negotiations and not to go back on
the existing announced approval of our present course of action’. Bruce ‘thinks
this position will not be easy for Wilson, but that he will find it distinctly pref-
erable to a split with us at this time’.72 Despite its evident cynicism, Bundy’s
memo was an honest attempt to ease Johnson’s aversion to Wilson.
To prepare the ground for his visit to Washington, Wilson sent Foreign Secre-
tary Michael Stewart to speak to Johnson on 23 March. Stewart – like his
predecessor Patrick Gordon Walker – supported the idea of a ‘close’ relation-
ship with the United States. He was also a conventional figure who was never
likely to steal much publicity from Wilson’s conduct of international affairs. But
the Prime Minister had some worries about Stewart’s trip. He told him that the
Americans:
should be left in no doubt about the strength of feeling here [on Vietnam] and about
the difficulties which we are facing. There is a danger of widespread anti-American-
ism and of America losing her moral position … Should the President try to link this
question with support for the pound I would regard this as most unfortunate … If
the financial weakness we inherited and are in the process of putting right is to be
used as a means of forcing us to accept unpalatable policies or developments regard-
less of our thoughts this will raise very wide questions indeed about Anglo-American
relationships.73
Though there is no record that anyone in the White House had by then sug-
gested such a ‘deal’, Wilson feared that Johnson would demand unequivocal
British support for US policy in Vietnam, even a commitment of troops, in
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return for US support for the pound. Certainly, Johnson had emphasised that the
United States needed firm allies in Vietnam, and Wilson had courted White
House support for sterling the previous year. Yet despite his dedication to the
United States, Wilson understood that given the political situation in Britain
there were limits to how far he could support the Americans in Vietnam, and,
furthermore, it was unlikely that if it came to the crunch Washington would
ever deny support – within reason – for sterling. The United States had an
interest in so doing, in order to avoid an international financial crisis.74 Thus
Wilson’s concern that the United States would exploit Britain’s economic weak-
ness in this way were exaggerated. Moreover, there is no record that sterling
was even mentioned during Stewart’s visit to the White House.75
However, Johnson and the Foreign Secretary did discuss Vietnam. The Presi-
dent complained later that Stewart had ‘not offered a single practical or helpful
suggestion’ on the matter. He thought it ‘insulting for politicians to come chas-
ing over to see him, to expound for home consumption their condemnatory
statements from the White House steps, unless they had practicable solutions to
offer for American problems’.76 On 23 March, Wilson had asked Stewart to
raise the issue of the use of gas in Vietnam: ‘the American decision to use gas,
even though it be non-lethal, coming on top of the use of napalm has greatly
aggravated the concern felt here in Parliament and indeed more widely. I hope
you will leave the Secretary of State and the President in no doubt at all about
the difficulty into which we have been put.’ Wilson was feeling the pressure of
continued jibes ‘that Her Majesty’s Government is the tail-end Charlie in an
American bomber’.77 While in the United States Stewart did indeed raise the gas
issue, but Bruce’s diary entry for 24 March indicated that by doing so he
jeopardised Wilson’s seemingly low chances for a harmonious meeting with
Johnson three weeks later. Bundy had telephoned Bruce, the Ambassador noted,
‘to tell me to prepare a draft of a possible letter to the Prime Minister, express-
ing the President’s indignation over Michael Stewart having answered a ques-
tion at the National Press Club’ soon after his meeting with Johnson ‘by replying
with a citation from the Declaration of Independence’. Stewart had ‘coupled
British objections’ to the United States’s use of gas in Vietnam ‘with a quotation
about the “decent observance of the opinions of mankind”’. But the American
Ambassador finally persuaded Johnson not to ‘rebuke’ Wilson for Stewart’s ‘de-
linquency’; ‘a great relief to me, for I thought it would be undignified and
unnecessary to do so’, he wrote.78 That day the President told Rusk that it would
have been ‘good’ if Stewart had not visited the United States. He complained
about foreign politicians ‘coming over here and using me as a forum … now we
got Wilson and I don’t know what to do about it, but I just hate to see my allies
destroy me – I’d rather my enemies do it … Everybody just wants to come and
lecture us … giving us hell’.79 Dean reported of his conversation with the Presi-
dent on 13 April that he attacked ‘the complaints made about the American use
of gas, which is not poisonous gas anyway and which the British had used just
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as frequently’. In any case, ‘the British were forced to kill quite a few Indonesian
infiltrators every day and he made no complaint’. His ‘friends and allies should
certainly state their views, but they should not stab him in the back or slap him
on the face (at this point the President slapped his own face quite vigorously)’.80
Gradually, Johnson came to see the gas issue more lightly. He told a journalist
on 29 April that ‘Stewart got off on the gas thing … he joined the Russians a
little bit for propaganda … but after he found out they’d [the British] used it two
or three hundred times themselves he was less critical.’81
Prior to Wilson’s visit, Rusk tried to boost Johnson’s perceptions of the Brit-
ish. The Secretary told the President on 22 March that ‘we have an excellent
degree of understanding and cooperation in crucial foreign policy matters from
the new Labour government in Britain … Anything we can do to maintain this
state of affairs is in our best interests’.82 On 14 April, George Ball praised Wilson’s
political leadership, his loyalty on Vietnam, his efforts to ‘develop a stringent
budget’ and his ‘evident determination … to defend the pound without devalua-
tion’.83 Fearful that relations between Wilson might deteriorate further, Bundy
sent a barrage of messages to Wilson to emphasise the importance of avoiding
… the Douglas-Home error, or the Michael Stewart error’ – in other words, to
ensure that the Prime Minister did not try to score political points at Johnson’s
expense. Wilson did not want anything substantial from the White House, only
to ‘be on visibly close terms with you’, Bundy told the President on 15 April.
Johnson was ‘in the driver’s seat, but my fingers are crossed because I know
whose fault it will be if something goes wrong’.84
On 10 April, Patrick Dean advised that to help strengthen the Anglo-Ameri-
can relationship, Britain should provide more support for the United States in
Vietnam. Johnson and his advisers were ‘very anxious to see a greater partici-
pation on the ground from South Vietnam from America’s Allies, including
ourselves’. Suggestions ‘ranged from provision of British military advisers or
transport pilots … to a British medical team or an expert British team to help in
the handling of the growing refugee problem, or again more police advisers’.
Dean anticipated that Johnson or Rusk ‘will argue that the offer of uncondi-
tional talks and economic aid in the President’s speech’ at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity in Baltimore on 7 April ‘constitute an important contribution to the
search for a peaceful solution for Vietnam’. They ‘may continue that now a
practical demonstration of further help from us, however limited, would be
valuable’. Dean believed that ‘a willingness to consider additional help might
pay quite disproportionate dividends in terms of our ability to influence United
States policies, and I hope that the Prime Minister would be willing to say that
he is at least prepared to see what we can do’. The Ambassador concluded by
saying that ‘help in dealing with the refugee problem might be the most useful
and perhaps the easiest for us to handle’.85 On 13 April, Dean added that Johnson
was ‘still very heavily pre-occupied with Vietnam and has the strongest per-
sonal feelings about it’. He expected that he would ‘take the matter up with the
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Prime Minister’, and advised that Wilson should ‘make it plain, both privately
and publicly how much we abhor and are opposed to incidents like the bomb
attack on the US Embassy in Saigon and the general atrocities perpetrated by
the Viet Cong and their friends in South Vietnam’. This would ensure that Johnson
‘would be a great deal more ready to listen to proposals’ for peace discussions.86
Wilson’s itinerary comprised a visit to the Economic Club of New York on 14
April, to give a speech on the British economic situation, and a trip to see the
President in Washington the next day. In New York, as a ‘Salesman for Ster-
ling’, Wilson succeeded in ‘extolling’ the currency’s ‘positive merits to the Ameri-
can business community’.87 Bruce, now in Washington for the Wilson visit, noted
that the White House was pleased with the speech. The Ambassador also noted
that on the morning of 15 April he and Bill Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs, ‘motored to Andrews Field to meet Prime Minister Wilson
and his Party’. Bruce wrote that Johnson had been ‘fretting over the Wilson
visit, thinking it unnecessary to see him except at lunch, after which he hopes to
leave for Texas’, but, dissuaded from such curtailment, ‘he received the PM
alone, chatting with him in the Oval Office’ for half an hour. ‘Meanwhile, Pat
Dean, Burke Trend, William Armstrong, Derek Mitchell, Oliver Wright and
other Britishers remained with our American group in the Cabinet room’.88
Surprisingly in view of its antecedents, Wilson noted that the meeting was
‘very cordial and friendly … fast moving … largely an exchange of views with-
out seeking any new agreements’. He recorded that the talk began with a ‘friendly
reference from the President about the growing strength of our economic posi-
tion and indeed he was very flattering about the success and standing of the
Government generally’. Johnson felt that Wilson’s speech in New York had
‘done a great deal of good’ in bolstering the status of sterling. His own ‘earlier
anxieties about sterling have now been set completely at rest and he referred
particularly to the visit of Kermit Gordon in this context’. In the ‘course of the
lunch’ Wilson ‘went further with the President into an outline of our domestic
political situation on which he seemed to be very well briefed’. Johnson seemed
‘highly satisfied with the progress of the Government and the toughness of our
decisions in a number of directions’. The President expressed his ‘very deep
appreciation’ for ‘the line we had taken’ on Vietnam. To assure the Prime Min-
ister that he was a man of moderation, Johnson said that he was ‘working along
the lines of the bomb-plus-olive-branch approach which was the centre of his
Baltimore speech’ which had suggested US aid for peaceful development in
Vietnam. This was a ‘3D approach: determination, discussions, and develop-
ment’. The President expressed gratitude, said Wilson, ‘for our immediate re-
sponse’ to the speech, ‘and also earlier for our condemnation of the bombing of
the Embassy in Saigon’. Johnson summarised ‘the agonising decisions’ he had
been obliged to take, ‘the pressures he had been under and said that his line
throughout had been a middle path between those who wanted to use Vietnam
as a jumping-off ground for an all out attack on China, and those who felt that
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the United States should quit Vietnam without conditions’. Wilson noted that
unlike the December summit and the telephone conversation in February, Johnson
did not make ‘any suggestion of our committing troops to Vietnam nor even any
reference to police, medical teams, or teams to handle the flow of refugees’.89
In response to Johnson’s forbearance and candour, Wilson gave him an ‘ac-
count of the political difficulties we had faced’ with regards to Vietnam. To help
ease some of those difficulties, Wilson then spoke of the prospect of peace nego-
tiations, suggesting ‘a joint approach with the Russians as co-Chairmen’. Johnson
consented to a low-key British investigation of possible peace negotiations in
Vietnam, although that is not to say that the White House sought anything other
than to perpetuate its ‘position of strength’ in Vietnam.90 After their talk in the
Oval Office, the two leaders had lunch, along with various Cabinet members,
Congressmen, Senators and members of Wilson’s party and the British Em-
bassy. Bruce said of the meal: ‘Delicious food, California wines, speeches pledg-
ing eternal Anglo-American friendship by the two Chiefs’.91 That day the Prime
Minister also spoke to Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, and a number of White
House economists. Finally, Bruce and Tyler ‘saw the Wilsonites off’ that ‘evening
at Andrews; they seemed pleased with their brief visit’.92
The Prime Minister’s indication that the talks were ‘very cordial and friendly’
was not entirely self-serving – on 16 April Patrick Dean told Oliver Wright that
‘An old friend of mine, who was not directly involved in the talks but who heard
immediately afterwards the views of those who had been present, said last night
to a member of my staff that the President was genuinely very happy about the
way the visit had gone’. When Dean suggested that ‘the speaker might just be
trying to say the right things he roundly affirmed that he meant just what he had
said, and added that he personally was glad because he had earlier had some
forebodings about how it would go’. These forebodings had arisen ‘because he
knew how very sensitive the President was and how quickly he had been an-
gered by the succession of people who … came offering gratuitous advice and
passing moral judgments on his actions and on the American conduct of affairs
generally’. The White House official who spoke to Dean ‘mentioned how op-
portune it had been that a telegram from the American Embassy in London had
come in and been put before the President just before the talks’. This telegram,
from Bruce, ‘reported how stoutly the Foreign Secretary had recently spoken in
support of United States policy, and it doubtless helped to create a good atmo-
sphere at the outset’.93 The durability of the ‘good atmosphere’ between Wilson
and Johnson remained to be seen.
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May–December 1965
The months May–December 1965 saw several developments in the Wilson–
Johnson relationship. The White House feared, in the light of London’s ongo-
ing Defence Review, that economic troubles might compel the Wilson
government to reduce its military commitments East of Suez, leaving the United
States as the only world policeman. This possible scenario worried President
Johnson, with the result that his advisers decided that it would be fitting to try
to impose some sort of ‘deal’ on London – the United States would support
sterling only in return for a British commitment to avoid far-reaching defence
cuts. There is little direct evidence concerning Johnson’s own position on this
arrangement, but it is clear nonetheless that he wanted Wilson to understand
that US support for the pound would be less likely if the British began to
reduce their global responsibilities. However, Johnson overrode his National
Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, who maintained that the United States
should support sterling only if the British committed troops to Vietnam, as
well as maintaining their existing defence commitments: ‘a battalion would
be worth a billion’.1 The President, however, was sensitive to the impression
that might be conveyed if the United States enlisted ‘mercenaries’. Wilson
always denied striking a deal with Johnson, but in truth he did accept the link
between Britain’s defence posture and the ease of securing US support for
sterling. On 17 June, Wilson initiated his ‘Commonwealth Peace Mission’ to
try to bring peace to Vietnam, essentially on American terms. He believed
that he had Johnson’s firm support, but the President was in fact hostile to-
wards the scheme, which he thought might turn out to be an embarrassment to
Washington. The project failed in part because of the perception among the
communist powers that Wilson was merely Johnson’s ‘errand boy’. On 16–17
December, Wilson visited Washington for the third time since assuming power.
The summit went well, not least because he underlined his commitment that
the UK should remain in force East of Suez and affirmed his support for US
policy in Vietnam.
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‘Imperial delusions’? Wilson and Britain’s global role
Upon taking office in October 1964, the Labour government began a Defence
Review, to try to find ways to save money in this regard. It sought to spend no
more than £2 billion on defence by 1969/70 (at 1964/65 defence estimate prices).
The figure was roughly the cost of defence for 1964/65, and meant a reduction
of £400 million from earlier projections for 1969/70.2 NATO and the Far East
were prime candidates for cuts. Commitments in these regions cost ‘£180 mil-
lion and £270 million respectively’, as the US Embassy noted on 11 November
1965.3 A CIA report on 7 June noted that the most expensive of these, the bases
in the Far East, were ‘supportable under ordinary circumstances’ by an economy
with a GNP the size of Britain’s, which stood at ‘more than $800 billion’. How-
ever, the balance of payments deficit, ‘a record breaking $200 billion’ in 1964,
generated ‘apprehensions about sterling devaluation – which might in turn gen-
erate a run against the dollar’.4 In 1964/65 the foreign exchange costs of defence
spending accounted for around 40 per cent of Britain’s balance of payments
deficit on current and long-term capital accounts.5 The British continued to face
the question of ‘whether they can save the pound with a combination of domes-
tic toughness and substantial foreign help or whether in sheer prudence they
must give themselves more leeway by drastically reducing their defence spend-
ing abroad’.6
Wilson wanted to reduce the cost of Britain’s defence commitments, but he
still supported the idea that Britain should continue to play a global role. He
certainly wanted the Americans to appreciate his commitment to East of Suez.
On 14 May 1965, he told Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, and David Bruce,
US Ambassador, that he would rather ‘take half of the British troops out of
Germany than withdraw them from the Far East’.7 Wilson believed that Europe
was unlikely to be the scene of another war,8 and he knew that, given the situa-
tion in Vietnam, the Johnson administration preferred a substantial British pres-
ence in Asia to one in West Germany. As Rusk commented on 22 October, a
‘marginal input by the United Kingdom in NATO is less important than an
input in Southeast Asia’.9 The Foreign Office backed up Wilson’s regard for
East of Suez and close Anglo-American ties. On 12 August, Paul Gore-Booth,
the Permanent Under Secretary, noted American concern about Britain abrogat-
ing its role in the world, which might precipitate ‘a gradual return to isolation-
ism within the United States’. Washington believed that it was ‘an essential
American interest that they should continue, in effect, to play a world-wide
peace-keeping role’, but without the help of major allies ‘there will be a revul-
sion of American opinion against it, with damaging longer term consequences
for American interests’. Because Britain believed that ‘the damage to our own
interests in such circumstances might be even greater, we think it desirable to
seek, within the limits of our ability, to maintain our global role, in association
with the Americans’. Moreover, said Gore-Booth, ‘even if the Americans are
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prepared in the last resort to go it alone, a British withdrawal would inevitably
change the whole nature of our relationship with the United States and drasti-
cally reduce our influence on them’. Britain’s ‘ability to go on acting as a world
power, even if of secondary dimensions and pretensions’ was ‘an essential ele-
ment in our association with America’.10 The Conservative opposition supported
the preservation of the world role, too. The US Embassy noted that after Wilson’s
defence in the House of Commons on 21 December 1965 of the global role ‘the
Opposition did not directly challenge the Government’s view of Britain’s de-
fence role in the future’.11
However, Wilson’s views did not command universal assent. The US Em-
bassy noted on 5 November that there was growing controversy in Britain about
‘the level of national defence commitments east of Suez and the wisdom of
continuing to maintain them in view of allegedly more pressing priorities’. Some
of the criticisms were ‘technical and deal with the kind and degree of relevant
military investment and support’. Critics in the Labour Party attacked ‘other
aspects of the British engagement east of Suez’, arguing that the country ‘can no
longer sustain a role based on “imperial delusions” and call for a drastic cut-
back of east of Suez commitments and order to provide … the means to pursue
a stable balance of payments policy and much needed social reforms at home’.
The Embassy noted that many ‘avowed leftists … oppose the scale and extent of
British commitments on grounds of doctrine and conscience’, while others be-
lieved that Britain should ‘rearrange its defence priorities everywhere if it is to
carry out domestic social and economic aims of more immediate concern to the
British people’. Others saw ‘in reduced international tensions between the West
and the Soviet Union in Europe additional reasons why Britain can afford to
reduce its total military commitments’.12 Some figures in Wilson’s Cabinet also
criticised his attitudes. Noting the Prime Minister’s recent affirmation of support
for the British role East of Suez to Dean Rusk, George Brown protested on 19
May that he disagreed ‘with this strategy both on principle and also in relation
to the claims it would be bound to make on our resources and its consequences
for our balance of payments’.13 Brown felt that British money was better spent at
home, and he complained later that Wilson was committed to East of Suez in
part because of an excessive dedication to the White House: he ‘was now bound
personally and irrevocably to President Johnson and had ceased to be a free
agent’.14 On 17 November, Philip Kaiser at the US Embassy reported the
deliberations in London about the Defence Review, among ‘key Cabinet offi-
cials, senior civil servants [and] military chiefs’. Kaiser had learned from ‘sev-
eral participants’ that Denis Healey, Minister of Defence, felt that ‘numbers of
British troops … should be substantially reduced’ to help save money. ‘East of
Suezers’ had a difficult time, said Kaiser; Wilson, George Wigg [Paymaster
General] and the Foreign Office were the ‘only strong defenders of East of Suez
role’. Healey had argued that there was ‘no real national role for UK East of
Suez and that British [were] liable to be nothing more than hangers-on in [the]
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area’. A number of ‘high officials’ in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Defence had later ‘expressed concern’ to the Embassy about the threat to the
position East of Suez. They ‘genuinely fear [the] erosion [of the] UK’s East of
Suez position and have suggested that the subject of [the] British defence review
would be sufficient justification for [a] meeting between President Johnson and
Prime Minister Wilson sometime in December’.15 Some of those who questioned
the validity of Britain’s global role cited the ‘precedent’ of Britain’s abandon-
ment of Greece in 1947. This had led to Washington’s promulgation of the
‘Truman Doctrine’, by which the United States expanded its global peacekeep-
ing presence and helped to fund the defence effort of allied states.16
An Anglo-American ‘deal’?
Time and again the White House stressed to the British the importance of the
East of Suez role. For example, on 10 June 1965 Patrick Dean, the British Am-
bassador to Washington, told Gore-Booth of the concern of Robert McNamara,
US Secretary of Defence, that ‘the United Kingdom had to regard herself as
having inescapable commitments in the Indian Ocean for at least the next ten
years’. The United States had the ‘military resources to take this part of the
world on, but not the political strength either at home or abroad to do so alone
and without allies. If, therefore, the British withdrew there would be a vacuum
which somebody else would no doubt fill’. The ‘last thing’ that American
policymakers wanted was ‘to find themselves involved with Indonesia at the
same time as they are confronting the Chinese in Vietnam, and we are most
important to them as a political and military buffer’.17 On 20 May, Francis
Bator of the National Security Council sent a memorandum to President Johnson
warning that economic troubles might prompt the British to initiate ‘sharp
changes’ in their ‘foreign political and military commitments’. Washington
‘should expect growing British pressure on us to support troop reductions in
Europe, or take over some of their East of Suez commitments, or to help ease
some of the pressure on their arms and aviation industries’. Although Wilson
had assured the White House that he would not devalue the pound, his measures
of ‘tight money, import restrictions, controls on capital movements and “per-
suasion” to clamp down price-wage-inflation’ could well prove inadequate. The
British faced the ‘big question’, said Bator, of ‘whether they will be able to
protect the pound through a combination of tough domestic measures plus exter-
nal (notably US) help’, or whether, ‘in addition, major cuts in defence spending
abroad will be necessary’. Bator argued that Wilson was ‘too conscious of our
support for the pound and of his reciprocal support for our position on Vietnam’
to try to ‘pressure us very hard or to present us with unpleasant surprises’.
However, there were growing pressures ‘within the government for something
to give’ with regard to Britain’s military presence in Europe or East of Suez.18
Bator’s concerns that Britain might be tempted to shed some of its global
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commitments registered with President Johnson. On 16 June, he told the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler, that as well as investigating the general
question of international liquidity, he should examine Britain’s economic prob-
lems. British weakness was ‘of major foreign policy concern’ to the United States,
said Johnson. He asked Fowler to consider how the United States could ‘arrange
for a relief of pressure on sterling, so as to give the United Kingdom the four or
five year breathing space it needs to get its economy into shape’. Otherwise,
Washington faced the ‘danger of sterling devaluation or exchange controls or
British military disengagement East of Suez or on the Rhine’.19
The President’s worries about British economic troubles gave some of his
subordinates the idea that there was scope to impose some kind of politico-
economic deal on Wilson, to ensure that any British defence measures did not
threaten US interests. On 25 June, Bator asked Bundy, in the approach to a visit
from James Callaghan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘whether we
are prepared … to engage in a purposeful, joint exploration of a possible deal –
which will involve defence, as well as money and commercial policy’. This
‘deal’ would seek to ‘protect the pound, avoid exchange or trade controls, and
maintain the British presence East of Suez and on the Rhine’. Bator argued that
Callaghan’s visit should be used to give Wilson ‘a sense that we are engaged on
his economic problem and that there is some prospect for a deal which will keep
the speculators at bay, and, over the longer term, give him a chance to pull off
his economic programme to get the UK economy into competitive shape’. This
would help ensure that Wilson thought of the United States should economics
force him to consider deep cuts in Britain’s foreign commitments.20 On 28 June,
Bundy tried to prime the President on the question of reaching an Anglo-Ameri-
can understanding. He told him that after discussing ‘the British problem’ it was
‘agreed that we should not make any deals with the British on the pound alone’.
Any arrangement ‘should be put together in terms of our overall interests –
political and economic, as well as monetary’. None ‘of us expects his kind of
deal can be made with Callaghan. It will have to be a bargain at a higher and
broader level’, between the President and Wilson.21 However, at this point
Johnson made no concessions to this approach, which might easily have been
interpreted as an attempt to coerce a loyal and valuable ally. In any case,
Callaghan’s visit to Washington included an hour with Johnson, who proved
‘sympathetic’ towards British economic difficulties, not least because of an ‘aware-
ness of their possible impact on the dollar’.22
The President’s advisers continued to moot the question of a deal. On 29 July,
Bator told Bundy that Fowler, Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defence) and
George Ball (Undersecretary of State), had agreed on roughly the same position
on a quid pro quo with Britain:
a East of Suez and BAOR are sacrosanct (by and large);
b $2.80 is sacrosanct;
c no pre-crisis preventive package is available;
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d an emergency rescue package, in the face of a crisis, must be multilateral – we will
not foot the bill without substantial help from others …
e no multilateral rescue package is obtainable unless the UK takes further steps to
compress internal demand, etc;
f UK troops in Vietnam, while not strictly a necessary condition for us to be
forthcoming on sterling, would greatly improve the odds.23
Bator added that ‘even if we leave out Vietnam … they must under no circum-
stances devalue, or impose comprehensive trade and exchange controls, or cut
back on East of Suez or on the Rhine, yet we will not take part in a rescue
operation unless they are prepared sharply to deflate at home’. Johnson opposed
the devaluation of sterling and any British cutback on global commitments, but
despite the promptings of his subordinates he had yet to show his cards on the
matter of a politico-economic bargain with London. It was thus necessary, Bator
told Bundy, to prepare ‘the President’s mind’ and to get a clear ‘reading on his
priorities’.24 Assuming that Wilson did not ‘come through on Vietnam’, but that
London was ‘prepared to promise to stay on the Rhine and East of Suez’, would
Johnson:
a … prefer to bail out the British with the US putting in the bulk of the money even
if they will not promise the internal measures that are needed to avoid another
crisis a few months later? In other words, are we prepared simply to underwrite
$2.80 indefinitely?
b If not, it is useless to say to ourselves that devaluation is unthinkable. It had better
become thinkable … in the minds of the principals and the President.25
Bator believed that Johnson would rather see the devaluation of sterling than
permit the United States to ‘underwrite $2.80 indefinitely’ without deflationary
measures in Britain. If, however, Wilson ‘makes an absolute objective of $2.80
– then of course we are in the saddle and can impose whatever terms we wish
when he comes for help on a Friday evening’.26
Johnson’s key advisers wanted to use US support for the pound as a lever to
impose terms on the British, but the ‘hawkish’ Bundy wanted Britain to do more
than to keep its existing commitments: he was especially keen that the British
should commit troops to Vietnam. This was despite the fact that economic diffi-
culties made London ill-disposed ‘to conceive of adding anything’ to existing
commitments, compounding ‘their difficulty in responding’ to Johnson’s own
desire for a British flag in Vietnam.27 Knowing Wilson’s desire to deal with
Johnson face-to-face, Bundy told the President on 28 July that the Prime Minis-
ter might seek ‘a private understanding with you’. Any attempt to this end
would be unacceptable, said Bundy, because ‘the British are constantly trying to
make narrow bargains on money while they cut back on their wider political
and military responsibilities’. It made ‘no sense for us to rescue the pound in a
situation in which there is no British flag in Vietnam, and a threatened British
thin-out in both east of Suez and in Germany … a British brigade in Vietnam
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would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for sterling’.28 On 29
July, Ball warned Bundy that any demand for British troops in Vietnam pre-
sented in the context of ‘balance of payments help’ from the US ‘would give the
British the reaction that we are asking them to be Hessions [sic]’. In the face of
Ball’s analogy that Washington would in effect be enlisting mercenaries to fight
in Vietnam, at least on this occasion Bundy conceded that the United States ‘did
not want to be buying troops’, which would look ‘bad from everybody’s point of
view’. However, Wilson needed to know, Bundy asserted, that unless the British
played by American rules Johnson might not ‘even do a short run rescue opera-
tion’ to protect sterling. Bundy repeated to Ball his fear that Wilson might ‘come
to the President through the Treasury and make a money deal without our get-
ting certain satisfaction on some political points’ concerning Britain’s stance in
world affairs.29 Bundy’s concern in this respect indicated that Johnson was less
impressed by the crude notion of a ‘deal’ with Wilson than were some of the
White House advisers.
Johnson, Wilson and the ‘deal’
The documentary record contains few of President Johnson’s direct comments
about a bargain with Wilson. There is evidence, though, of his exasperation
with Labour’s apparent unwillingness to uphold the toughest of measures to
preserve the parity of sterling. He asked Eugene Black, president of the World
Bank, on 5 August:
What can we do about the British pound thing? We’ve told them how far they ought
to go and they won’t do it … then we’re going to have to bail them out. We tell them
we won’t do it except multilaterally but I think we’re going to have to. They know
that we can’t make good on our threats … we can’t walk away from it and I just don’t
know what to do … They got us by the yin-yang. I want some smart fellow like you
to figure how to tell them to go to hell.30
Later that evening Johnson told William Martin of the Federal Reserve that he
had ‘never had any confidence’ in the British ability to handle their economic
difficulties. He was tempted to say ‘we begged you, pled with you, tried to tell
you and you haven’t followed our advice so we can’t help you’. The British
were like ‘a reckless boy that goes off and gets drunk and writes cheques on his
father’. The father honours ‘two or three or four’ of the cheques before ‘call[ing]
him in and just tell[ing] him now we’ve got to work this out or you live off what
you’re making … if you don’t, I can’t come to your rescue any more’. But the
boy just ‘goes home’ and writes another cheque.31 There is evidence that Johnson
finally accepted the view that US economic support, however reluctantly it was
dispensed, could be used to shore up the British commitment to the global role.
His thinking in this regard is reflected in the comments of his advisers. On 28
July, Bator noted Johnson’s belief that anything ‘which could be regarded as
even a partial British withdrawal from overseas responsibilities is bound to lead
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to an agonising reappraisal’, so far as US support for sterling was concerned.32
On 8 September, Johnson indicated that he fully supported the views of George
Ball.33 Ball believed that Johnson should tell Wilson that ‘we are coming to your
rescue on the condition that they [sic] are not going to pull back from their
present commitments’.34 Patrick Dean gathered from a conversation with Johnson
on 12 August that the Americans were ‘prepared to go quite a long way to help
us in our present difficulties, provided that they remain satisfied that we are
ready to continue to help ourselves and do our share in the world’.35
The President did not, however, want to go so far as to try to force Wilson to
place British troops in Vietnam. Johnson was not always a man of great subtlety,
but he realised that if, under these circumstances, Wilson agreed to send men to
Vietnam then the controversy of the US stand there might be inflamed still
further should the facts emerge of the recourse to ‘mercenaries’. Clive Ponting
has indicated persuasively that in rejecting the ‘a battalion for a billion’ ap-
proach, Johnson understood that, given feelings in the Labour Party and among
the British public, Wilson would not be able to commit British troops to Viet-
nam, and to press him to do so might strain his desire to sustain Britain’s global
role and not to devalue sterling.36 In March 1965, Wilson himself said that the
situation in Vietnam created a ‘danger of widespread anti-Americanism and of
America losing her moral position’. If Washington tried to use Britain’s ‘finan-
cial weakness … as a means of forcing us to accept unpalatable policies or
developments … this will raise very wide questions indeed about Anglo-American
relationships’.37 Johnson vetoed Bundy’s efforts to try to force the British to
commit troops to Vietnam. After a talk with the Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend,
on 2 August, Bundy told the President that ‘In accordance with your instructions
I kept the two subjects of the pound sterling and Vietnam completely separate’.38
Bundy’s account to Johnson on 10 September of Ball’s talk with Wilson also
indicates the President’s reluctance to demand British troops in return for Ameri-
can money:
The one thing which [Wilson] was apparently trying to avoid was a liability in Viet-
nam, and you will recall that it was your own wisdom that prevented us from making
any such connection earlier in the summer, although I did once informally say to one
of the Prime Minister’s people that a battalion would be worth a billion – a position
which I explicitly changed later.39
The question of the alleged deal attracted some attention in Britain. Wilson
noted in 1970 that ‘there was a small minority on the extreme left’ who believed
that Anglo-American bonds were ‘not so much a relationship as a cash nexus’.
The ‘legend’ was that ‘short-term monetary accommodation’ was made avail-
able only in return for a secret understanding that Britain would support US
policy in Vietnam’. But according to Wilson the truth was that ‘there was never
any suggestion’ that Vietnam or British troop commitments abroad ‘should be
taken into account when urgently needed economic cooperation was involved’.40
Edward Short, Wilson’s Chief Whip, suggested that during the first Wilson
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government (1964–66) Britain’s ‘reliance on United States support for sterling
forced us to refrain from any overt criticism’ of American involvement in Viet-
nam. Wilson is said to have framed this bargain with Washington even before
the Labour government came to power.41
After studying the available sources at the Johnson Library as well as the
memoirs and diaries of various British politicians, Ponting concluded that in
1965 ‘the Labour government reached a series of “understandings” with the
United States’, which ‘fundamentally shaped both British domestic and strategic
policy’ for the first three years or so of the Wilson government.42 The terms held
that the Wilson government would preserve the parity of the pound, implement
deflationary economic policies at home and maintain Britain’s defence commit-
ments in the Far East in return for American support for the pound.43 Ponting’s
ideas were subsequently adopted by at least one more historian,44 although some
writers were more critical. C. J. Bartlett, for example, argued that ‘While de-
pendence on American assistance in 1964–65 might seem to have left the British
government dangerously exposed to American influence (or even dictation), in
practice it is just as reasonable to argue that the Wilson government was able to
turn American self-interest to its own advantage … In effect, Washington was
subsidising the Wilson government to pursue policies which the latter wished to
pursue in any case.’ American policymakers may also have ‘failed to distin-
guish between genuine British opposition to American demands and a tactical
stance designed to wring aid from Washington’.45 Chris Wrigley has put for-
ward similar arguments.46
The release of more primary source material in recent years has permitted
more substantiated reflections on the Anglo-American ‘deal’. Saki Dockrill has
argued that while there was ‘a tacit understanding on both sides of the Atlantic
Ocean that defence was closely linked to the economy, British officials and
ministers just managed to avoid entering into a formal linkage agreement with
the United States’, not least because it would be impossible to do so while the
Defence Review was in progress.47 John Dumbrell comments that the ‘deal’
‘never attained any formal status, remaining rather at the level of shared under-
standings within a well defined power relationship’.48 Thomas Schwartz supports
these conclusions in his comments that ‘the evidence indicates that the arrange-
ment was more in the nature of a classic “gentleman’s agreement” than an
explicit bargain’.49
In the face of speculation about his commitment to Washington, Wilson de-
nied – correctly – that there was ever any explicit bargain on Vietnam or any
other issue. Wilson told Johnson on 2 August 1965, for example, that ‘I should
be loath … to run the risk of spoiling any chance we may have of fulfilling the
functions which we originally accepted as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Confer-
ence.’ This was Britain’s position, Wilson told the President, ‘when you first
raised the matter with me last December and its advantages for both of us seem
to me to be just as valid, if not more so today’.50 Wilson informed Ball on 9
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September that Britain ‘would not accept an additional demand for a United
Kingdom contribution to Vietnam as a quid pro quo for US Government short-
term support for sterling’.51 He also told Bruce that day that ‘the attitude of the
United States had been made abundantly clear by the fact that at a time when
President Johnson would dearly have liked to see United Kingdom participation
in Vietnam this had never been raised during all the discussions leading up to
the present support operation’.52 David Bruce also denied that there was ever
any Anglo-American deal. He argued that while the Johnson administration
was ‘anxious’ about the possibility of a British withdrawal from East of Suez or
from West Germany, it never told Wilson that, ‘If you will do this, we will help
you, about your foreign exchange problem’.53 On 17 July 1966, Henry Bran-
don, the Sunday Times’ Washington correspondent, wrote to Wilson about the
American desire to frame a deal: ‘a long-term, massive loan in exchange for our
maintaining all our present military commitments in the near future’. Brandon
suggested that Wilson could respond by presenting ‘a bill to the US of what it
would cost Britain to agree to American insistence on maintaining these mili-
tary commitments and ask for some sort of military aid for the duration of
Britain’s economic recovery period’.54 Wilson’s reply evaded the point, saying
little more than ‘we ourselves have been giving a great deal of thought to the
problem of the mechanics of consultation over the whole field of public policy’.55
Yet on other occasions he made clear his acceptance of a tacit connection
between US support for sterling and Britain’s posture East of Suez. On 9 Septem-
ber, Ball told him that ‘it would be a great mistake if the United Kingdom failed
to understand that the American effort to relieve sterling was inextricably re-
lated to the commitment of the United Kingdom to maintain its commitments
around the world’. Wilson admitted that ‘all aspects of the [Anglo-American]
relationship must be considered as a totality in any long-range review of the
United Kingdom defence effort’.56 In a Cabinet meeting in February 1966 he
‘repeated time after time that the Americans had never made any connection
between the financial support they gave us and our support for them in Viet-
nam’, but he added that American ‘financial support is not unrelated to the way
in which we behave in the Far East: any direct announcement of our with-
drawal, for example, could not fail to have a profound effect on my personal
relations with LBJ and the way the Americans treat us’.57 Wilson and Johnson
did not strike any explicit, formal ‘deal’, but the British leader realised that if
Britain began to abrogate its status as a world power, then the Americans might
well think twice about providing further financial support. In effect, though, the
American approach was superfluous, as Wilson already had no wish to devalue
the pound or to initiate deep cuts in Britain’s defence spending. Even before
Labour’s return to office in October 1964, Wilson had repeatedly spelt out his
commitment to the British defence posture East of Suez.58 Moreover, the US
stake in international economic stability meant that the Johnson administration
would probably continue to support sterling regardless of Britain’s defence posture.
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Foreign Office official G. C. Mayhew commented on 12 May 1966 that ‘We
have … been told over the past 18 months that continued US support for sterling
depends to some extent on our willingness to continue to share the US burden
east of Suez’. But he was not convinced that ‘the maintenance of sterling as an
international reserve currency is of less interest to the Americans than it is to us
and that the linking of support for it to a continued British presence east of Suez
does not contain an element of bluff’. As his colleague K. J. Uffen added on 5
July 1966, ‘I would have thought it would have remained an American interest
to continue to support sterling provided that our economic and monetary poli-
cies were not so perverse as to profoundly undermine the basis for international
monetary cooperation’.59
The idea of American economic support to sustain Britain’s global commit-
ments certainly had some British adherents. Patrick Dean told Paul Gore-Booth
on 10 June 1965 that ‘if we feel bound to invite the Americans to assume some
of our present commitments East of Suez, or to assist us financially in meeting
them, we shall have to convince McNamara, and behind him the White House,
that having made all possible economies in our defence establishment, it is still
beyond our capabilities to handle them on our own’.60 Gore-Booth commented
on 12 August that the ‘current alarm felt in Washington lest Britain should
disengage from her worldwide role … could and should be turned to profit when
American support, financial or otherwise, will make the difference between
maintaining the British commitment’ and cutting back.61 Gore-Booth’s colleague,
John Nicholls, suggested on 8 October that the Americans would ‘have to dip
their hands into their pockets if they want us to continue playing our present
role in the world … economically and financially, we are not in a position to do
what the Americans would like us to do’. The ‘only difference is that we now
appear to have a pistol at our heads and that, when the Defence Review is
completed, it will be somewhat more difficult for the Americans to accept the
obvious conclusion that they will have to make it financially possible for us to
do what they regard, and what we in our hearts accept, as our duty’.62
British economic problems
The measures of the United States to try to ease its own, substantial balance of
payments deficit compounded British economic difficulties.63 On 10 February,
President Johnson announced moves to induce US companies to bring more
money home and to encourage US banks to reduce overseas lending. Within ‘a
few weeks dollars became scarce’ in continental Europe, and ‘the measures
seem to have been the direct cause of some withdrawals of funds from London’.
On 25 May, Britain made its second IMF drawing of £1,400 million. This was
needed mainly to repay the short-term assistance borrowed from central banks
in November 1964, but financial experts still remained concerned as to whether
Britain had ‘really got to grips with its basic economic problem’.64 Wilson
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realised that to strengthen his ties with the President he had to make it apparent
that any American money would not be used to finance a domestic spending
spree. Wilson told Johnson on 29 July of the Labour government’s latest eco-
nomic measures, announced two days earlier:
Politically this has been a very difficult operation indeed … Many of my colleagues
were resistant to what I considered necessary and since the announcement there has
been a lot of unrest among our supporters in Parliament and outspoken opposition
by the Trade Union Congress. The support of the Confederation of British Indus-
tries and the recognition by our Financial Times, with its specialised readership, that
the measures showed the Government’s determination to put the strength of sterling
before politics, are things which count both ways for a Labour Government – par-
ticularly when it is far from certain that there is a case on objective economic grounds
for more than a minor degree of deflation.65
The British budget was initially well received by economists, but it soon be-
came apparent that the financial markets were ‘unconvinced that the crisis was
finally under control’. On 2 August, a newspaper report indicated that President
Johnson and William Martin had drawn pessimistic conclusions about sterling.
This contributed to ‘heavy and widespread selling of sterling, and devaluation
rumours revived’.66 (Johnson had said little in public about the British economic
situation because, as Fowler had advised on 16 June, any ‘statement … would
be taken as an indication of concern and might have unfortunate repercussions’.)67
On 5 August, Bundy told Johnson of the renewed pressure against sterling: the
British ‘lost $80,000,000 yesterday and $180,000,000 today. Estimates of pos-
sible losses tomorrow run between $300,000,000 and $500,000,000’. If the losses
continued ‘at this rate into next week, they would literally run out of reserves
and be forced into devaluation in a very few days’. Bundy feared that ‘if the
Prime Minister is faced with imminent devaluation, he will try to come over
here and dump the problems in your lap’. To avoid this, Bundy had warned
Derek Mitchell, Wilson’s Principal Private Secretary, ‘that there should be no
such visit unless we agree to it, and that I do not myself see what the virtue of it
is’. Bundy was sure, he told Johnson, that the ‘Prime Minister will not come
without further consultation (he is in fact on a train to the Scilly Isles, because if
he changed his plans and stayed behind it might deepen the panic for tomorrow)’.68
Wilson had indeed considered ‘dumping’ the problem in Johnson’s lap. On 5
August, in response to the worries of Lord Cromer, the Governor of the Bank of
England, he said that ‘if the issue was as bad as he thought, then I would be
ready to fly to America for talks with the President and the Federal Reserve
authorities there, because, obviously, we were all in it together’. Wilson ‘went
so far as to have a call put through to the President on a contingency basis and
to make provisional arrangements to have a plane ready to pick me up’.69 How-
ever, this proved unnecessary, as, due to Wilson’s assurances that Britain would
preserve its global role as well as to concerns for international financial stabil-
ity, the Americans provided help. On 1 September, Bator informed Johnson that
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the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were ‘hard at work helping the British line
up the Continentals’ to participate in another multilateral bailout for sterling. It
was likely, said Bator, ‘that by early next week all the major central banks will
be on board’. The pound would have ‘a solid international stand-by defence
against the speculators which is not likely to cost any of us very much money’.
In return, Wilson ‘will have staked his political life on getting Parliament to
adopt a more ambitious wage-price policy (short of outright controls) than any
major Western country’. Britain at last had ‘a fair chance to contain inflation
without enforced and prolonged stagnation’.70 The bailout succeeded in bolster-
ing the pound, temporarily at least. Confidence in sterling was renewed by the
influx of $1 billion in credits from foreign central banks.71
The Commonwealth Peace Mission on Vietnam
A Foreign Office analysis from June 1965 examined the Vietnam War in the
context of the Anglo-American relationship. It began by noting that British ‘di-
rect involvement’ in Vietnam ‘is insignificant. Our major interest in the situa-
tion in Indochina is to see that it does not escalate into a global or regional war
in which we might be involved’. But Britain’s ‘interests as a non-communist
power would be impaired if the United States Government were defeated in the
field, or defaulted on its commitments’. As ‘a major global ally we have an
interest in how the United States wages its wars’. Britain could meet its needs
‘by keeping in continuous and close touch with the Americans and showing
them that though we make no military contribution in Vietnam we have a
number of major assets of value to them’. These included ‘the Co-Chairmanship
of the Geneva Conference [1954] which, as the Prime Minister has said in the
House, we will use to the advantage of the Western side’; a ‘direct expertise on
China which the Americans lack’; and, finally, the British ‘attitude has a bear-
ing on that of others, particularly the Commonwealth’. Britain should ‘give
support to our major ally’, and whenever the British declared ‘a determination
to seek a peaceful settlement we should accompany this with an expression of
general support for the Americans, while avoiding passing judgment on their
specific actions’. The analysis did not express much faith in Wilson’s ties with
the President, though: Johnson’s ‘secretive nature’ meant that ‘high-level ap-
proaches to him’ on Vietnam ‘are difficult’.72
David Bruce tried to foster appreciation in the White House for Wilson’s
continued support. On 3 June, he wrote that although the war’s recent intensifi-
cation could tempt Wilson ‘to buy some easy political credit at the expense of
the US on the Vietnam issue, I do not think he will’, because of the depth of his
commitment to Washington.73 Yet Johnson remained unimpressed. On 3 June,
Bundy wrote to the President, noting Johnson’s ‘scepticism when one or another
of us has remarked that the British have been very solid and helpful on Vietnam.
And you have recollections … of Harold Wilson’s effort [on 11 February] to
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telephone his way into a fancy trip to the White House at just the wrong time’.
Moreover, Bundy noted, Johnson still felt ‘the wounds of what Home said about
the buses and what Michael Stewart said about gas, although everyone else has
long since forgotten those particular episodes’. Every ‘experienced observer’,
Bundy continued, ‘from David Bruce on down has been astonished by the over-
all strength and skill of Wilson’s defence of our policy in Vietnam and his mas-
tery of his own left wing in the process’. British support ‘has been of real value
internationally – and perhaps of even more value in limiting the howls of our
own liberals’. It was true, Bundy told the President, ‘that we would get this sort
of backing more or less automatically from a Conservative government, but
support from Labour is not only harder to get but somewhat more valuable in
international terms’. British support had come cheap to Washington, demand-
ing little more than the effort involved in ‘keeping them reasonably well-in-
formed and fending off one ill-advised plan for travel’ on the part of the Prime
Minister. It was ‘well worth our while to keep the British on board as long as it
can be done simply by keeping them fully informed and giving them the feeling
that they are in the know as we go ahead’.74 To Bundy, therefore, Johnson
should try to keep Wilson and the British ‘on board’, because the small effort
required to do so was a sound investment.
A State Department analysis noted the pressure on the Prime Minister to
attempt some kind of initiative to help bring peace to Vietnam. It concluded that
Wilson, facing a ‘small circle of pacifists and neutralists in the left wing … of
his party … is conscious of the strength of British public opinion for détente with
the East’. The ‘role he must play to keep matters under control at home is that
of a responsible world statesman, patiently seeking the resolution of disputes
while remaining loyal to his chief ally’.75 Wilson initiated the so-called ‘Com-
monwealth Peace Mission’ to try to fulfil these goals.76 This was, notes Philip
Ziegler with some justification, ‘a dazzlingly ingenious attempt to achieve his
three main policy objectives in a single stroke: to maintain the Anglo-American
alliance, to fortify the unity and standing of the Commonwealth, and to keep his
left-wing quiet’.77 On 17 June, Wilson and other leaders of the British Common-
wealth, meeting in London, announced that a four-member mission (the Prime
Ministers of the United Kingdom, Ghana, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago)
would speak to the governments chiefly concerned to try to bring about a peace
settlement in Vietnam.78 For the benefit of the White House, Wilson had already
‘explained the initiative we had in mind’ to David Bruce, who responded enthu-
siastically, describing the idea as ‘brilliant’, ‘terrific’ and ‘something with great
prospects’. Later, Derek Mitchell told Bruce that Wilson’s idea had been ‘sub-
mitted to the most rigorous scrutiny both within No. 10 and by the Foreign
Office; but it had survived on the grounds that … it was bound to be a winner
whether or not the Mission succeeded’. Even if the communists turned it down,
the British and American willingness to talk peace would generate favourable
publicity for London and Washington. Mitchell and Bruce then discussed ‘whether
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there should be any direct contact between the Prime Minister and President
Johnson’ on the matter. Mitchell noted that he had advised Wilson against tele-
phoning the President to gain his approval, as when he had telephoned Johnson
on 11 February the ‘conversation had been thoroughly unsatisfactory’.79
The Ambassador wrote to Washington about his talk with Wilson, stating
that the Prime Minister had given the assurance that ‘he would not be a party to
any arrangement that was not satisfactory to the United States’.80 Bruce also
telephoned Bundy to ask ‘whether the President would … send a pleasant per-
sonal message to the Prime Minister’. Bundy replied that the President ‘had no
liking for hot-line conversations, but he might be persuaded to send Wilson a
telegram’.81 Johnson chose not to respond directly to Wilson, but did forward a
message to say that he was ‘keenly interested in the Prime Minister’s imagina-
tive proposal for a mission of Prime Ministers’. Bundy also implied that the
exercise interested Washington primarily for its public relations value rather
than for the possibility that it might lead to negotiations: even if the ‘mission
fails in its immediate purpose, it should also succeed in showing just where the
responsibility lies’.82 On 15 June, McNamara advised Johnson that he did not
think anything would be accomplished by the Commonwealth mission, ‘but if
you express your willingness to … have US representatives at a conference
under those circumstances’ it would ‘further the peace image that you’re push-
ing’. The project was ‘primarily’ for Wilson’s political benefit ‘but it fits in with
our plans as well’. Johnson responded that he did not ‘see any objection’.83 In
presenting the Mission to the House of Commons on 17 June, Wilson omitted to
mention his prior cultivation of American support, seeking instead to create ‘the
impression he was acting independently’ of Washington. He simply noted that
there had been a television report indicating Johnson’s approval.84 In private,
the Prime Minister felt that he had gained Presidential endorsement of the
Mission. He wrote to Johnson on 6 July, pleased ‘that you were able to wel-
come … a mission on Vietnam’. Johnson’s ‘Baltimore speech last April and
repeated offers of discussions since then have been crucial’.85 Wilson believed
that ‘the Commonwealth – the world in microcosm – has a great role to play
in taking the sting out of the major problems that lie ahead of us in interna-
tional life’.86
Wilson wrote in his memoirs that Johnson tried ‘in the most restrained way
to counter the line being put out in communist capitals that my initiative was a
put-up job on behalf of Washington’. The President, Wilson said, was ‘keen to
see any direct line into Hanoi, provided he could keep below the horizon’.87
Johnson’s desire to keep a low profile stemmed not only from the need to stop
the communists thinking that the peace initiative was a Washington set-up, but
from a certain amount of cynicism towards Wilson’s project. On 21 June, he
said that North Vietnam and China ‘both have made statements on this Wilson
mission, telling him to go to hell … Wilson will just screw things up more when
he comes over here’. Johnson feared that the Prime Minister would ‘make a big
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speech dividing our country’, which was increasingly torn by controversy over
Vietnam.88 On 23 June, in a discussion in the White House, the President voiced:
considerable concern about the Wilson mission and said that he saw no point in
having the Prime Minister come to Washington if Washington and Saigon were the
only capitals which would receive him. He expressed the view that a Wilson visit
could be counterproductive, would achieve little in the interest of peace, and might
turn out to be a further embarrassment to the United States’ foreign policy.89
On 23 June, Bundy noted that although Moscow had just dismissed ‘the Wilson
Peace Mission and in rather tough language’, Wilson’s zeal was such that he
‘expected the British to move right ahead even though no Communists will give
them the time of day’.90 On 25 and 28 June respectively, China and North
Vietnam finally dismissed the Commonwealth Peace Mission.91 The commu-
nists’ perception that Wilson was little more than Johnson’s ‘errand-boy’ con-
tributed to the failure. For example, Hanoi noted in an article in the Party
newspaper that Wilson had been ‘trying hard … to keep British policy on Viet-
nam closely concerted with President Johnson’s thinking’. They argued that the
British Prime Minister was far too committed to Washington to be an effective
mediator:
When Johnson spoke of negotiations with preconditions, Wilson promptly demanded
that the Viet Cong … lay down their arms, and North Vietnam stop its aggression.
When Johnson changed tune and asked for unconditional discussions, Wilson also
changed tune and asked for unconditional discussions and unconditional cease-fire.
When Johnson said the USA has to defend South Vietnam against aggression, Wil-
son also stressed the need to guarantee South Vietnam from aggression.92
The North Vietnamese were of course right in their assertions of Wilson’s com-
mitment to the American line. He seemed to realise himself that he was too
close to the US President to be able to mediate properly, telling him on 2 August
that British ‘solidarity’ with Washington ‘is nowhere better understood than in
Hanoi, whose leaders, in common with other communist governments and their
sympathisers, never cease to reproach us for it’. But all the same, Wilson was
determined to persevere in his ‘support for American policies which I believe to
be in the interests of peace and stability in the world at large, no less than in
South East Asia’. In the face of ‘the persistent North Vietnamese refusal to nego-
tiate’, Wilson told Johnson that he saw ‘no alternative to your policy of strength-
ening your forces in South Vietnam in order to demonstrate to Hanoi the futility
of their dreams of military victory’.93 Wilson went on and praised Johnson for
‘the careful balance you have throughout maintained between determined resis-
tance to aggression and a patient insistence on your readiness to negotiate an
honourable settlement … I wish there was more we could do to help you.’94 It
seems that Johnson was responsive to this sort of sycophancy. On 12 August,
while speaking to Patrick Dean, he spoke, uncharacteristically, ‘in the highest
terms of … the Prime Minister and said he realised only too well how difficult it
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had been for HMG to continue to support US policy in Vietnam with so small a
majority in Parliament’.95
The third summit
Wilson’s love of the world stage meant that the idea of visiting the White House
was never far from his mind. The part-time White House adviser Richard Neustadt
noted on 9 August, after speaking with the Prime Minister, that ‘He wants to see
the President, and as we talked he came up with a succession of reasons why the
time would soon be ripe for an exchange of views “from politician to politi-
cian”’. Neustadt said that these ‘reasons ranged from “Africa” (I tried to look
incredulous) to a concert against de Gaulle’s “cold war”’.96 Later, Wilson indi-
cated that he wanted to see Johnson to reassure him that the outcome of the
Defence Review would not jeopardise American interests.97 On 16 November,
Bundy told Johnson that he had just heard ‘from Derek Mitchell in Harold
Wilson’s office, that Wilson is likely to ask us soon if he can come and see you
some time in the second week in December’. The British had ‘completed their
major review of defence policy, and before they make decisions, Wilson wants
to discuss the problem with you’. Bundy told the President that ‘it may well be
in our interests to have Wilson here in December, both to make sure their de-
fence review does not leave us in the lurch in some important part of the world’.
Moreover, if Wilson ‘comes to the UN, I don’t see how we can easily avoid a
visit’.98 On 17 November, Bundy again wrote to Johnson, saying that the British
were still ‘eager for an answer on Wilson’s proposal of December 17’. Consis-
tent with the President’s usual lack of enthusiasm for Wilson, Bundy proposed a
low-key meeting: ‘the best thing to do with Wilson is one serious talk at the
Ranch, and leave it at that … you will not really want to have a lot of ministers
on your own’. If Wilson ‘is in this country to address the UN, and asks to see
you, there really isn’t much choice’.99 Johnson liked the idea of seeing Wilson
alone at the ranch in Texas, because this would mean a minimum of fuss. How-
ever, Bruce feared that if Wilson did not go to the ranch, then the President
would not bother to see him at all.100 Due to Johnson’s commitments in Wash-
ington, it was finally arranged that he would see Wilson at the White House.
To improve attitudes towards him in Washington, on 26 November Wilson
told Ball and McNamara, who were then in London, that ‘there was no ques-
tion of the British Government taking decisions on the Defence Review without
discussions with our allies and primarily with the United States’. The first step
would be a ‘private talk with the President’ to discern ‘the American views on
the various options open to us and see if we could reach agreement on priori-
ties’.101 Bundy told Johnson on 16 December that American enquiries had gleaned
from Burke Trend ‘that the British review is leading toward these conclusions:
(1) maintain current strength in Europe; (2) stay in the Persian Gulf but pull out
of Aden in 1968; (3) cut-back in the Far East as soon as confrontation ends –
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hopefully in 1968–1970’. Bundy said that if these were Wilson’s ‘preliminary
conclusions’, then ‘the sore spot for us is the projected Far Eastern cut back’.
The Americans needed ‘a British role at Singapore for as far ahead as we can
see, and I think you may want to press the Prime Minister hard on this point’. If
the British confrontation with Indonesia ended, ‘the ordinary cost of this Far
Eastern position should go way down, and some British presence there is of very
high importance to us’. If ‘the new British defence policy foreshadows with-
drawal in Southeast Asia, the impact on our own effort will be real’.102
On 16 December, Bruce ‘went to the White House at 11.00 a.m., where
President Johnson convened Messrs. Ball, McNamara, Moyers, Bundy, Valenti
and myself to consider the probable agenda items for his talk with Harold
Wilson this afternoon’. The team answered a range of questions from the Presi-
dent, including questions on Vietnam and the British Defence Review.103 One of
Johnson’s enquiries reflected his disdain for Wilson. The President asked Bruce:
why the Prime Minister was so set on making trips across the Atlantic to see him,
especially in view of charges in the British press and Parliament of Wilson’s subservi-
ency, in some respects, to American policies. I replied that I thought such visits were
useful to the PM in terms of his domestic politics, and he was anxious to establish
with the President something like the close relationship – or its appearance – which
existed between Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy.104
On an earlier occasion Johnson had complained to Rusk that he was ‘pretty fed
up’ with Wilson ‘running over here’. He suggested that ‘we botched this in the
State Department’ by giving the Prime Minister too much time. This might
have ‘reverberations’ among other visiting allies such as Chancellor Erhard of
West Germany: ‘Why the hell do we throw in an extra two hours for Wilson?’105
But as Bruce noted on 16 December, Wilson arrived at Andrews airforce base
‘from New York, where he had addressed the UN’. He then went ‘directly to the
White House’,106 where he spoke with Johnson for about an hour. They then
talked together with officials. The topics included Vietnam. On arrival in Wash-
ington, Wilson received a telegram from sixty-eight Labour MPs, not only from
the left but right across the Party, demanding that the United States should stop
bombing North Vietnam, which, it was feared, might escalate into a war with
China. The telegram was organised and despatched in complete secrecy to coin-
cide with the Prime Minister’s arrival. Edward Short suggested in fact that Wilson
himself had somehow orchestrated the telegram, to remind Johnson of the pres-
sure he faced from the Labour left.107 Wilson noted later that during his visit he
‘pushed the President hard … at least to suspend the bombing to test the sincerity
of North Vietnamese hints that there might be a response on their side, possibly
leading to negotiations’. He also indicated that if US aircraft were to bomb Hanoi
or Haiphong the Labour government would be ‘forced publicly to dissociate from
that action’.108 However, he also offered his strong ‘support of US efforts to pursue
peace … and said that his Government was quite satisfied with the willingness
repeatedly expressed by the United States to go to the conference table’.109
chap4.p65 08/06/2004, 14:4192
93‘A battalion would be worth a billion’?
Wilson also outlined to Johnson the findings of the Defence Review. He un-
derstood the importance that the United States attached ‘to a continuation of
British defence commitments and gave assurances that the British world wide
role would be maintained’. He said there would be ‘readjustments in the British
defence posture East of Suez but that they would maintain their presence’. In the
long run, Singapore ‘might become very tricky’, due to political difficulties
there, ‘and the UK had no real assurance that it could be used in times of need’.
Consequently, the British government had been ‘considering the possibility of
an alternative base in Northern Australia’. Wilson ‘expressed interest in the
possibility of defence talks with Australia and New Zealand and, by implica-
tion, with the US on the defence problems of the area’. With respect to Aden,
Wilson said that ‘this could not be regarded as a long-term base’. In the Persian
Gulf there ‘continues to be a need to affirm some protection to Iran and Kuwait’.
The Prime Minister thought that Bahrain ‘would have some use in this connec-
tion but that generally it should be possible to lighten the British presence in the
Gulf’. David Bruce suggested that Wilson was ‘careful in phrasing his remarks
on the defence review to indicate a desire to have our comments while avoiding
any commitment that British decisions would conform to our views’.110 Though
Wilson had made it clear that the British needed to make cuts in the cost of their
defence posture, his affirmations that Britain would continue to play a global
role satisfied the President. He later took Wilson to the ceremony of switching
on Washington’s Christmas lights, which Wilson recalled proudly was the first
such honour to be bestowed on ‘a British Prime Minister since one to Mr.
Churchill, twenty one years earlier’. In his speech the President confirmed that
Britain should continue its peace-making efforts in Vietnam, and claimed that
he would support any initiative from London to that end. This, said Wilson,
satisfied that his peacemaking efforts had born fruit, ‘was a far cry from the hot
line explosion ten months earlier’.111 However, Marcia Williams, Wilson’s per-
sonal secretary, was more realistic in her interpretation of Johnson’s address.
She argued that ‘the speech, far from being complimentary to the British was
meant critically, hitting out at us in an oblique way maybe but nevertheless an
attack on us for not participating in the Vietnam War.’112 Her interpretation was
correct. Earlier that day, in response to a comment from Dean Rusk about the
possibility of a British troop commitment to Vietnam, Johnson responded sar-
castically that ‘Wilson is going to do nothing. He wants a DSC for fending off
his enemies in Parliament’.113 On the day after the Christmas lights ceremony,
18 December, Bruce ‘went to Andrews Field this morning to see the Wilsons
off’.114
Johnson thought well of his talks with Wilson, saying that the ‘most impor-
tant thing about the meeting was the feel of it, not the substance’. It was ‘like
two partners meeting each other after each of them had taken a business trip
and each reaching a conclusion that each thought the other did all right … this
had been a most satisfactory and helpful discussion’. He added with a hint of
chap4.p65 08/06/2004, 14:4193
94 A ‘special relationship’?
sarcasm that ‘the Prime Minister’s expressions of gratitude’ for American eco-
nomic support ‘had been really touching, and you could not help but like him’.115
Observers also had a good impression of the latest talks. Francis Bator told
Bruce that Johnson ‘considered his conversation with Wilson today the most
satisfactory he had ever had with a foreign President or Prime Minister, and had
voiced a sympathetic feeling about Wilson’. Bruce noted that Wilson himself
‘considers his visit has been eminently successful; he has every right to be pleased,
for President Johnson has been favourably impressed by him, and their relation-
ship will be more intimate than heretofore’.116 Bundy reflected that Wilson’s
visit ‘marked another step forward in the understanding and mutual respect
between the British government and our own’. Wilson was ‘most generous in his
expressions of understanding for the way in which the United States Govern-
ment has stood with the British Government in facing certain financial prob-
lems over the last year or more’. Johnson and Wilson ‘were able to confirm
their close understanding and support’ for one another, and to ‘understand each
other quickly and easily on every issue they discussed’. Both governments ‘will
now be able to move forward with confidence in a series of efforts which are of
great concern to both of them’. The Defence Review was a ‘special example’ of
the value of the summit: ‘The British Government faces very important prob-
lems of matching its commitments to its resources, and in most cases where
there is a British interest there is a very important American interest, too’. After
hearing Wilson’s ‘exposition and discussing it with Secretary Rusk and Secre-
tary McNamara, the President is confident that the two governments can work
fruitfully together to meet their common responsibilities’. The ‘firm and clear
determination of the British Government to play a constructive world role within
the limits of the available resources’ had made this possible. Johnson was also
‘impressed by the Prime Minister’s firm grasp of the fact that the defence of
freedom and peace in every part of the world is a matter of high importance to
all free men’.117
Henry Brandon of the Sunday Times said that the visit had been the Prime
Minister’s ‘most successful encounter with the President so far’. Brandon noted
that ‘one or two hasty moves sometime ago did not go down well with Johnson,
probably due to Wilson misjudging [the] intimacy of his relations’ with the
President. However, the ‘rapport Wilson had previously wrongly taken for granted
now seems truly established’.118 On 21 December, Wilson gave the Commons
what the US Embassy described as a ‘very optimistic and encouraging report’
on the visit to Washington. The talks were ‘very thorough and searching …
brisk, comradely and fruitful’. Wilson doubted ‘whether relations between our
two countries have been closer or more frank and marked by clearer under-
standing … than probably at any time since the Second World War’. There was
‘complete agreement … with HMG’s decision to continue [to] maintain [a] world-
wide defence role, particularly to fulfil those commitments which for reasons
[of] history, geography, Commonwealth association, and [the] like, we, and
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virtually we alone, are best fitted [to] undertake’. Moreover, the Prime Minister
was ‘absolutely satisfied that the President was anxious and determined … to
bring fighting to a speedy conclusion’ in Vietnam ‘and to find an honourable,
just and permanent solution’. Finally, Johnson had given the ‘fullest support to
Britain’s peace role’.119
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In the months January–July 1966 there was particular strain in the relationship
between Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson. The Labour government won
the general election of 31 March with a comfortable majority of ninety-four, but
this margin of victory gave rise to a vigorous ‘New Left’ within the Labour
Party which would bedevil Wilson’s commitment to Washington. To placate
this group, he ‘dissociated’ Britain from the US bombing of the North Vietnam-
ese cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, which was carried out on 28–29 June. He
stated that Britain still supported the general principle of the United States’s
policy in Vietnam and, on a personal level, he was as committed as ever to
close relations with Johnson. But Johnson failed to understand why, with Labour’s
position in the Commons newly-secured, Wilson had acted as he did. The US
Ambassador David Bruce and the British Ambassador Patrick Dean both helped
ease the rift, but Wilson’s questioning of US policy in Vietnam and the more
general problems of continuing British economic difficulties precipitated a con-
cern in some quarters of the White House that Britain’s claim to a ‘great power’
role and a close relationship with the United States should be discouraged. Johnson
had never favoured the idea of close relations with the British, but he wanted
Britain to retain its global role. On 29 July, Wilson visited Washington for the
fourth time since assuming office in October 1964. Despite his prior intimations
of uncertainty about the future of Britain’s position East of Suez, his loyalty to
Washington and his desire to overcome the ill will engendered by the criticisms
over Vietnam led him to reaffirm his commitment to East of Suez and to the
parity of sterling – both of which were important to the ‘special relationship’.
Wilson’s performance delighted Johnson, with the result he used his luncheon
toast not only to eulogise the Prime Minister but as a means of bolstering ster-
ling in the eyes of currency speculators.
The general election
In 1966 Wilson was, as ever, concerned that Britain should have the sympa-
thetic understanding of the White House. Hence he wrote especially often to the
President. According to Henry Brandon, the American correspondent of the
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Sunday Times, the letters were well received. He told Wilson on 24 May that
Johnson ‘last week in private conversation with me went out of his way to
emphasise how much he enjoys communicating with you and reading your
personal messages’. Brandon was certain that Wilson was ‘the only foreign
statesman who has succeeded in establishing this kind of rapport – and personal
relations matter a great deal with this President’.1 Despite the upbeat tone of
Brandon’s comments, Johnson was at best ambivalent towards Wilson himself.
Generally, he disliked seeing the Prime Minister face-to-face, because he thought
that most foreign statesmen were opportunists who used their visits to the White
House mainly to secure political advantage at home. He also had little desire
for ‘hot-line’ conversations, as he resented being put ‘on the spot’ over the tele-
phone. But Wilson’s letters did not place him under pressure as did the more
direct means of communication, and they were of growing interest to the Presi-
dent as US ties with Britain grew more problematic. The Prime Minister wrote
thirty-one times in January–July 1966 – on average, more than once a week.2
On 27 February, Wilson wrote a typically candid and long letter to the Presi-
dent, explaining that he and his colleagues had decided ‘to hold an immediate
general election’. The Labour government needed to boost its majority, which
had fallen to one, in order to safeguard its position and to ‘toughen up and speed
the measures needed to strengthen our economy’. Though he used diplomatic
language, Wilson invited Johnson to visit Britain for the campaign: ‘I am not
proposing to ask you to come and help us during the election’, but there were ‘of
course, abundant precedents’. In 1955 President Eisenhower ‘agreed to Eden’s
request for an early Summit meeting to which, in fact, Eisenhower was strongly
opposed’. In 1959 the President ‘conferred the same benefit on Macmillan and
indeed allowed himself to be toted through fourteen London marginal constitu-
encies in an open car with Macmillan beside him’. The issue of Anglo-Ameri-
can relations featured in British domestic politics: Wilson told Johnson that
Edward Heath, the new Conservative leader,3 was ‘now attacking our defence
review on the grounds that it drives us too closely into relations with you’. In a
similar vein, Heath’s predecessor, Alec Douglas-Home, had called on ‘the elec-
tors to vote Conservative so that we do not accept satellite status to the United
States’. Wilson anticipated that ‘this will be one of their themes and that they
will make an appeal to the latent anti-Americanism amongst some of our elec-
torate which they called into being with some success at the time of Suez’ in
1956. The ‘big issue’, though, in which Wilson wanted to confide to Johnson,
‘relates to sterling’. Election speculation had ‘led to a little weakness in the last
week or two because elections mean instability and also because there has been
some fear that if the Conservatives got in they would do what we did not do and
devalue sterling on the day they took office, blaming it on their predecessors’.4
The President’s reply was brief and impersonal, and showed no inclination to
visit Britain as the Prime Minister had wanted: ‘I will not break the rules by
wishing you good luck’.5
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On 31 March, Labour won the election with a decisive ninety-four seat ma-
jority, but the size of the victory brought problems for Wilson and his commit-
ment to the Washington axis. A State Department analysis some months later
reflected that Wilson, ‘like his predecessors as head of the Labour Party, is
feeling the sting of opposition yapping at his heels from within his own party’s
ranks’. This opposition was ‘much more worrisome to him than that of the
entire Conservative Party’. Previously, because of the ‘bare majority in the last
Parliament, he used the threat of the government’s fall to quell rambunctious
back benchers’, and his success in doing so ‘contributed greatly to his image as
an able leader and his stunning electoral victory last March’. But the substan-
tial victory was a double-edged sword, as it created a ‘situation where unruly
backbenchers cannot be contained, but offer opposition to his leadership’. The
Labour left posed the greatest difficulty for Wilson. He had ‘sought to secure
this flank by including in his cabinet most of the top leaders of the traditional
left-wing’, but a strident ‘New Left’ had developed nonetheless. Its standard-
bearers included some ‘traditional left-wingers such as Michael Foot’, along
with some ‘new elements, principally educators or journalists, who are doctri-
naire, articulate, and constructive’. Unlike their ‘Bevanite forbears, the New
Left is not trying to displace’ Wilson, but to drive him back to a more ‘socialist’
approach.6 This would involve a more independent line towards Washington.
Wilson’s ‘dissociation’ from the American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
On 26 January, Patrick Dean suggested that if the Americans became involved
in a ‘harder-hitting war’ in Vietnam, then Britain might find itself under ‘in-
creasing fire’. As American casualties rose, ‘and the effects of the Vietnam War
on the budget become apparent, Americans are likely to ask more and more
insistently what their allies are contributing, militarily and economically, to
this defence of the free world against aggression’. The United States was ‘feeling
lonely and a bit edgy about Vietnam’.7 Wilson scarcely needed prompting to
keep in touch with the White House over the matter. On 9 February, he ex-
plained to the President the mounting difficulties he faced from within the Labour
Party: ‘the Foreign Secretary and I have had over the past ten days to face by far
the most dangerous attack from within the Parliamentary Party on the question
of Vietnam’. The attack ‘centred around the decision’ of the United States to
resume bombing after a pause over Christmas ‘and was activated by the very
clear statement put out by the Foreign Secretary that the bombing decision had
not only our understanding but our support’. This led to the ‘despatch on the
same Monday evening’ to William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in Washington, ‘a telegram signed by 90 Labour MPs,
covering … a wide consensus right across the Party, including some who had
previously supported our action’. Wilson told the President that two days later
he ‘addressed a full meeting of our Parliamentary Party when I repeated my full
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support of the Foreign Secretary’s statement and took full responsibility for it’.
Wilson made a ‘very strong attack on those concerned and got considerable
mileage out of our of pointing out that during the 40 days bombing pause [over
Christmas] there was not a sound out of them commending the United States
administration for the opportunities they had opened up for a peaceful settle-
ment’. He ‘managed to detach from the [anti-American] lobby all but the
irreconcilables, but their attack continues and gets a great deal of support from
Party supporters in the country’. Next, said Wilson, ‘the Opposition who on the
whole have supported the United States position on Vietnam and have given in
the main general but not enthusiastic support to Her Majesty’s Government,
had yesterday a Parliamentary Day’ on which they chose Vietnam as a topic of
discussion, ‘in the hope of exploiting what they called the split’. Wilson and his
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart ‘decided to meet the challenge head on …
the operation was a total success’. But the Prime Minister told Johnson that the
challenge had shown ‘once again the difficulties I am bound to have from time
to time … with a parliamentary majority so much less than my real present
majority in the country’.8
Wilson’s account of his victory over the critics of the United States was not
exaggerated. David Bruce told the State Department on 2 February that a ‘high
placed Labour government source’ had indicated that Wilson was ‘aggressive,
uncompromising, and effective … completely overwhelming [the] critics …
Wilson never looked better … in dealing with [an] internal Party problem’.9 But
the Prime Minister’s difficulty with supporting the American position in Viet-
nam intensified as the United States stepped up its efforts there. In late May,
Bruce informed Wilson that the Administration was contemplating the bombing
of POL (petrol, oil and lubricants) facilities in the North Vietnamese cities of
Hanoi and Haiphong. Wilson told Johnson on 24 May that this measure would
jeopardise British support: ‘we have always made it clear that bombing either
of these cities would create a situation where we would have to disassociate
ourselves from the action taken’. Wilson reminded Johnson of his remark to this
effect at their last meeting in December 1965, a comment which he had also
made ‘more than once when under pressure in the House of Commons’. The
President would have to understand that ‘I shall have to make a statement of
this kind if this action takes place, though you will realise equally that this will
not affect my general support of American policy in Vietnam’. For the record,
and with few chances of success, Wilson urged the American leader not to bomb
Hanoi and Haiphong: ‘I would … ask you to reconsider whether this action,
whatever its results in terms of immediate military advantage, is worth the
candle’. But the decision ‘will be yours, and I know you will understand our
difficulties and the nature of the statement we would have to make’.10
Wilson understood that he could not exert much influence on US policy in
Vietnam, largely because Britain did not have troops there. An MP asked him in
the Commons on 23 June 1966 whether he was ‘aware that there are many
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people in this country who would like him to do precisely what Attlee did in
1950 – urge commonsense on the Americans?’ Wilson responded that he was:
a member of the Cabinet when Lord Attlee went to Washington to deal with a very
serious situation caused by a statement that the atom bomb was to be used in North
Korea. I believe that intervention was decisive. It is a point that at that time we had
troops in Korea. We do not have troops in Vietnam. So far as the views of this
country are concerned … they have been regularly explained to the President of the
United States and to this House.11
Wilson’s concerns in 1966 about the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong had little
impact on the thinking of the White House. Johnson told him on 27 May that it
was ‘essential that we reduce the oil supply’ to the communists ‘in the light of
the radical increase in the flow of men and materiel by truck to South Vietnam’.
The calculus was ‘whether they shall have less oil or I shall have more casual-
ties’.12 Washington sent Colonel Bernard Rogers to explain that the bombing
would be directed solely at POL facilities and not at civilians. However, the
ferocity of the critics in Britain was such that Wilson would still need to dissoci-
ate the Labour government from the measures regardless of the number of civil-
ian casualties. On 3 June, he let Johnson know that ‘the possible military benefits
that may result from this bombing do not appear to outweigh the political dis-
advantages that would seem the inevitable consequence’. But ‘our reservations
about this operation will not affect our continuing support for your policy over
Vietnam’, said Wilson, demonstrating the delicacy of his position, balanced
between the White House and British opinion.13
On 14 June, Johnson warned Wilson that he saw ‘no way of avoiding such
action, given the expansion of the illegal corridor through Laos, the continuing
build-up of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, the growing abuse of
Cambodian neutrality, and the absence of any indication in Hanoi of a serious
interest in peace’. He ‘deeply hoped’ that the Prime Minister could ‘maintain
solidarity with us in Vietnam despite what you have said in the House of Com-
mons about Hanoi and Haiphong’. Johnson then made another low-key plea for
British troops in Vietnam, saying that Britain’s role as co-chairman of the 1954
Geneva conference, which partitioned Indochina, did not mean Britain ‘should
stand aside’, because the other co-chairman, the Soviet Union, was helping to
arm the communists. Finally, he hoped of Wilson:
that you will not find it necessary to speak in terms of dissociation. But it would be
important to us if you could include the following elements:
1 You were informed of the possibility that such an action would, in our minds,
become necessary.
2 You expressed your own views to us in accordance with the statements which
you have already made in the House of Commons.
3 The particular step taken by US forces was directed specifically to POL storage
and not against civilian centres or installations.
4 Since Britain does not have troops engaged in the fighting, it is not easy or
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appropriate for Britain to determine the particular military action which may be
necessary under different circumstances.
5 It is a great pity that Hanoi and Peiping have been so unresponsive to
unprecedented efforts by the US and others to bring this problem from the battle
field to the conference table.
6 Britain is satisfied that US forces have no designs against civilian populations and
are taking every possible precaution to avoid civilian casualties.
7 Britain as a member of SEATO fully understands and supports the determination
of its fellow SEATO members to insure the safety and self-determination of South
Vietnam.
There had been forewarnings that British dissociation from US actions in
Vietnam would strain the Anglo-American relationship. As early as 30 Decem-
ber 1965, Patrick Dean told Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under Secretary of the
Foreign Office, that Averell Harriman, Washington’s Ambassador-at-Large, and
Dean Rusk had indicated that ‘if HMG were to maintain their influence with
the President it was most important that there should be no statements of “disso-
ciation” from American policy’. In particular, Harriman had said that ‘while
the political difficulties of the Prime Minister in Parliament were not underesti-
mated, it ought to be possible … to express disagreement with American policy
in a way which would not put the President’s back up’.15 On 15 June, Wilson
discussed Johnson’s message of the previous day with Michael Stewart (Foreign
Secretary), along with Burke Trend (Cabinet secretary), Michael Halls (Wilson’s
Principal Private Secretary), and Michael Palliser (Wilson’s Foreign Office as-
sistant). They decided that Stewart would see David Bruce ‘as soon as possible
to obtain from him, on a purely personal basis, his estimate of the likely date of
the bombing; and his advice on the desirability of a visit to Washington by the
Prime Minister and on the timing of any such visit’.16 But Bruce could offer little
concrete information, as the debate in the White House about the virtue of
bombing Hanoi and Haiphong, and the possible impact on the Russians and the
Chinese, was still proceeding.17 When the discussions had ended, Johnson wrote
to Wilson to say that ‘we now feel it necessary to go ahead with the operation
against POL installations’.18 In view of the growing international controversy
surrounding Vietnam, Wilson’s diplomatic support was important to the White
House, which therefore tried to keep him ‘on board’ as far as possible by telling
him in advance of the attacks. Only he, the ‘chiefs of governments with troops
in Vietnam’ (such as Australia) and Lester Pearson of Canada were thus
favoured.19
Wilson wanted the Americans to realise that Britain was fundamentally a
faithful ally despite the talk of dissociation. On 2 June, Bruce told Johnson that
Wilson wanted to visit the White House again: ‘It has been about six months
since he last saw you, and there are many things he would like to discuss’. The
Prime Minister was concerned, though, ‘to avoid speculation whether his trip
was in connection with whatever decision you make about bombing’ – a visit
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‘might be construed as a last minute plea for you to abandon the project’. If
bombing took place, ‘his journey might be interpreted in Britain as representing
a summons from you to rake him over the coals for not having supported you in
this respect’.20 On 10 June, Wilson informed Johnson that ‘it is right for us not to
meet too near the bombing. It would be a political mistake for both of us if
people could say I was making a trans-Atlantic dash, with my shirt-tails flying,
to put pressure on you’.21 Johnson agreed, telling him on 14 June that ‘there
should be a great deal of blue sky between your visit and possible action on
Vietnam’.22 Johnson was worried that Wilson would exploit his odyssey to give
the impression of dictating to the White House. Dean Rusk shared this view,
fearing that the ‘timing of a brief visit from the Prime Minister’ might suggest
‘that he is coming to Washington to persuade our President to be a good boy’.
The Secretary of State recalled ‘Attlee’s frantic visit during the Korean War’.23
But the Prime Minister’s efforts to see Johnson were supported by Bruce, who
commented on 15 June that Wilson should visit Washington to help ‘keep up’
‘the personal relationship’ with Johnson.24
Walt Rostow, the new National Security Adviser in the White House, com-
pounded Johnson’s reservations about another visit from Wilson. Rostow was
one of the chief ‘hawks’ in the Administration, and had little patience with those
American allies that would not send troops to Vietnam. On 28 July, he told
Johnson that British reticence towards Vietnam meant that Washington faced
‘an attitude of mind which, in effect, prefers that we take losses in the free world
rather than the risks of sharp confrontation’.25 In connection with the British
threat of dissociation and the prospective Wilson visit, Rostow advised the Presi-
dent on 17 June:
as things stand I take it to be our task to make bloody clear to the British Embassy in
Washington and the British Government in London that (1) the visit must be very
carefully prepared; (2) the Prime Minister, whatever his pressures at home, should
not come here unless what he says here in public and private reinforces your position
on Vietnam; (3) if this is impossible for him, he must find an excuse for the visit not
to take place.26
On 22 June, Patrick Dean wrote to Michael Palliser, Wilson’s Foreign Office
secretary, about the efforts of Rostow and Rusk to make sure that Wilson should
behave properly lest he alienate the President completely. Rostow said that Johnson
‘had now accepted the Prime Minister’s suggestion for a visit and was ready to
receive him towards the end of July’. The President’s ‘first reaction to the sug-
gestion, however, had been far from favourable’. He was ‘under great domestic
pressure and was, because of Vietnam, having to sit by’ as ‘his overwhelming
political power fragmented’. The polls ‘showed about 52 per cent against the
President’s policy, and of this only 10 per cent was on the side of the doves in
Vietnam and some 40 per cent wanted the President to use more military power’.
Johnson was ‘under great personal pressure, but remained determined to pursue
the line of policy he judged to be right’. He considered that the British refusal to
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provide troops violated the country’s ‘obligations under SEATO’. He thought
‘that as one of the co-Chairmen under the Geneva Accords we had a special
responsibility, since the use made by the North Vietnamese and their friends in
transitting Laos in order to attack South Vietnam was a clear violation of the
Geneva Agreements’.27
Rostow had told Dean that Johnson was ‘receiving messages from Mrs.
Gandhi, Lee Kuan Yew and even the Israeli government, urging him not to give
way or abandon South Vietnam, but publicly he received little support’. He
wanted ‘practical help, not advice about how to run the war and conduct lim-
ited military operations from those who were taking no active part’. Johnson’s
‘first reaction to the Prime Minister’s message’ about dissociation from the bomb-
ing of Hanoi and Haiphong ‘had therefore been very strong, particularly to the
implication that he was about to order the bombing of civilian centres when in
fact all that the Americans intended to attack was oil installations and trucks’.
Both Rusk and Rostow ‘hinted strongly’ to Dean ‘that they had had a very
difficult time with the President in order to persuade him not to react very
sharply and to agree that there were a number of subjects which he could use-
fully discuss privately and with no holds barred with the Prime Minister’. He
had now agreed, ‘but kept on asking why the Prime Minister wanted to come’.
Rostow said that Johnson ‘had very much admired the way in which the Prime
Minister had stood his ground and given the President such firm support when
he had only a majority of three’ in the House of Commons. Now Johnson ‘could
not understand why, when Mr Wilson had a really big majority, he felt it neces-
sary to dissociate himself much more than before from American actions’. Johnson
feared that Wilson ‘might cut away the ground from under his feet in the same
way as Mike Pearson had tried to do in his speech at Philadelphia over a year
ago’.28 (On 2 April 1965, Pearson, the Canadian Prime Minister, in an address
at Temple University in Philadelphia, criticised US policy in Vietnam. His com-
ments reinforced Johnson’s suspicions that foreign statesmen used their visits to
Washington mainly so that they could play to the gallery at home.)29 Rostow
had told Dean that if Wilson acted rashly then ‘the damage to Anglo-American
relations would be great and long-lasting’, as Johnson felt that ‘if for any reason
the Prime Minister could not say helpful things about Vietnam both privately
and publicly, i.e. to leading Senators and so on, when he was in Washington, it
would really be better for the visit to be postponed’. Dean Rusk ‘did not go so
far’ as to say that the visit might have to be cancelled, ‘but he did say that the
terms in which the Prime Minister dissociated himself from the bombing of the
oil installations, if and when this took place, would be crucial’. Dean apologised
to Palliser that the letter did ‘not make very pleasant reading, but both Rusk and
Rostow were at pains to emphasise the strength of the President’s feelings’. In
order to ‘ensure the success of the visit the first requirement is to reassure the
President about the purpose and objectives of the Prime Minister’s visit’. The
best way, said Dean, ‘would be to let the President and Dean Rusk have as soon
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as possible a list of topics which the Prime Minister wants to talk about’. In
order to play down differences over Vietnam, the topics might include ‘East–
west relations, European problems including especially Germany, NATO and
French policy, disarmament, Rhodesia and any other African problems and
defence East of Suez including Malaysia’.30
Wilson’s concerns for his ties with Johnson could not overcome his domestic
need to dissociate from American actions. The US Embassy noted that follow-
ing the raids on Hanoi and Haiphong on 28–29 June, 10 Downing Street ‘issued
a statement disassociating the UK government from the US bombing of fuel
storage facilities in the Hanoi–Haiphong areas’. The statement indicated, though,
that ‘the British Government continues to support the US policy of assisting
South Vietnam to resist Communist domination’, and it largely conformed to
Johnson’s suggestions to Wilson in the letter of 14 June.31 Wilson repeated the
statement of dissociation in the House of Commons. As Patrick Dean noted, the
statement ‘had been very carefully worded and two thirds of it had been devoted
to confirming that US basic policy as regards Vietnam still had the support of
the British government’.32 The US Embassy in London noted that in the subse-
quent debate Edward Heath ‘strongly supported US policy’. He charged that
‘the Government’s endorsement of US policy in Vietnam but disassociating itself
from the implications of that policy was an untenable position’. The Labour left
‘condemned the US action and called on the Prime Minister to disassociate the
UK completely from US Vietnam policy’. Wilson ‘rejected the left-wing de-
mands and reiterated UK support for American policy’, placing ‘the onus for the
continuation of the conflict squarely on North Vietnam’.33
Wilson practically apologised to the President after the dissociation: some
‘actions and statements of ours in the past few days have not been helpful’. He
spoke of the pressure he was under ‘to acknowledge that the logic of disagreeing
with this particular operation would be a total denunciation of the whole of
your Vietnam policy’. Wilson had rejected this view, ‘not only because I distrust
the motives of those who put this argument forward, but because their argument
itself is balls’.34 The vivid language did not mollify the President, who was
deeply weary of the war in Vietnam. As Patrick Dean noted, he regarded the
conflict as a ‘lamentable diversion of money and effort from the more worth-
while task of building the “Great Society”’.35 Johnson sought Bruce’s opinion to
try to understand the British dissociation. On 11 July, the Ambassador explained
that as ‘a political animal, highly skilled, intelligent, a master at infighting’,
Wilson was ‘usually adept at making ambiguous public statements to serve his
political aims’. However, in December, while ‘reporting to the House of Com-
mons … on his trip to Washington’, he said ‘that he had discussed the bombing
of North Vietnam with the President’ and that the UK opposed the bombing
of ‘the major cities in North Vietnam’. In subsequent months, Wilson had
‘repeated this so frequently to meet tactical pressures from within his own
party that … he had left himself no room for manoeuvre’. When Wilson first
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took office in October 1964, said Bruce, ‘he accepted the principle of the conti-
nuity of British foreign policy, which was based upon the long established friendly
relationship with the US’. This meant that Wilson was ‘prepared to cooperate
with the United States on major American policies in a measure that would not
always be popular’ in Britain. ‘Nevertheless, to counter the charge of being a
mere puppet or satellite of the US, HMG would, from time to time, assert its
independence by taking exception to certain details of policies to which he is
ready to give general support’.36
Bruce said that, to Wilson, Vietnam posed ‘in acute form the problem of
defining acceptable limits of Anglo-American cooperation’. American moves
had ‘increased his fears of escalation and certainly cut against the grain of his
belief that there could be no clear cut military victory in Vietnam’. Wilson
believed, too, that ‘a basis for a political settlement must be found, and he was
increasingly frustrated’ that it had proved elusive. The Prime Minister’s ‘inter-
nal party problem was not only one of dealing with the small band of leftist
militants who long ago wanted him to break unconditionally with the US’. He
did not have ‘much to fear from them, despite their noise and pressures’, but
when ‘the dissidence over Vietnam widened to include a substantial number of
Labour MPs in the centre and on the right-wing … the problem of party man-
agement threatened to get out of hand’. Wilson was forced finally to adopt ‘the
view of those elements which though generally moderate would not accept un-
conditional support of US military policy in Vietnam’.37
Bruce added that Wilson could not ‘ignore the pressures on him from many
sides after the bombing decision without endangering his leadership of the Party’.
If all else failed, and ‘he did not secure the support that he wanted, he even
hinted at dissolution’ of Parliament. Wilson ‘almost certainly did not believe
that the situation would come to that, but it was a possibility’. Summit trips to
Moscow and Washington, ‘announced at the height of the crisis, were particu-
larly designed as insurance against the extreme possibility of going to the coun-
try, and also more immediately as a means of isolating the extremists and forcing
the waverers to fall into line’. As well as needing to ‘placate dissidents by a
show of independence, the PM was, I think, influenced by an exaggerated idea
of his possible effectiveness as a mediator with the Soviet authorities’. Bruce
advised that Johnson should ‘content himself with remarking on his disappoint-
ment … and say he expects continuing fidelity to the promise of adherence to
our overall objectives in Vietnam’. The President could ‘add that after review-
ing the debates in the House of Commons he had noticed that Heath, Douglas-
Home and others of the Opposition had been much stronger advocates for
American policy than Wilson’s government’. Bruce concluded that given Wilson’s
‘overriding desire and necessity’ to get along with the President, ‘or to restore
any impairment’ of relations, ‘he will be doubly careful to try to avoid saying
anything embarrassing to us’.38 Dean wrote to Michael Palliser again on 2 July,
reporting Walt Rostow’s further efforts since the dissociation to make it clear
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that Wilson should not antagonise the White House any further. Rostow told
Dean that the President ‘fully realised that the Prime Minister had got political
difficulties which had to be handled carefully’. Nevertheless ‘the visit must not
be used in any way to undercut the President’s position, particularly on Ameri-
can soil’. The Prime Minister had to realise, Rostow emphasised to Dean, that
the object of his trip ‘must be to strengthen the President and that the visit must
not be used for political purposes at home’.39 After talking to British representa-
tives, Rostow informed the President on 3 July that he had ‘worked on the
British Ambassador here’ and that ‘David Bruce has talked … to Wilson’. The
Americans had been as ‘bare-knuckled … as diplomacy permits and Wilson
appears to have the point loud and clear’.40
On 2 July, George Ball advised Bruce that the President was willing to
meet Wilson on 29 July, but only on ‘two conditions: careful preparation for the
meeting and that the Prime Minister, whatever his pressures at home, not come
unless what he says here in public and in private reinforces the President’s posi-
tion on Vietnam’.41 On 3 July, Ball explained further to Bruce that Wilson’s
‘preparations’ include expressing ‘strongly optimistic views about the progress
of free Asia’, such as ‘the forthcoming elections in South Vietnam … and the
progress being made toward improving economic conditions in Southeast Asia’.
Ball said that the Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt had given the Ameri-
cans fulsome support on a recent visit. This had been a ‘great shot in the arm’,
and there was no reason, argued Ball, why Wilson’s visit ‘could not have the
same public effect without any way compromising the position he feels com-
pelled to take in Britain on specific aspects of the South Vietnamese conflict’.42
On 4 July, Bruce saw Wilson, who more or less pleaded to be able to see Johnson:
he was ‘absolutely confident he could avoid any embarrassment to the President
during his visit to Washington’. Wilson emphasised that he was ‘a politician
and, as such, highly sensitive to other statesmen’s concerns. He has never yet
embarrassed [Johnson], and would on no account do so’. Wilson wanted the
President to be absolutely sure that ‘he does not believe in making a mess on
another fellow’s carpet’. The ‘showdown with his own party will soon be over,
and though it will be a violent episode, he has no doubt of winning’. Bruce
regarded Wilson’s ‘assurances’ as ‘sincere and determined’.43
Wilson and the problems of British decline
On 3 February, Dean told the Foreign Office that on the matter of British de-
fence policy there was ‘a sense of relief’ in Washington that ‘we have managed
to make such a good showing with what is by American standards a very mod-
est sum of resources, and that we are not in quite such a hurry to implement the
more drastic measures as they had feared’. So far as the Far East was con-
cerned, Washington believed that Britain’s ‘physical withdrawal from the South-
east Asian mainland would have profound psychological repercussions on Asian
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and indeed on American opinion and create a climate which would fatally
weaken their position in Vietnam’. There was however, ‘a deep satisfaction that
Her Majesty’s Government is prepared to remain committed to Indo-Pacific
defence’.44 In a further letter to the Foreign Office on 16 February, Patrick Dean
wondered ‘whether it is still the Prime Minister’s intention to communicate with
the President’, in the light of possible developments stemming from the ongoing
British Defence Review. Dean realised that although ‘the Prime Minister has
many other preoccupations (and so has the President), I think there would be
advantage, if only to keep the record straight’. Such a message could ‘recapitu-
late the basic principles underlying Her Majesty’s Government’s 1970 defence
plans … and show the extent to which we have responded to American preoccu-
pations’. It could ‘also serve as a vehicle for reminding the President of the
heavy balance of payments burden which we are accepting in maintaining our
world-wide defence role and the continuing need for United States cooperation
in mitigating its effects on our external financial position’.45 Wilson wrote to the
President the same day, stressing the continuing British commitment to a global
peacekeeping role alongside the United States: ‘The Cabinet have now taken
their decisions and these will become public knowledge when the White Paper
on Defence is published on 22 February … our decisions follow very closely the
outlines I gave you of our provisional thinking when we met last December’.
The adjustments ‘provide a sound basis for our continued cooperation which, as
you know, is at the heart of all our overseas policies’.46 The Defence White
Paper of 22 February indicated that Britain would remain a world power, but
acknowledged that although the country would retain a presence in Singapore
and Malaysia, it would reduce its forces when Malaysia’s confrontation with
Indonesia ended. The British base at Aden would be abandoned by 1968, but
British forces in the Persian Gulf would be augmented to some extent. There
would be some cutbacks in the Mediterranean. The UK would keep its 51,000
man British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) intact, consistent with its NATO obliga-
tions, provided that the German government was prepared to offset fully the
foreign exchange costs of the BAOR.47
For Wilson, defence issues were entwined with his concern for Britain’s standing
in the eyes of the Americans. He told his Cabinet on 17 July 1966 that a ‘com-
plete withdrawal of forces from one of the three main theatres – Europe, the
Middle East, and the Far East – would be contrary to the commitments we had
indicated, when discussing the results of the Defence Review with our allies,
that we would continue to discharge’. A large withdrawal ‘from any of these
theatres could hardly fail to do incalculable harm to our international stand-
ing’.48 But as 1966 drew on, fewer of Wilson’s colleagues accepted his thinking.
Housing Minister Richard Crossman complained that Wilson had delusions of
grandeur: ‘it’s all a fantastic illusion. How can anyone build up Britain now as
a great power East of Suez when we can’t even maintain the sterling area and
some of our leaders are having the idea of creeping inside Europe in order to
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escape from our independence outside?’ Wilson was ‘trying to be some kind of
British de Gaulle, but, unlike the General, at the same time he wants to nestle
under the shadow of the USA and restore Ernest Bevin’s concept of the special
relationship’.49 Anthony Wedgwood Benn argued that ‘this country is dependent
on the United States and cannot act in a military sense apart from the United
States’. Referring to certain allegations of British dependence on the United
States, Benn said that for the ‘right wing of the Labour Party to say this is
significant, since it has been denied so often in the past’. Benn contended that
‘most people realise now that a continuation of permanent bases East of Suez is
bunk, or at any rate a declining policy’.50
On 9 June, the US Embassy noted the increasing opposition to the government’s
East of Suez policy. Although ‘left-wing elements oppose government policy on
doctrinal grounds, the size and character of the dissidents suggest that current
dissatisfactions are not predominantly doctrinal or ideological’. These dissatis-
factions stemmed primarily ‘from most middle-of-the road and right-wing Labour
MPs who oppose the continuation of a British role in the east, from a conviction
that the UK has no longer the economic resources to uphold an independent
position in this theatre’. Although the Labour government was not ‘likely to
make precipitate or unilateral decisions’, the ‘differences over East of Suez policy,
now acutely focused in parliamentary Labour circles and reflected in both the
Conservative and Liberal Parties, could impose a serious strain on the Anglo-
American alliance’.51 On occasions even Wilson seemed to doubt the viability
of the posture East of Suez. On 10 June, he told Dean Rusk that preserving this
role ‘involved deep domestic problems’. In 1965 he had ‘got away pretty well
with a tough line on Vietnam but the situation was now changing’. The Viet-
namese lobby was ‘no longer standing alone and a big fight was brewing not
only with the pacifists but with the sophisticated Europeanists’. The East of Suez
commitment faced ‘heavy attack and a much more dangerous line-up against
the British policy was now coming about’. Both of ‘these factions were afraid of
Britain getting dug in Southeast Asia in a policy of containment of China’. It
was ‘not only the pacifists and the Europeanists who opposed the East of Suez
policy, but the economists, who felt that more foreign exchange was seeping
away than was justified by British interest in the area’.52
Britain’s economic difficulties required firm remedies. On 15 July, Henry
Fowler of the US Treasury advised James Callaghan, the British Chancellor of
the Exchequer, that ‘if the United Kingdom is to avoid devaluation, to maintain
the pound as a reserve currency, restore its position, and avoid the risk of dan-
gerous dislocation of international financial affairs, much stronger stabilisation
measures than those presently invoked are required’.53 This Wilson realised. On
20 July, he told Johnson that the next budget ‘must have – and will have – a
very hard disinflationary impact’. It would mean ‘a total standstill for the next
six months on prices and incomes and a further six months period of very severe
restraint’ in that field. In order to bear the sacrifices, the public needed ‘to be
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satisfied that they are not carrying a disproportionate share of the general cost
of Western defence’. But Wilson wanted to reassure the President that despite
Britain’s financial problems ‘any cut of this nature should not affect the basic
lines of foreign policy on which the defence review was founded’. Cuts in over-
seas spending ‘must be consistent with our international commitments and with
our common policy in defence of Western interests across the world’.40 The
budget, announced on 20 July, included a £500 million combination of reduced
spending and increased taxes, a wage–price freeze, and cuts in direct overseas
spending, including cuts in defence and aid of about £100 million per year.55
The budget met with White House approval, with Dean Rusk informing the
President on 27 July that it comprised ‘the most severe deflationary measures of
any postwar British Government’.56 Johnson himself told Patrick Dean on 22
July that ‘the measures … were helpful and should succeed’.57
Despite these votes of confidence in Washington, more widely ‘the immedi-
ate reaction to Mr Wilson’s measures, especially in the exchange markets, was
only lukewarm, reflecting scepticism that he would adhere to a sufficiently de-
flationary course to meet the problem’.58 The budget created as many problems
as it solved for Wilson. A State Department analysis of 27 July noted that many
of the Labour government’s moves ‘come down hard on the toes of trade union-
ists, who are now joining the left-wing back benchers in opposition tactics’.
Difficulties over the government’s incomes policy had ‘brought about the first
resignation of a member of his cabinet, Minister of Technology Frank Cousins’.
This departure ‘represents a visible split in the leadership of the Labour Party …
and raises prospects of a more intensive intra-party opposition’. One of the key
issues ‘will, of course, be the kind of support Wilson receives from the trade
union segment of the Labour Party’. Much of the ‘burden of his austerity
programme falls upon the average consumers, and the wage-freeze portion hits
directly at the working-class, Labour’s main electoral support’. Wilson would
face continued strong pressures, and would need ‘to take the bit in his teeth in
the future and push relentlessly forward with programmes, which, like the aus-
terity measures, may be unpopular’. As a ‘talented politician’ he had managed
to ‘extricate himself from some tight spots in the past, but … there comes a time
when there is no place to dodge’.59
British problems led Washington to see Britain more and more, as Henry
Brandon put it, ‘with humiliating sadness – her prestige and her power position
have not been so low for a long-long time’.60 Robert McNamara, Secretary of
Defence, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow still believed that Britain could and should
uphold its commitments East of Suez,61 but on 23 May a composite report from
the US Embassy in London had argued that on most ‘hard’ calculations ‘the
British appear to have a limited future in international power terms, certainly
small indeed if they persist in over-stretching themselves and fail to manage
their economy’. Britain ‘lacked the material resources, the vantage points, and
the leverage to play their own Great Power role, even if economic fortune favours
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them’. More than ever before, Britain’s foreign policy and international role
‘must be tailored to harsh economic imperatives’.62
The Americans had played a critical role in helping to bail out sterling in
November 1964 and in August 1965, but throughout 1966 they gave few indica-
tions that they might do so again. John Stevens, an economics minister at the US
Embassy, explained on 27 July that the ‘failure of the exchanges to turn round,
the continued doubts about when the United Kingdom economic situation will
show clear improvement, as well as the size of the recent exchange losses’ led
him to believe that ‘opposition to devaluation of sterling at the highest levels’ in
Washington ‘may be changing’. There was a growing feeling, said Stevens,
‘that if it has to come, the sooner the better, and in that case the United States
dollar can look after itself’. This outlook stemmed in part from the US Defence
Department, which felt that ‘continued United Kingdom psychological support
of the United States in the Far East is of more importance than the sterling rate;
some stems from what seems to be an excessively confident feeling’ on the part
of Henry Fowler, US Secretary to the Treasury, ‘that the United States can get
their way on international liquidity’. Stevens concluded that ‘if there is a real
risk of a further heavy run on the pound after the publication of the July figures
and of our running out of ammunition, officials cannot be counted upon to
suggest spontaneously giving help neither for United States political reasons nor
out of fear for what might happen to the United States dollar’.63
On 18 July, Fowler told President Johnson that if Washington continued its
pressure on London to remain as a world power, then British economic weak-
ness would simply be exacerbated and prolonged. He noted the most recent
sterling troubles: ‘Last week’s severe losses – $200 million on Friday alone –
followed a month of weakness’. If the British did not take ‘severe measures, they
very likely will face an avalanche by the end of the week’. Austerity measures
would ‘solve’ Britain’s payments problem only ‘at the cost of recession now, and
over the longer pull, unacceptable unemployment and little or no growth’. Wil-
son would still face ‘the basic problem faced by every British government since
the postwar recovery – how to keep his international payments in order, and, at
the same time, keep unemployment at a tolerable level and maintain a good
rate of growth’. Fowler continued to say that ‘there will be great political pres-
sure on him to reduce defence spending – especially East of Suez’. Without such
a policy, ‘he will be accused of making his unemployed pay for a neo-colonial
policy, under pressure from Washington’. If the British strove at all costs short of
devaluation to remain a world power, ‘it will either cost us a weak Britain and
a great deal of balance of payments money, or, even more likely, a weak Britain
and eventual devaluation of sterling’.64 On 22 July, George Ball tried to per-
suade the President to try to discourage British claims of a ‘special relation-
ship’ with the United States, by easing the pressure for a continued British role
East of Suez, refusing any further short-term financial support, stressing its
willingness to take part in a financial operation that would lead to British
chap5.p65 08/06/2004, 14:41114
Dissociation 115
membership in Europe, and helping the British phase out their national nuclear
deterrent.65
The fourth summit
The auguries for Wilson’s visit to Washington, on 29 July, were not favourable.
J. A. Thompson of the British Embassy reported on 18 July that Rostow had said
that the mood would ‘not be particularly cordial’, as Johnson had been ‘hurt’ by
the British dissociation over the bombings of North Vietnam. The President
even ‘wondered why Wilson was coming’, and Thompson thought that ‘if the
main reason for the visit lay in domestic political considerations the President
would not be sympathetic’. Francis Bator had indicated that Johnson had two
criteria for the visit: the effect it would have on ‘his big problem, Vietnam’, and
the degree of confidence he could feel in ‘Britain controlling her affairs in such
a way that she could play a useful and important role’ in the world. So far as
Vietnam was concerned, Johnson hoped that Wilson would ‘express general
support’ for his policy; state that ‘the conflict and its continuation was the fault
of Hanoi’; and refuse ‘to say anything substantive about the bombing of the oil
installations’. However, Johnson wanted to be confident that ‘it was not prima-
rily Vietnam that the Prime Minister wanted to talk about; rather his object was
to continue the exposition he had given last December of Britain’s role in the
world’.66 Bator also told Thompson that ‘Even those advisers who are most
friendly to Britain are expressing doubts about the ability of Britain to sustain
her chosen role … [that] the British economic position was trickling away and
that this would continue’. Wilson ‘should convince the President against the
doubters that Her Majesty’s Government had all the threads of the situation in
their hands’, as Johnson feared that Britain ‘might lose control of events and
cease to play an important role in the world’. A few days later, though, Patrick
Dean recounted to the Foreign Office his latest conversation with the President.
Johnson was ‘most relaxed and spoke of the admiration and respect which he
had for the Prime Minister’. He said he was ‘much looking forward to talking
with him and to learning from him how best to deal with the domestic, financial
and economic problems which were very much the same in the two countries’.
Sooner or later ‘the Americans might have to take the same sorts of steps and he
thought the Prime Minister could tell him a lot of useful things’.67
Wilson was scheduled to spend one hour alone with Johnson from 11.00–
12.00 a.m., noon–1.00 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Ball and others,
lunch at 1.00 p.m. with forty-four guests, and at 3.00 p.m. there would be a
continuation of the meeting with advisers.68 It became obvious that Wilson’s
chief purpose was to strengthen his ties with Washington, post ‘dissociation’.
His Foreign Office briefs, for example, presented Vietnam as but eleventh of the
sixteen possible topics (ranging from NATO to Latin America) for discussion.69
Vietnam was not ignored in the talks though: while in the White House Wilson
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‘affirmed his strong support for US policy in Southeast Asia, Vietnam in particu-
lar … disagreement on particular actions did not mean any weakening of sup-
port for general policy’. He also stated to the Americans that Britain was ‘more
useful to you, as well as to the world, as an ally rather than as a satellite’.70 The
country would ‘continue to carry its share of the load’ East of Suez. He said that
Britain was interested in joining the Common Market, ‘but not on French terms’,
as Paris would ‘insist that the UK break its ties with the US, or at the very least
… abandon their East of Suez position’. Britain did ‘not want to become a
narrow, Europe-oriented country without an Atlantic role’.71 Wilson stated his
‘absolute and unshakeable commitment to solve the balance of payments prob-
lem without devaluation … We mean business’.72 The Prime Minister added
that the cost of the British troops in Germany ‘presented a difficult problem’, but
he received Johnson’s assurances: the US would ‘purchase ships in the UK to the
value of $23 million … Also, some $15 million would accrue to the UK from
shifts of some air units out of France to Great Britain. In addition, we would be
buying Rolls Royce A7 engines. All of this might add up to $100 million’.73
The President was so impressed by Wilson’s affirmations in support of
Britain’s world role that he ‘discarded his original speech for the lunch and had
it considerably strengthened during the period between the end of the private
talk and lunch’.74 The revised toast was rhetorical and full of hyperbole, but it
was significant all the same. It was designed, in the light of Britain’s economic
and defence problems, to consolidate Wilson’s commitment to the Washington
axis and to give financial markets a degree of confidence in Labour’s manage-
ment of the British economy:
A nation that has given us the tongue of Shakespeare, the faith of a Milton, and the
courage of a Churchill must always be a force for progress; and influence for good,
in the affairs of men. In World War II, Mr. Prime Minister, England saved herself by
fortitude and the world by example. You personally are asking of the British people
today the same fortitude – the same resolve – that turned the tide in those days.75
Wilson was, the President continued with a hint of sarcasm, ‘gallant and hardy
… a man of mettle … a leader whose own enterprise and courage will show the
way’.76 Dean Rusk was ‘rather surprised at the warmth’ of Johnson’s toast,77
while a State Department official is alleged to have said of the address that
‘there has been nothing like it since the days of Dien Bien Phu, when successive
French Ministers were compared to Lafayette in the hope of persuading them to
go on fighting in Indochina’.78 On 3 August, a pleased Patrick Dean assessed
that the ‘general feeling, both among officials and non-officials, is that the visit
was highly successful, certainly more so than people had been expecting’. A
number of people had told Dean ‘how well the Prime Minister must have handled
the President to have obtained such a satisfactory result and there is … general
pleasure on almost all sides that the close and friendly relations established here
last December have not only been preserved but strengthened’. Apparently, the
President had said of Wilson that ‘I really do like that man’.79 On 6 August,
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Dean suggested further that there were several reasons for Johnson’s effusive-
ness towards the Prime Minister. Firstly, there was ‘an obvious interest from the
American point of view in doing anything possible to reinforce international
confidence in the Prime Minister and HMG, and, hence in sterling’. Secondly:
although the President must have known that he could not expect anything of major
importance in the way of additional help or new commitments East of Suez, the
negative aim of ensuring that HMG … do not withdraw their general support for the
United States over Vietnam and in relation to Southeast Asia generally, acquired an
almost dramatic importance when the President began to reflect seriously upon the
potential consequences of Britain drifting seriously out of line.80
The British dissociation had ‘rattled’ the President. It was ‘extremely important
from the point of view of American standing with world opinion that the lead-
ing socialist-governed country in the world should support their objectives in
Southeast Asia’. Thirdly, the Administration might soon face ‘the need for fairly
stringent economic measures to control the growing inflationary tendencies in
the American economy’. Johnson ‘may therefore see a strong vested interest in
praising the Prime Minister’s courage, in endorsing HMG’s economic policies
and, of course, in the success of a programme of retrenchment which is going to
hurt quite a large section of the British public’. Underneath the President’s ‘fair
words, which were I am sure genuinely meant, there was a good deal of Ameri-
can self-interest in the whole exercise’. Certainly, ‘the personal rapport between
the President and the Prime Minister was reaffirmed and I have no doubt that
the President genuinely enjoys seeing the Prime Minister and talking about their
mutual problems’. He also felt ‘an admiration for the Prime Minister’s powers
of exposition and conviction’. In addition, ‘the meeting brought out quite clearly
that both the Americans and ourselves badly need each other, and that although
our financial troubles make our present position rather parlous, the Americans
are themselves facing equally dangerous potential difficulties’.81 Yet Johnson’s
behaviour would soon suggest that he felt little sympathy for the British, what-
ever Washington and London might have had in common.
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6A declining relationship,
August 1966–September 1967
The period August 1966–September 1967 saw a decline in Wilson’s commit-
ment to President Johnson and to the United States, both personally and in the
wider context of British foreign policy. In February 1967, the Prime Minister
tried to use the visit to London of the Russian leader Alexei Kosygin to bring
Hanoi and Washington to the negotiating table over Vietnam. Wilson was sin-
cere – if over-optimistic – in his belief that he and his colleagues could play the
role of peace brokers, although it is clear that he also wanted to bolster his
standing in the eyes of the critics in Britain of American policy in Vietnam. The
Prime Minister’s initiative collapsed when the White House toughened its nego-
tiating stance at the eleventh hour, although there had been no real intimations
that Hanoi was ready to talk. There were a number of reasons why the White
House changed its position, including the fear that the communists would ex-
ploit the bombing pause which was central to the phase A–phase B peace for-
mula under which Wilson was operating. Washington also felt little faith in
negotiations conducted through third parties and saw Wilson’s efforts as essen-
tially self-serving and a distraction from the more important issue of events on
the ground in Vietnam. Wilson’s treatment by the White House led him to ques-
tion the value of his relationship with Johnson and Britain’s ties with the United
States. The British decision in 1966 to seek membership of the EEC strengthened
this outlook, as did Britain’s planned withdrawal from East of Suez by the mid-
1970s. Johnson opposed any announcement of a withdrawal from the region, at
least until the United States had succeeded in Vietnam, a position which he
stressed in correspondence with the Prime Minister and when Wilson visited
Washington on 2 June 1967. However, political opposition at home, economic
problems and the turn towards Europe meant that by this stage Wilson had little
freedom of choice on the matter. The British government announced its plans
for withdrawal on 18 July 1967. This relinquishment of the post-war peacekeep-
ing role alongside the Americans, combined with Wilson’s personal disenchant-
ment with the White House, made this period a transitional one in the
Anglo-American relationship.
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A ‘hell of a situation’: the phase A–phase B affair
George Brown, the new British Foreign Secretary, was in Moscow in November
1966, when Januscz Lewandowski, the Polish representative of the International
Control Commission, was involved in a peacemaking initiative concerning Viet-
nam. However, Brown could not answer Russian questions about Lewandowski’s
activities, as Washington ‘had failed to inform us’ of what was happening,
Wilson complained later.1 He told David Bruce, US Ambassador to London, on
10 January 1967 that this lack of communication raised ‘a major issue of confi-
dence in relations between the Foreign Secretary and himself and the President
and Mr. Rusk [Secretary of State]’. If he was ‘to work with the President then the
British Government must be treated more as a partner in things that mattered’.2
The Prime Minister anticipated that when Parliament reassembled after the
Christmas recess there would be ‘much more serious pressure over Vietnam’,
including ‘serious disquiet’ in the Labour Party. Although the Government ‘did
not intend to “dissociate” from United States Government policy’, the situation
was ‘harder to hold, politically, than hitherto’. Public opinion, ‘not just on the
so-called left-wing, was much more critical of the United States Government’
than in 1966. Wilson could ‘hold the position’, but the Anglo-American rela-
tionship might well face strain.3
A State Department analysis on 15 February also noted the continued contro-
versy in Britain about Vietnam. Both the Conservative and the Labour Parties
were ‘officially committed to general support of United States policy in Viet-
nam’. This approach presented ‘no problem for the Conservatives as they are in
the opposition’, but Labour’s official support presented problems for Wilson. It
obliged him to ‘bend and shape this general policy to fit specific situations in the
light of conditions within his own Party’. British opposition to American activi-
ties in Vietnam had ‘waxed and waned depending on developments’. Now the
opposition was ‘at one of its periodic peaks, largely because of the United States’
bombing of North Vietnam’. Even those people in Britain, including Wilson,
who wanted the United States to succeed in defeating the communists, ‘believe
that the bombing of North Vietnam does not bring military results commensu-
rate with its high political cost’. British opposition had ‘always found its most
effective voice in a segment of the Parliamentary Labour Party’, though. Labour
MPs had ‘a natural forum’ in the Commons and were able to ‘bring pressure to
bear directly on the Prime Minister’. This pressure had ‘produced some embar-
rassing moments for US/UK relations, as was the case last April and June when
HMG “dissociated” itself from American bombings of the North’. Neverthe-
less, Wilson had ‘demonstrated great political skill’ in controlling ‘the vocifer-
ous critics of American policy … without making basic alterations in his policy
of support for the United States’. His chief argument, ‘the one he always draws
on when forced to a wall, has been that the Americans are willing to talk peace
whereas the other side is not’.4
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Political pressures, a predilection for high-profile diplomacy and a desire
for peace meant that Wilson still wanted to try to help to end the Vietnam
War. On 28 November 1966, after visiting London, Washington’s Ambassa-
dor-at-Large, Averell Harriman, informed Johnson and Rusk that Wilson and
Brown were ‘anxious to do everything they can to help bring about the end of
hostilities in Vietnam’.5 Wilson’s hopes rose on 2 January 1967, when Johnson
told the press of Washington’s appreciation for ‘the interest of all peace-loving
nations in arranging a cease-fire and attempting to bring the disputing parties
together to work out a conference where the various views can be exchanged’.6
Wilson was especially determined that he should be fully informed about Viet-
nam for the visit to London of the Russian premier, Alexei Kosygin, in Febru-
ary, as he thought that ‘the way that Kosygin had handled the timing and
length of his visit’ implied that ‘the Soviet Government related this to the
possibility of a truce’.7 He also believed that the Russians had felt more faith
in London’s role as an intermediary since the British ‘dissociation’ from the
American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in June 1966.8 Consequently, Wilson
asked Bruce on 10 January ‘for some American representative’ to provide a
‘full and frank’ briefing on Vietnam and the Administration’s attitude towards
peace negotiations.9
Johnson sent Chester Cooper of the National Security Council to brief the
British. On 30 January, he advised Wilson and Brown that Washington’s ‘direct
contact with the North Vietnamese … was low-level and fragile’, but the Ameri-
cans were ‘trying to keep it alive’.10 Cooper outlined the ‘phase A–phase B’
peace formula, which had first been mooted by Arthur Goldberg, the US Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, in September 1966. The formula held that the
United States would ‘order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam the
moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered
promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side’.11
The adversaries would then enter into detailed talks. Yet Johnson had never felt
enthusiastic about phase A–phase B, as he feared that the army of North Viet-
nam ‘might use a bombing halt to improve its military position’.12 In fact, phase
A–phase B was but one of ‘at least four de-escalatory proposals’ remaining
unresolved between the United States and North Vietnam by early 1967.13 Ow-
ing to growing concerns in the White House that the North Vietnamese would
exploit any bombing pause, Johnson abandoned the phase A–phase B formula
when he wrote to Ho Chi Minh, the leader of North Vietnam, on 8 February.
The President offered to stop bombing ‘only as soon as … infiltration into South
Vietnam by land and sea has stopped’.14 Johnson gave a broad outline to Wilson
of the letter to Ho, but when the Prime Minister asked for a copy he was in-
formed that it was ‘inappropriate’ to provide one because of the need for secrecy
on all direct communications with Hanoi.15 The White House did not even tell
Cooper – who was to remain in London for the duration of the Kosygin visit – or
Bruce exactly what Johnson had told Ho.16
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On Monday 6 February, Wilson had outlined the original version of the
phase A–phase B formula to Kosygin. Cooper advised the White House that the
optimistic Wilson had formed the impression from the Russian premier that
North Vietnam was ‘ready to negotiate’. Wilson believed that Kosygin was
‘deeply concerned about the state of Communist China and the threat it repre-
sented, and willing, apparently, to underwrite Hanoi’s commitment to talk if we
stopped the bombing’. Through Cooper, at 7.35 p.m. that evening Wilson ‘sig-
nalled that he wished to talk to the President on the telephone’.17 The message
first reached Walt Rostow, the ‘hawkish’ National Security Adviser, who did
not share the Prime Minister’s excitement. Rostow advised Johnson that ‘We
have a problem: real, but soluble’. The British ‘took our proposal … and put it
into A–B form: first bombing halt, then simultaneous stopping of infiltration’.18
Johnson, who was engaged in a Congressional briefing, asked Rostow ‘to tele-
phone 10 Downing Street and tell [Wilson’s Foreign Office aide] Michael Palliser
… that we were not prepared to accept talks in exchange for a cessation of
bombing North Vietnam’. The Vietnamese would have to make their own sac-
rifice towards peace before the United States could engage in any discussions. In
response, Wilson asked the White House for an ‘alternative proposition’ for
Kosygin to pass to Hanoi. Johnson ‘came down to the Situation Room’ of the
White House at about 9.00 p.m. Washington time, to discuss the matter. After
talking to Rusk, McNamara (Secretary of Defence) and Rostow, he then ‘retired
to his bedroom’ while his advisers attempted to draft a peace formula for British
use with Kosygin. The message for Wilson was ‘then taken to the President’s
bedroom; revised by him; and dispatched directly to the Prime Minister at about
midnight Washington time’.19
Johnson believed that any peace negotiations were more likely to prosper if
they took place directly between the Americans and the North Vietnamese,20 so
he tried to dampen Wilson’s enthusiasm for peacemaking. The President sug-
gested to Wilson that the communists were hostile to peace moves: last year the
United States had ‘agreed to meet with the North Vietnamese under Polish aus-
pices but nothing came of it’. Washington had ‘stopped bombing in the region of
Hanoi but we have seen neither a corresponding military step on their side nor
a use of existing channels to get on with the discussions’. Since 23 December the
North Vietnamese had received a number of ‘messages from us but we have not
had any replies of substance’. American representatives had told Hanoi that
they were ‘prepared to take additional military measures of de-escalation simi-
lar to the limitation of bombing on the Hanoi perimeter’. There was no reply to
this offer. Johnson said that Washington was ‘ready for private or public talks
with Hanoi’, but all the previous American contacts had given ‘no impression
from them as to the substance of the issues which must be resolved as a part of
a peaceful settlement’. Although he was not explicit on the point, Johnson dis-
dained the phase A–phase B formula under which Wilson was still operating:
Washington could not accept ‘the exchange of guarantee of safe haven for North
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Vietnam merely for discussions which thus far have no form or content, during
which they could expand their military operations without limit’.21 Palliser told
Wilson of Cooper’s belief that in its pessimism the message was ‘pure Rostow’
and that ‘if it had originated in the State Department rather than from Walt, the
tone would have been substantially different’.22 Despite the tenor of the President’s
message, Wilson was not discouraged, and pursued the topic of Vietnam with
Kosygin several times that week. On Friday 10 February, Wilson informed the
President that in public, Kosygin ‘took a hard line on Vietnam and on all the
sinful enormities of American policies, and a very gentle line on denunciation of
China’, but in private he was ‘less tough on Vietnam, more selective in his
criticism of America and quite uninhibited about China’. Kosygin regarded China
as ‘an organised military dictatorship’ which sought to ‘enslave Vietnam and
the whole of Asia’.23
Wilson wanted to make ‘absolutely certain’ that his understanding of the US
position on peace talks was fully ‘approved by the Americans’. He invited Bruce
and Cooper to draft a letter to hand to the Russians, to ensure that it reflected
the American position on the prospect of peace negotiations.24 On 10 February,
Bruce and Cooper transmitted to the State Department the peace terms that the
British intended to pass to the Russians. The terms included the phase A–phase
B formula: ‘The United States will stop bombing North Vietnam as soon as they
are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam will stop.’25
When the telegram arrived, Rusk was ‘tied up in a lunch with the King of
Morocco and the signing of a treaty with him’, with the result that ‘the meeting
to formulate the requested response could not take place until about 3.15 p.m.’.
At Johnson’s instruction, Rostow told the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend at
Downing Street that Washington ‘would transmit a reply but we could not quite
meet the 10.30 (London time) deadline and they might have to transmit it in
writing somewhat later’. Johnson ‘had every reason to think nothing would be
transmitted to Kosygin’ until Washington had replied.26 For reasons that remain
obscure, Cooper and Bruce gained the impression that the formula was accept-
able to the White House.27 That evening, Bruce handed the ‘validated’ text to
Wilson. In Wilson’s account, the Ambassador is alleged to have said that the
Wilson–Kosygin initiative was ‘going to be the biggest diplomatic coup of the
century’. This was probably Wilson’s own thought, not that of the more realistic
Bruce, but, regardless, the text was passed to Kosygin, and, by now, a copy had
reached the White House. Fatefully, at 10.00 p.m. British time Rostow phoned
London to say that Johnson wanted the text for Kosygin to be redrafted. A ‘new
text would come over the White House–Downing Street teleprinter, starting
now, and should be the one to be used with the Russians’, Rostow said. If the
earlier text had been handed over, then ‘the new text should be substituted’.28
Cooper noted that in the new text from Washington the ‘sequence of phase A
and phase B had been reversed, and the whole formula had been distorted’.29
The new text held that the United States would ‘order a cessation of bombing of
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North Vietnam as soon as they were assured that infiltration from North Viet-
nam to south Vietnam had stopped’. The attention of the British was finally
‘drawn to the difference between their sequence and the one envisioned by the
US in the President’s letter to Ho’.30 The new, tougher formula had to be given to
Kosygin, who was by then catching a train for a visit to Scotland.31
Bruce and Cooper reported to Washington that Wilson and Brown, embar-
rassed and angry at the change of tenses in respect to the stoppage of bombings,
subjected them to a ‘stormy session’ of complaints about the latest message
from the White House.32 Bruce and Cooper were themselves perplexed, and
struggled to explain the change to the British.33 As Washington had not objected
to the original version of the phase A–phase B formula earlier in the week,
Wilson and Brown had ‘assumed they were on safe ground’. But now the ground
had ‘shifted [from] under them’. They demanded to know why, if Washington
had told Hanoi that the United States was willing to stop bombing only as soon
as infiltration into South Vietnam had already stopped, ‘why did we not inform
them of this?’34 Wilson was deeply embittered about what he described as the
American exercise in ‘switch-selling’. Cooper reported the Prime Minister’s con-
clusion that:
Washington did not know what it was doing from one day to the next, or that
Washington knew what it was doing but did not wish to keep the British informed, or
that Washington was consciously trying to lead him up the garden path by tightening
its negotiations posture while letting the British proceed on the basis of an assump-
tion that Washington was in fact ready to reach a settlement.35
The Prime Minister felt that ‘his credibility … was now badly damaged’. If he
could not reach an agreement with Kosygin in their next meeting – at Chequers
on Sunday – ‘it would largely be the fault of the United States because of its
shifting position’. He warned that he ‘might be forced at some point to say this
publicly’ and to take a much more ‘independent position with respect to Viet-
nam’. Anglo-American relations ‘could never be the same’, he said bitterly.36
He also reflected that ‘the situation had become so confused by the misunder-
standings which had arisen that he felt there was an urgent need to re-establish
a personal relationship with the President’.37 But Bruce dissuaded him from
flying to the White House to see Johnson: ‘it would not be wise for the Prime
Minister to dash off to Washington … since it would appear to be an act of
panic and hysteria’.38
Wilson managed to restrain himself and to collect his thoughts. He expressed
‘considerable anguish about the shift in tense’39 in a telegram to the President
despatched on Sunday 12 February: ‘You will realise what a hell of a situation
I am in for my last day of talks with Kosygin … I have to re-establish trust
because not only will he have doubts about my credibility but he will have lost
credibility in Hanoi and possibly among his colleagues’. Wilson faced ‘very
great difficulties’ on the ‘vitally important question of whether’ as he had ‘told
him a cessation of bombing depends on a prior secret assurance by Hanoi that
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infiltration will stop’, or ‘will only take place after infiltration has stopped’.
Wilson told Johnson that ‘You will realise that on lunchtime on Friday [Kosygin]
suddenly bit hard on what I said to him, namely that all that was required was
a private assurance that infiltration would stop’. He ‘bit on this because he
clearly knew as I did not, that your message to Hanoi was the tougher version
which requires a prior stopping of infiltration before bombing could cease’.
Kosygin thought Wilson was ‘telling him something new’, while in reality Wil-
son was ‘merely repeating what I had told him earlier with as I thought your
authority’. Wilson could not ‘get out of this position’ by saying ‘either that I am
not in your confidence or that there was a sudden and completely unforeseeable
change which as a loyal satellite I must follow’. He and Brown had discussed
this ‘dilemma for some three hours with Chet [Cooper] and David [Bruce]’.40
In the absence of any real alternative, Wilson decided to stand by ‘the docu-
ment which I handed to Kosygin at 7.00 p.m. GMT on Friday before I received
Rostow’s message for transmission to Kosygin’. Wilson could only ‘say to Kosygin
that if he will go along with’ the original version of phase A–phase B, ‘and press
it on Hanoi, I will similarly press it on you’. If Kosygin agreed, said Wilson,
‘then I must press our line on you and if it is impossible for you to accept, we
shall have to reason together about the situation which will then arise’. In view
of the ‘clear breakdown in communication and understanding which has oc-
curred this week, and the need for the fullest understanding in the future, we
ought to meet very soon’. Wilson sent another message to the President that day,
describing in more detail the misunderstanding between him and Washington.
He complained that if the White House was going to repudiate the original
phase A–phase B formula, ‘as indeed it was [repudiated] on Friday night by
Rostow’s telegram, I cannot understand why I was not told earlier’. Kosygin
would find this matter ‘even more difficult to understand’.41
Cooper tried to placate Wilson by telling him that ‘the President and top
Washington officials had been sufficiently concerned about his problems to have
met through Saturday night’.42 Indeed, Wilson’s two messages of 12 February
were ‘considered in the Situation Room’ of the White House by Johnson, Rusk,
McNamara and Rostow, though less out of sympathy for the Prime Minister’s
predicament than from the need to ‘assure that the expected failure of the Wil-
son–Kosygin talks could not legitimately be blamed’ on American policy. Fi-
nally, the President sent a telegram at 3.36 a.m. on Sunday morning, ‘explaining
temperately’ the American position to Wilson.43 Johnson dismissed Wilson’s
argument that ‘the matter hangs on the tense of verbs’. Hanoi had received the
phase A–phase B formula ‘from the Poles’ in 1966, but the North Vietnamese
had not shown more than a ‘flicker of interest for more than two months’.
Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese military ‘build-up continues and they have
used three periods of no bombing (Christmas, New Year and Tet) for large-scale
movement and preparation of their forces for further military action’. Johnson
stressed that ‘we have had nothing yet from Hanoi. They receive our messages
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– but thus far it has been a one-way conversation’. Many intermediaries had
‘attempted, from time to time, to negotiate with us. Everyone seems to wish to
negotiate except Hanoi.’ Johnson wished that ‘someone would produce a real
live North Vietnamese prepared to talk’, and complained that Kosygin had
failed to transmit even ‘one word from Hanoi’. The United States ‘cannot stop
the bombing while three (possibly four) divisions dash south from the DMZ
[Demilitarised Zone across the 17th parallel] before their promise is to take
effect’. The problem was that no peace formula ‘can be satisfactory to us – and
perhaps to Hanoi – unless there is clarity about two matters’: firstly, ‘the timing
of a cessation of bombing, cessation of infiltration, and no further augmentation
of forces’, and, secondly, ‘how assurance in the matter of infiltration will be
established’.44
Wilson told Cooper that he was ‘mollified by the tone of the President’s mes-
sage and said he had “muted” the message he … sent to Washington later in the
morning’.45 In this message Wilson expressed ‘full agreement’ to the President
‘about the grave danger of a PAVN [North Vietnamese army] rush southward if
there is an interval of even two or three days between the stoppage of bombing
and the stopping of infiltration’. He had been ‘considering an alternative way of
securing the required guarantee, namely that the prior two-way assurance should
contain a time-table if possible underwritten by or communicated through the
Russians’. The United States might ‘agree in advance to stop the bombing in
return for Hanoi’s prior assurance that they would stop the infiltration, say six
hours or less afterwards’. Wilson would try his idea on Kosygin ‘if the time were
right’.46 Wilson thus wanted ‘one last chance at an A–B formula’, to try to bring
his peacemaking initiative to fruition.47 Cooper suggested that in choosing this
course of action the Prime Minister ‘obviously felt that even if Kosygin rejected
the formula, he would be better off in the House of Commons for this last
minute attempt’.48 Johnson, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, McNamara, Wil-
liam Bundy of the State Department, and Rostow met for discussions in the
Cabinet Room of the White House at about 5.15 p.m. Washington time on
Sunday.49 Finally, Johnson sent a message at 7.00 p.m., midnight in Britain,
where Wilson had been ‘practically hanging on to his guest’s coattails’ to ensure
that he stayed long enough to receive word of Washington’s revised position.50
The President attempted to assuage Wilson, telling him that ‘you have worked
nobly this week to bring about what all humanity wants; a decisive move to-
wards peace … I feel a responsibility to give you this further chance to make
that effort bear truth’.51 Wilson, said the President, ‘should go forward and try
once again with Kosygin’, telling the Russian that:
If you can get a North Vietnamese assurance – communicated either direct to the
United States or through you – before 10.00 a.m. British time tomorrow that all
movement of troops and supplies into South Vietnam will stop at that time, I will get
an assurance from the US that they will not resume bombing of North Vietnam from
that time. Of course the US build-up would also then stop within a matter of days.
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This would then give you and me the opportunity to try to consolidate and build on
what has been achieved by bringing the parties together and promoting further
balanced measures of de-escalation.52
At 9.30 p.m. Washington time on 12 February, Palliser and Cooper called Rostow,
to say that Wilson and Brown had ‘thrown their weight behind’ the latest for-
mula. Kosygin agreed to send it to Hanoi, but he complained that the 7 or 8
hours on offer were not enough. Half an hour later, Wilson pleaded over the
telephone to Rostow, asking that the Russians and Hanoi should be given more
time. Kosygin ‘needed time to talk to his colleagues’, and the Hanoi govern-
ment was ‘run by a committee and they were split between a pro-Chinese fac-
tion and others’. Rostow asked how much more time was needed, with Wilson
suggesting twenty-four hours. Johnson deliberated with his advisers about how
to respond to Wilson, suggesting cynically that they should give him ‘a little
palaver where he’s really complimented and we can keep him aboard when he
loses the battle and the war’.53 Finally, Johnson ‘personally dictated the mes-
sage’ which was sent to Wilson at about 1.00 a.m. Washington time on Monday
13 February.54 He told Wilson that ‘after careful consideration … we are pre-
pared to extend the time by six hours’, to 4.00 p.m. British time. Washington
could offer no more because the communists had ‘had the possibility of respond-
ing to essentially this message for the three months’ since they had first learned
of it. If there was ‘any interest in the A–B proposition, there has been ample time
for them to agree or to come back with a counter-proposal … A few hours either
way cannot be significant.’55
Wilson later informed Johnson that Kosygin had told him that he had no
reply from Hanoi, but that Moscow was pursuing the matter. The British also
passed to the White House details of ‘an intercepted telephone message’ from
Kosygin ‘to Moscow en clair’ which suggested that Moscow was pressing Hanoi
on the grounds that ‘all they had to do was give a confidential, positive answer’.
Once again, Johnson was obliged to assemble his team, at 8.30 a.m. Washing-
ton time on Monday 13 February. Concerned about continued communist infil-
tration of the South, it was decided that there was little hope of the Wilson–Kosygin
initiative bearing fruit, and that military operations over North Vietnam should
be resumed (the bombing pause had, on the advice of David Bruce, been ex-
tended for the period of the Kosygin visit to Britain). Wilson had exhausted
Johnson’s patience, with the result that the Prime Minister was to be told of the
resumption of bombing ‘on a routine basis’ via the State Department, ‘not via a
message from the President to Wilson’.56 Hanoi never responded concerning the
revised peace formula which Wilson had passed to Kosygin. As Johnson com-
mented later, ‘how in the hell’ could anyone say ‘that you can have peace with
somebody that has never even answered you?’58
Wilson was greatly vexed by the phase A–phase B imbroglio, telling Rostow
on 25 February that he ‘resented’ the fact that the White House had ‘not cut him
in fully in respect to the direct channel between Hanoi and Washington’.59 On
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24 February, Wilson even suggested that a full enquiry be made into the failure
of the phase A–phase B initiative, along the lines of Richard Neustadt’s account
for President Kennedy of the Skybolt crisis of 1962.60 However, Donald Murray
of the Foreign Office, along with Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under Secretary,
had reservations about the idea of Wilson re-opening with Johnson ‘the whole
question of what exactly went wrong’. Murray noted Patrick Dean’s report that
‘the President evidently believes that Hanoi is just not willing to talk at present’.
Johnson ‘probably also believes that, even if different but still US-endorsed pro-
posals had been put through Mr. Kosygin to Hanoi during the fatal week, the
reaction from the North Vietnamese would still have been an uncompromising
“no”.’ Consequently a ‘suggestion from the Prime Minister … that he and the
President might judge to be an “inquest” into what went wrong, might well
increase the President’s frustration and not in fact clear up the mystery’. If the
President ‘were to become irritated, the effect might be felt throughout Anglo-
American relations, not only on the subject of Vietnam’. Moreover, ‘if the ques-
tion were reopened now, in the way the Prime Minister suggests, it is quite
possible that news of an Anglo-American argument might leak’. Murray be-
lieved that Wilson should confine himself to addressing the matter in a ‘heart-
to-heart’ with Johnson when they met in June.61
George Brown put views of this nature to the Prime Minister.62 Wilson re-
plied on 15 March that he was sceptical ‘about the likelihood of Walt Rostow
having conveyed a full and accurate picture to the President of the very serious
anxieties I expressed to him’, and he suspected that Rostow ‘was largely respon-
sible for the misunderstandings during the Kosygin visit’. Wilson wanted Johnson
‘to be in no doubt of the fact that we also are worried at the way things went
during this week’.63 On 23 March, Palliser concurred with a still-bothered Wil-
son that there was a ‘need to get Pat Dean to clear the air with LBJ’. Palliser
suggested that firstly ‘we should arrange for Pat Dean to be very fully briefed by
Donald Murray who has all this at his fingertips and with whom I have dis-
cussed it today; and that you can give him the personal touches that you want
conveyed to LBJ’.64 Wilson sent Dean to probe the phase A–phase B affair with
the President. The Ambassador, who had had little direct involvement with the
matter, shared the view that a post-mortem could only do harm. As Rostow told
Johnson on 7 April, ‘The truth is that Dean believes that Wilson should not be
pushing things any further, and he is extremely anxious that his call on you not
make things worse’.65 On 10 April, the Ambassador saw the President. Dean
reported Johnson’s comment that there had been no ‘breakdown in communica-
tion’ between the White House and 10 Downing Street, despite what Wilson
had alleged. The ‘difficulty with Kosygin arose from the fact’ that the British
had ‘given him a written communication when the President and his advisers
were busy drafting a message for you to pass on’. In any future peace negotia-
tions ‘communications should only pass directly’ between the White House and
Hanoi. Shortly after Kosygin had arrived in London, ‘the threat from the North
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Vietnamese through the DMZ had suddenly become so great that the old Phase
A–Phase B plan was no longer tolerable’. This, plus ‘the interposition of other
people in the direct line of communications had caused the misunderstanding’.
Dean told Wilson that the President’s comments ‘amounted to a clear admission
that there was a change in the American attitude during the critical three days
and that the Americans were at fault’ in not informing London. They were
‘genuinely preoccupied by the sudden and increased threat from the North’.
They informed the British of this new threat but not that it had ‘altered their
view about the Phase A–Phase B plan’.66
On 25 February, Rostow had reassured Wilson that ‘the President and his top
advisers … fully appreciated the motives of the PM and the FonMin and thought
their attempt had been magnificent’.67 In reality, Johnson and his colleagues had
doubted the wisdom of Wilson’s desire to broker a peace in Vietnam. Johnson
wrote later that the Prime Minister:
seemed to feel that he and the Soviet leader could serve as mediators and bring about
a settlement of the war. I doubted this strongly. I believed that if the Soviets thought
they had a peace formula Hanoi would accept, they would deal directly with us rather
than with a fourth party.68
Similarly, Johnson told his advisers on 13 February that he:
had not expected anything to come of probes at this phase; and his anxiety was to
separate Kosygin and Wilson and avoid their heading for Hanoi; or Wilson’s head-
ing for Washington. He held to his fundamental view that successful negotiations – if
and when they came – would have to be direct and bilateral.69
The affair had also strained the President’s regard for David Bruce, leading him
to say that ‘he wants to be a Goddamned peacemaker’.70 There were also
suggestions in Washington that Wilson’s involvement in the peace initiative was
largely self-seeking. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler,
suggested to McNamara on 11 February that Wilson was ‘operating basically
from a narrow objective of obtaining importance and prestige in the British
domestic political scene; i.e., his “peacemaking” efforts are pointed primarily
at maintaining ascendancy over his political opponents within and without his
own party’.71 A State Department analysis also attributed questionable motives
to the British: they were eager ‘to participate with maximum personal visibility
in bringing peace to Vietnam – in early February alone Wilson proposed travel-
ling personally both to Washington and Hanoi’. This zeal was ‘sometimes em-
barrassing to the US, which greatly preferred confidential dealings with a
minimum of participants’. On the other hand, ‘the domestic-political value to
Wilson and to Brown of such a role and the importance of their support for US
policies … made the US willing to bring the British into negotiation efforts’.
Moreover, Kosygin’s visit to London made British participation nearly inevi-
table, the analysis suggested. If Washington ‘stood aloof … the results could be
harmful’ to the international standing of the United States. The analysis criticised
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Wilson’s overt references ‘in Parliament and to the press to the transactions of
Marigold and Sunflower [peace initiatives based on the phase A–phase B for-
mula]’. He did not criticise the United States but his comments ‘gave those not
previously informed reason to believe that something of substance had been
afoot’. Wilson’s remarks caused ‘alarm’ in South Vietnam and in the govern-
ments of ‘Troop Contributing Nations’ such as Australia. Furthermore, Wilson
‘seemed to contradict the President, who on February 3 had said he had seen no
action by the other side that he could interpret as “a serious effort to either go to
a conference table or to bring the war to an end”.’72
The State Department analysis noted that the ‘battle of the tenses brought
additional friction to the Anglo-American relationship, including emotional
personal communications between Wilson and the President, Brown and the US
Ambassador’ and others, ‘in which the British leaders claimed to have been put
in a “hell of a situation” and questioned US intentions and consistency of policy
in the search for a negotiated settlement’.73 Cooper suggested that Wilson’s zeal
for peacemaking ‘might have been somewhat dampened if he had known that
Johnson, Rostow, ‘and a few people in the State Department took a rather dim
view of his eagerness to discuss Vietnam with Kosygin’. There was a ‘sense that
the British Government was pushing hard, perhaps too hard, to undertake the
role of mediator’. There was ‘another, less articulated but more deeply felt
attitude … that contributed to the failure of the talks’, namely that ‘the prospect
that Wilson might be able to use American chips to pull off peace talks was hard
for the President and some of his advisers to swallow’. If the time was ‘now ripe
to get Hanoi to talk, Johnson, not Wilson, should get the credit’.74 George Brown
reflected that the British efforts to broker a peace in Vietnam in February 1967
foundered partly because Wilson’s relations with the President were so poor:
The Prime Minister’s hot line to President Johnson was not as reliable as it ought to
have been. I think that the fact of the matter was that Mr. Johnson didn’t really like
the Prime Minister much, and the hot-line from No. 10 that went allegedly directly to
the President was inclined to go instead to Mr. Rostow.75
The most recent appraisal, that of John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, suggests that
the initiative was ‘almost doomed to failure, not least because of the negative
and distrustful state of Anglo-American relations at this time’. There were other
reasons, too, including a lack of clear direction on Johnson’s part, Wilson’s
unrealism, and Rostow’s scepticism as well as the ambivalence of Moscow.76 It
is certainly clear that the affair did strain an already fragile relationship be-
tween the Prime Minister and the President.
The ‘special relationship’
On 1 January 1967, Cabinet minister Richard Crossman complained that the
‘personal reliance on LBJ’ evident in Britain’s dull, ‘Bevinite’ foreign policy
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‘could be described as a peculiarly Wilsonian touch’.77 Early in 1967 Wilson’s
commitment towards the American leader was still in evidence, to the extent
that he even told the President of the circumstances of his meetings with Robert
F. Kennedy, one of Johnson’s political rivals.78 Similarly, Rostow informed Johnson
on 28 February that Wilson’s office ‘wanted you to know that as a matter of
courtesy – but no more – the Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr. Richard
Nixon when he goes through London’.79 On 21 April, a State Department analysis
suggested that Wilson attached ‘the highest importance to his relations’ with
President Johnson ‘and to a continuation of a close relationship between our two
countries’.80 However, the phase A–phase B affair had tested Wilson’s commit-
ment to the White House. On 2 April, he told Hubert Humphrey, US Vice-
President, who was on a visit to London, that ‘the key to peace’ in Vietnam ‘lay
through the Soviet Union and the key to the Soviet Union lay with Britain’. He
felt that in February he had had ‘a real opportunity to act as a middleman
between the US and USSR to reach a negotiated settlement’. Wilson said that he
had been ‘considering the possibility of moving toward the middle, between the
two nations, on Vietnamese policy’. Humphrey responded that he should ‘con-
sider very carefully any change in the UK position’, because this might ‘jeopardise
his relationship with the President’. Bruce reiterated this, ‘urging that he keep in
close contact with the President, being mindful of the close relationship between
our countries and of the friendship of the President’.81 Two days later, Humphrey
warned Wilson:
against doing or saying anything which could imply a shift in the British position
away from Washington and towards Hanoi … President Johnson admired and
trusted the Prime Minister. He had heard him say several times to doubters or critics
that if only a few more Americans had the courage of Harold Wilson the war would
already be over. The President saw these matters in intensely personal terms. If he
were given cause to think that, as he would see it, he was being ‘betrayed’ by the Prime
Minister his reaction could be very violent indeed.82
Later that day Palliser reaffirmed these views to Wilson.83 The Prime Minister’s
comments to Humphrey and Bruce reached the President, who responded in a
tone of mollification. On 10 April, Dean told him that Wilson wanted ‘to be
assured that the President saw his close relationship’ with the Prime Minister ‘as
a very valuable asset in these difficult days’, and that the ‘apparent failure of
communication’ in February ‘must not be allowed to prejudice the future utility
of this relationship either personally or as between leaders of our two countries’.
Johnson responded by saying that he had ‘the greatest of respect’ for Wilson and
‘a great affection for Britain’. He and the Prime Minister ‘could continue to
work usefully together’.84
The underlying strains in the Wilson–Johnson relationship attracted public
comment. Bruce noted in his diary on 14 April that Palliser had called ‘to say
that the Prime Minister was concerned over an article’ by the Labour MP Eldon
Griffiths in the Times, which ‘alleged dissatisfaction and lack of warmth on the
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President’s part toward the Prime Minister’. Under instructions from Wilson,
Palliser asked Bruce if he could find ‘any recent statements by the President
laudatory of the Prime Minister’. Bruce assumed that Wilson expected to be
‘questioned about this article in the House’. But there were ‘none such’ state-
ments, ‘for there has been no occasion for the President recently to make such
pronouncements’.85 On 28 May, the Washington correspondent for the Sunday
Times, Henry Brandon, noted a recent ‘deterioration in the personal relations
between President Johnson and the Prime Minister … both have somehow come
to feel more cynically about each other as politicians’. Johnson was ‘uncertain
how much reliance to place now on the words of the British Government, on
Mr. Wilson’s own promises, and on past policy declarations and white papers’.
The White House was ‘disturbed even more’ by the ‘hint Wilson threw out
recently in private that he is thinking of moving the British government more
toward a middle position, presumably between Washington on one hand and
Moscow and Hanoi on the other’. According to Brandon, ‘the uncertain feeling
that maybe Mr. Johnson is not as eager to find a negotiated solution to the war
in Vietnam as he claims’ had ‘undermined Mr. Wilson’s confidence’ in the White
House. Brandon suggested that there was a ‘need to remove the misunderstand-
ings and suspicions’ festering between Wilson and Johnson.86 Part of the diffi-
culty of the relationship stemmed undoubtedly from the fact that while Britain
had continued to seek a peacemaking role over Vietnam the fact remained that
there was no prospect of a British troop commitment. In late April, Wilson and
Johnson met briefly in Bonn at the funeral of the former West German chancel-
lor Konrad Adenauer, where the President allegedly told Wilson that if only he
would ‘put troops into Vietnam’ then his ‘worries over sterling would be over’.
Wilson responded that if he did so he would be ‘finished’.87 Johnson also asked
Wilson if he was ‘going crazy’ by planning to pull troops out of Asia, where the
communist threat was at its most potent.88
Britain’s turn towards Europe
The difficulty of sustaining the global role and the need to reinvigorate the
British economy led Wilson from 1966 towards the idea of British membership
of the EEC. The strains in his relationship with Johnson notwithstanding, this
meant that the United States was becoming less central to his foreign policy
outlook. An American analysis noted later that the ‘conversion of Harold Wil-
son and the Labour Government’ on the question of joining the EEC ‘came late
and suddenly but, when it finally did come, it was complete’. Wilson’s intention
‘to re-apply for membership … announced on November 10 1966, enjoyed far
broader support – in the government, within the political parties, in business
and labour circles, and among the public – than did the first decision to apply,
in 1961’. The 1966 decision ‘reflected a recognition that Britain had been trying
to play a role beyond its capabilities and had been over-extended for too long’.
chap6.p65 08/06/2004, 14:42134
135A declining relationship
While ‘British spokesmen continued to point to the UK’s extra European com-
mitments and to talk about its remaining a world power and maintaining the
special relationship with the US, there was no question that the commitment to
gain entry into the EEC was complete’.89 On 11 November 1966, Wilson out-
lined his thinking to Johnson. The Prime Minister said that he had ‘never been
one of the little band of so-called “Europeans”’ seeking ‘a tight little inward-
looking group of countries concerned essentially with their own affairs’. He and
Brown, in probing visits to European capitals, would make it clear ‘that a forth-
coming attitude towards the Kennedy Round’ of tariff negotiations ‘will be a
significant earnest of their desire for British membership in a joint enterprise
with them’. On the other hand – ‘and this is perhaps the main reason why I feel
that our present initiative is right – I believe that the situation in Europe has
changed pretty fundamentally since 1962 and is continuing to change … the
prospects of building a new and wider community … are now much more prom-
ising than they were’. However, this concept of ‘an outward looking European
community, designed to play the constructive role in world affairs that each of
us individually is now finding too difficult, is bound to raise once more the
fundamental issue of our relationship with the United States’. The ‘prophets of
gloom say that this remains as total an obstacle to our present approach as it
proved for our predecessors. We shall see.’ But Wilson expressed to Johnson ‘the
firm determination of my colleagues and of myself that there shall be no change
in the fundamental relationship between and in our own basic loyalty to and
belief in the Atlantic concept’.90
Although Wilson had told the President that the Anglo-American relationship
would not impede British membership of the EEC, in private he said otherwise.
He suggested to the publisher Cecil King on 13 May 1967 that a more critical
attitude towards American conduct in Vietnam would ‘stand us in good stead in
Europe, wouldn’t it? And at the right time, too. You’ve got to think politi-
cally’.91 Wilson told his Cabinet on 6 June that the turn towards Europe meant
that ‘the concept of a special relationship between the United States and our-
selves was … undergoing a gradual modification, although close relations in
the shape of continuing consultations on international affairs would no doubt
continue’.92 On 8 May, Bruce, ruing Britain’s relinquishment of its East of Suez
commitments, wrote that if the British entered the EEC ‘Neither Britain nor
ourselves would lose anything substantial’. The ‘so-called Anglo-American spe-
cial relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology, although the
underground waters of it will flow with a deep current’. The ‘entry of the UK
into Europe, via common institutions, should strengthen, not impair, our easy
intercourse with it and its new associates’.93 Johnson told Wilson on 13 Novem-
ber that he felt ‘immensely heartened’ by the British willingness to join the EEC,
taking Wilson at his word that the initiative would help to ‘strengthen and unify
the West. If you find on the way that there is anything we might do to smooth
the path, I hope you will let me know’.94 Francis Bator noted in a press briefing
chap6.p65 08/06/2004, 14:42135
136 A ‘special relationship’?
on 1 June 1967 that the President had ‘on two occasions [in speeches] … indi-
cated that we are very much in favour of the British move’ to join the EEC.
Washington looked on ‘with very great sympathy at the British application’.95
However, compared to the question of the British stance East of Suez, the ques-
tion of British membership of the EEC simply did not engage Johnson’s atten-
tion.
Wilson’s turn to the EEC was shown by his appointment of George Brown as
his new Foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister suggested to Johnson on 11 August
1966 that Brown would bring ‘a new kind of robustness to the foreign office and
you can count on him as a staunch supporter of the Atlantic Alliance’.96 Indeed,
Brown did not oppose the idea of a close Anglo-American relationship; the State
Department told Johnson on 10 April 1967 that in the Commons Brown had
defended ‘the Wilson government’s policy of support for US objectives in Vietnam’
with ‘steadily growing effectiveness and recently, even brilliance’.97 Bruce
suggested on 6 May that Brown was, ‘more than any other Cabinet member,
except possibly the PM, anxious to preserve close comity with USG, and even
more than the PM, sensitive to the fragility of our present connexion’.98 However,
Brown did not support Britain’s position East of Suez, believing that British
money was better spent at home and that the country should moderate its
diplomacy by joining the EEC. On 13 October 1966, John Leddy of the State
Department told Dean Rusk that Wilson had asked that the Administration
should ‘enlighten Brown on the importance of Britain’s world role and thus
hopefully dampen his enthusiasm for Europe’.99 Wilson’s odd request was probably
designed primarily to bolster his own standing with the White House rather
than for any other purpose, because Brown had never concealed his commitment
to Europe, and, of course, Wilson had himself given Brown the post of Foreign
Secretary.
East of Suez and the fifth summit
A State Department analysis early in 1967 reflected on Britain’s international
standing, noting that in July 1966 the Labour Government had ‘announced a
further cut of £100 million in overseas spending, much of it to come out of the
military establishment’. The original Labour ‘endorsement of a world role for
Britain has now been considerably eroded’, and Wilson had even argued in the
House of Commons that Britain ‘had neither the inclination nor the resources to
go on being the world’s policeman’. The Defence Review had ‘coincided with a
period of national soul-searching and with the severest balance of payments
crises since the devaluation of the pound in 1949’. More and more British people
were unable ‘to find any real reason why their country should spend blood and
treasure in far off places’, and many also believed that ‘Britain’s future’ lies in
Europe.100 In spring 1967 Wilson and his Cabinet, as part of the Defence Re-
view, decided on the necessity of cutting Britain’s current strength in the Malaysia–
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Singapore area by half (to around 40,000) by 1970–71 and to withdraw com-
pletely from mainland Asia (Hong Kong excepted) by the mid–1970s. Articulat-
ing the Foreign Office’s desire to preserve Britain’s global influence so far as
possible, Palliser told Wilson on 21 March that ‘It is not for me to question the
implications, in terms of foreign policy, that would flow’ from major withdraw-
als East of Suez, ‘since this is essentially a matter of policy, of paying our way
and of getting the country back on its feet economically’. But Palliser drew
Wilson’s ‘attention to the very serious presentational and practical implications
… we should be under no illusion that it is anything but the end of Britain’s
“world role” on defence’. The move could ‘also be seen, unless it is very skil-
fully presented, as a reversal of the policy’ that Wilson had himself often advo-
cated publicly, including in his dealings with Johnson. For the sake of a policy
‘which is not due to be fully implemented for another eight years we should
incur immediately all the odium at a time when our main allies in the Far East
are bogged down in the Vietnam War, and resentful of our failure, as they see it,
to help them there’.101 Similarly, Paul Gore-Booth of the Foreign Office believed
that ‘there should be further interchanges between the UK, US and other govern-
ments … before any final decision by HMG’. Although ‘Foreign Office officials
were not without competence to assess the exigencies of British party politics,
must a July announcement be made, and also could not any determination on
ultimate and complete withdrawal be “fuzzed” in public statement?’102 John
Killick of the British Embassy urged Jeffrey Kitchen of the State Department
that Johnson should ‘absolutely knock the pants off’ Wilson on the East of Suez
question. It was ‘important that the President really hit Wilson hard’, to discour-
age Britain’s contraction of the global role.103
Conscious of hostility in Washington to further defence cuts, Wilson told
Patrick Dean on 30 March that ‘we had to face this problem’ of Britain’s
international role ‘sometime with the Americans and we should need to speak to
them about it fairly soon’. He ‘could not avoid doing so in May/June’. The
question was whether ‘discussion of this now between the two Secretaries of
State would ease the way’.104 Rather than tell the White House himself, Wilson
sent Brown to outline the British plans. On 8 April, Patrick Dean offered Brown
‘some ideas … about how we might handle these difficult questions’. In the first
place, said Dean, ‘I am sure you will already know that though the Americans
are not going to like what we intend to do, a great deal will depend on the
manner in which we present our decisions to them’. In terms of substance,
Washington would ‘probably accept fairly easily that we shall be fully off the
mainland of Asia by 1975 and halfway off by 1970’, but, given the uncertainty
over what would become of South Vietnam even after an American victory, Britain
should make it clear that ‘we also will have a capability of coming back into the
area in circumstances in which we judge it to be our interest to support them’. If
Britain could provide such an assurance, ‘they will take our decision reasonably
calmly’. In terms of appearance, ‘an early announcement of our intentions will
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be very much disliked and resented particularly if it is made in the next year or
so with the election ahead and during a period in which the fighting in Vietnam
may well get much worse’. Dean understood that there were ‘strong pressures
for an early announcement to be made this summer and for this reason it can be
argued that it would be better to make it sooner rather than later’, but he hoped
that the Cabinet ‘will agree that the terms and the timing of any announcement
should not be settled until you have had a thorough discussion on all aspects of
the matter to Mr. Rusk’ and ‘have had an opportunity to discover from him how
the US Government see their own commitments and deployments in Southeast
Asia in the post-Vietnamese war period’.105
Yet economic and political pressures meant that Wilson could do little on the
East of Suez question. Rusk commented that British plans for an announcement
in July were designed to meet ‘two objectives: making a gesture to Labour Party
critics of present defence policies and at the same time demonstrating to the Six
that, as part of its bid for membership in the Common Market, Britain is adjust-
ing its world role and attendant financial burdens accordingly’.106 After Brown
had visited the White House, Bruce complained on 6 May that Britain’s inten-
tion to make ‘a unilateral determination, and announcing it in July, eight years
in advance of its being carried into effect’ was ‘more likely to cause bitter
controversy between the US and UK Governments than any other issue between
us during the last few years’. If Wilson presented ‘his decision as a fait accompli
to our President … and tried to justify it, and a July announcement, on the
grounds of domestic-political pressures, he would be inviting, and in my opin-
ion recklessly, a possible rebuke of titanic proportions’. The United States had
its own ‘domestic political difficulties in much more acute degree than those
afflicting the Labour Party’. Moreover, ‘the appearance of our being deserted …
in the midst of our Vietnamese involvement, by a Government assumed to be
our most reliable ally, headed by a Prime Minister who had repeatedly declared
himself an “East of Suez Man” was unwise, provocative, and absolutely unac-
ceptable to us, to our public opinion, to our fighting allies, to say nothing of
Singapore, Malaysia, and most of the rest of Asia’. Bruce believed that the
Cabinet should ‘take no binding decision until the PM had seen the President in
Washington on June 2’, feeling that Johnson might be able to persuade the
Prime Minister at least to delay an announcement until victory was in sight in
Vietnam. Wilson should ‘keep his options open, and if he has radically altered
his policy about previous East of Suez commitments, to say so when he sees the
President – meanwhile to leave the matter undecided’.107
Johnson was deeply concerned about British defence plans, with the result
that he invited Wilson to visit Washington, rather than Wilson ‘inviting’ him-
self as was usually the case108 (Wilson’s trip to the White House would be his
fifth since assuming power in October 1964). On 11 May, Johnson told Wil-
son that it was essential ‘that we have an opportunity to talk before the deci-
sion is finally made’ on East of Suez.109 On 20 May, Johnson ‘spoke at length’
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to Henry Brandon about Britain’s ‘projected plans for military redeployment
in Southeast Asia and made no disguise of his disappointment and disap-
proval’.110 Yet Wilson could not please the Americans even had he so desired.
On 1 June, Francis Bator advised Johnson that domestically the Prime Minis-
ter faced:
increasingly sharp attack from all sides for:
• spending money in the Far East at the alleged cost of unemployment and stagnation
at home – with Lyndon Johnson the only beneficiary;
• catering to the bankers, with deflation, tight money, unemployment, wage freeze
and zero growth.111
It would be ‘exceedingly difficult for any elected politician to do all the things
we would like Harold Wilson to do’. These included ‘to stay in the Far East;
back us on Vietnam; avoid balance of payments trouble and any risk of devalu-
ation (whatever the costs in domestic deflation)’ and to ‘maintain a constructive
stance vis-à-vis Europe (no further cutbacks in the BAOR, no giving up on entry
to Europe, etc.)’. This ‘simply does not add up to a workable platform for
Wilson’s 1969–70 elections’, Bator concluded.112
On 1 June, Minister of Technology Anthony Wedgwood Benn wrote in his
diary that he expected Washington to receive Wilson ‘with all the trumpets
appropriate for a weak foreign head of state who has to be buttered up so he can
carry the can for American foreign policy’.113 Yet Wilson had himself requested
the fanfare for his visit: on 30 May the State Department told Rostow that the
Prime Minister had said that he was ‘prepared to advance by a few minutes the
time of his arrival in the event that military honours are planned on his arrival
at the White House on June 2’. It was clear that Wilson, ‘knowing that military
honours will be given Prime Minister Holt [of Australia] on June 1, would like
to receive the same honours on arrival’.114 Wilson was due to spend about an
hour and half with Johnson in a private meeting, and that evening there would
be a White House dinner for the Prime Minister.115 As Bator briefed the press,
the two leaders had ‘no fixed prior agenda; there is no formal list’ of topics to
discuss; ‘These two men just get in a room and they start talking to each other
about the problems they share’.116 On 2 June, Bruce noted in his diary that ‘The
President and the Prime Minister were closeted together for two hours while the
rest of us waited in the Cabinet room’.117
The discussions were dominated by tensions in the Middle East, as Egypt had
recently announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Wilson
wanted an international peacekeeping force to keep the Straits open, an idea
with which Johnson was in broad agreement. However, the situation soon over-
took this approach when on 5 June the ‘Six Day War’ erupted.118 The East of
Suez issue also featured in the talks. Bator had recently informed Michael Palliser
that the President would ‘hit Wilson hard’ on East of Suez, as the White House
saw the British proposal ‘as a kind of stab in the back as long as they are bogged
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down in Vietnam’, and the Pentagon could not understand ‘why we need to
close the options, political and military, nearly 10 years ahead’. Other figures
in Washington ‘profess to regard it as irresponsible politically and likely to be
just as expensive in the long run by the time we have given economic aid in lieu
and paid for our long-range transport commitments’. American policymakers
‘believe that Britain is pulling out of her world role, and that nothing they do or
say will do more than prevent this’. All ‘they really hope from us … is that we
shall not announce our intentions now’. They were not ‘very much impressed by
the notion of a residual presence’, and they certainly did not ‘see it in any way
as compensating for an announcement of our long-term intentions’.119 In his
meeting with Johnson, Wilson tried to explain his position. He said that there
was a ‘growing mood of isolationism in the United Kingdom – a reversion to a
feeling of “Little England” or perhaps “Little Europe”’. Consequently the Brit-
ish government had ‘to reach, by July, their basic decisions of policy’. There
was ‘no doubt that they were right at aiming to achieve by 1970, a run-down of
the forces in Malaysia to 50 per cent of their pre-confrontation level’. Thereaf-
ter, it would be ‘a question of rationalising our commitments in the area and
reducing our capability to match the reduction in commitments’. The Cabinet
was ‘not prepared to agree that we should maintain indefinitely a major base at
Singapore or elsewhere if this meant the retention of large numbers of troops to
protect’. Johnson countered by warning Wilson of a possible ‘chain reaction
which such an announcement would almost inevitably provoke – a reaction
which could extend to the American troops in Germany’. Despite these admoni-
tions, Wilson could not compromise.120 It was ‘clear’, noted a subsequent American
analysis, ‘that the British were well along the road to a formal decision’ to
withdraw from East of Suez.121
Yet Johnson and his advisers still believed that the British might still be de-
flected from an early public announcement to this effect. On 6 July, Johnson
told Wilson that ‘I continue to be preoccupied with your East of Suez decision’.
The countries of the Asian and Pacific Council were ‘meeting in Bangkok with
the prospect that they will register a growing sense of solidarity among the free
nations of Asia’. Hanoi seemed ‘to be calling home a number of its key ambas-
sadors. Whether this means a policy review, we do not know’. Meanwhile,
Burma faced ‘new pressures from a China which continues in turmoil’. In Viet-
nam, the Americans and their ‘fighting allies’ had to address some ‘difficult and
critical manpower decisions’. This was not the time ‘for Britain to make or to
announce a decision that it is sharply reducing its presence in Southeast Asia’.
Johnson urged Wilson to ‘find some way of putting this matter off for a time and
not to take a step which would be contrary to your and our interests and to the
interests of the free nations of Asia’.122 On 11 July, the President told Harold
Holt that ‘I have weighed in again with Harold Wilson … I believe that we
have presented our case as forcefully as possible, and I trust it will have a real
effect on the thinking of the British Cabinet’.123
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On 10 July, Palliser argued to Wilson that if a ‘close’ Anglo-American rela-
tionship was to survive, then London should ‘consult’ Washington on the East of
Suez decisions rather than merely presenting belated ‘information’ on the mat-
ter. If the Americans were advised in detail of British intentions only ‘a day or
two before … the White Paper they (and particularly the President himself) may
feel decidedly aggrieved’.124 On 13 July, Wilson did provide a thorough expla-
nation to the President for the East of Suez position, although, as previously,
without making any concessions. He said that ‘we have been giving very deep
and earnest consideration to this problem before I saw you last month’. The
matter had been discussed with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore
and Malaysia. All had bemoaned ‘our longer term intentions and … we fully
understand the fundamental concern that is shared in common by you all’. The
British would try to ease the concern by phasing the withdrawal ‘over a period
of years so as to reduce the likelihood of any lasting setback to the economies of
the countries in the area; and our mitigating aid coupled with their own deter-
mination to help themselves will contribute positively to the kind of self-reliant
future at which the whole area should aim’.125 The tone of Wilson’s letter sug-
gested that the United States was just one of a number of concerned allies.
Optimistically, however, Johnson told the press five days later that ‘we have
expressed ourselves as very hopeful that the British would maintain their inter-
est in [East of Suez]. We are very hopeful that they will find it is their interest to
do so’.126
Johnson’s blandishments to the British had exerted little effect. On 18 July,
London’s ‘Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy’ indicated that ‘in the
Far East, we have decided to reach a reduction of about half the forces deployed
in Singapore and Malaysia during 1970–1971’. Numbers would be reduced
from 80,000 to 40,000.127 The President and his colleagues accepted the British
decisions with equanimity, as they had little choice but to do so. As Dean ad-
vised the Foreign Office on 4 August, ‘the Administration … have accepted
defeat, having pulled out all the stops during the period up to the announcement
itself, with reasonably good grace’. Dean did not ‘expect them to seek to retali-
ate or “punish” us in the short term’, but he could not forecast the effects ‘in the
middle and longer term’. It would, ‘of course, be very much against the interests
of the Administration to play up our decisions by making anything of it pub-
licly’. This would ‘play straight into the hands of the Congress, and in particu-
lar of Senator Mansfield, in their present mood of urging upon the Administration
all kinds of cutting back overseas’. In fact, it was ‘a matter of some local embar-
rassment that a great deal of the favourable comment on the decisions we have
taken comes precisely from those circles who wish to see the United States cut
back abroad’. This comment ‘took the form of urging the Administration to
follow our example’.128 East of Suez, as well as British economic troubles and
Vietnam, would remerge in the next and final phase of Anglo-American rela-
tions under Wilson and Johnson.
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October 1967–December 1968
The period from October 1967 to December 1968 began with the devaluation of
sterling and ended with President Johnson retiring from office, and therefore con-
stituted the last phase of the Wilson–Johnson relationship. Sterling began to slide
again from October 1967, and to try to extract financial help, Wilson sought to
pressurise the White House with immediate, drastic cuts in Britain’s defence pos-
ture. However, his claim to David Bruce, US Ambassador, that he needed to see
Johnson to deal with Labour Party criticisms over Vietnam did not impress the
Americans. They disliked the idea of foreign politicians visiting Washington for
patently domestic-political reasons, and so denied Wilson his hoped-for transat-
lantic excursion. The White House knew that only a large bail-out might save
sterling, but Britain’s prior cuts in foreign commitments meant that there was no
real interest in providing help, and by now the Americans had grown confident
that they might be able to handle the impact of devaluation. Johnson and his
colleagues accepted with good grace the modest 15 per cent devaluation of ster-
ling on 18 November, realising that Wilson had fought the prospect as long as
possible. Devaluation did not then put a great strain on the Anglo-American rela-
tionship, though Wilson had worried about its impact on his standing in the eyes
of the President. More seriously for the ties between Britain and the United States,
economic troubles compelled the British to announce on 16 January 1968 an
accelerated withdrawal from East of Suez and the Persian Gulf, despite vigorous
White House opposition. The next month Wilson paid his last visit to see Presi-
dent Johnson. The talks were cordial enough, but the key Anglo-American issues
were already played out. Moreover, the reports of the British Ambassador Patrick
Dean indicated that the increasing exposure of Britain’s weakness and declining
strategic value suggested that increasingly the country was but one ally among
many for the Americans. Finally, in 1969 Wilson sought to establish a ‘special
relationship’ with Johnson’s successor in the White House, Richard Nixon.
The devaluation of sterling
On 19 October 1967, National Security Adviser Walt Rostow told Johnson that
as ‘part of a last ditch British effort’ to hold sterling at $2.80, London had raised
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the bank rate by half a per cent. Trouble had befallen Britain despite every-
thing. In 1966 the British had ‘moved strongly … to support the pound: they
deflated their economy, cut down foreign commitments and borrowed heavily
abroad’. This programme ‘worked well through the first quarter of this year:
they were able to pay off more than $1 billion in debt’, but soon they experi-
enced ‘bad luck: disappointing exports, largely because of the recession on the
continent; the Middle East crisis and the closure of the Suez Canal; and rising
interest rates elsewhere while theirs were going down’. The British ‘began to
lose reserves and had to draw heavily on their line of short-term credits’.1 In
London, after deliberations, the Prime Minister, Burke Trend (Secretary to the
Cabinet), and John Silkin (Chief Whip) concluded that they should seek Ameri-
can help to obviate the immediate prospect of devaluation, then negotiate with
the Americans ‘to see’, according to Wilson, ‘whether they would take the whole
burden of the sterling balance from our backs’.2 He advised Chancellor of the
Exchequer James Callaghan that Johnson should be warned ‘that we would be
forced to take all, or most, of our troops out of Germany and withdrawal from
the Far East, Singapore, etc, not in 1975, but immediately’.3 The threat would
increase the likelihood of American help, as Wilson had anticipated that any
offer of dollar assistance from Washington would be ‘conditional on … more
support in the Far East’.4
The Prime Minister himself would deliver the warning during a visit to the
White House. This visit would be presented as a mission to discuss Vietnam, in
order to avoid fuelling the speculation and rumour that would exacerbate the
sterling crisis. Wilson did not reveal his thinking even to David Bruce. Bruce
noted in his diary that he was ‘called at 12.30 a.m.’ on 8 November ‘by 10
Downing Street, to hear that the Prime Minister wanted me to go there immedi-
ately’.5 Bruce met a Prime Minister seemingly anxious about the fact that the
official Labour policy of support for the Americans in Vietnam ‘had become
increasingly unpopular in the Party, the Cabinet, and amongst the people gener-
ally’. Although Wilson intended to ‘maintain his own position on the subject as
affirmed by him in his previous statements’, he ‘thought he could strengthen his
authority greatly if he could return from a visit to the President and declare that,
after a frank exchange of views about Vietnam, he was satisfied that his attitude
toward the problem was correct and in the national interest’.6 Wilson’s conten-
tion that he needed to see Johnson about Vietnam was certainly plausible, given
the controversy about the matter in Britain. Bruce had noted on 29 October that
when the Prime Minister had visited Cambridge University ‘eggs and tomatoes
were thrown at him, and cries of “right-wing bastard” and “Vietnam murderer”
were uttered. His car was kicked, thumped and beaten upon, its roof dented, the
radio aerial smashed, and he was only extricated by the efforts of the police’.7 In
their early hours discussion, Wilson also told Bruce that his government was
‘also under heavy attack against its economic measures … and on account of
the failure thus far of Common Market negotiations’. Moreover, he ‘expected to
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be fiercely attacked from within his own Party and, for other reasons, by the
Opposition’. Finally, Wilson referred to ‘the instability of sterling’, but revealed
little else on the matter.8 Bruce believed Wilson’s assertion that he wanted to
visit the White House to ease the pressure about Vietnam. He understood, too,
that a Prime Ministerial visit for avowedly domestic purposes would annoy the
President, who scorned foreign politicians acting in such a manner.
Bruce tried therefore to dampen Wilson’s desire to cross the Atlantic, asking
him ‘whether the result he wished to achieve could not be reached by other
methods of communication’. Wilson replied in the negative; ‘a personal meet-
ing with the President would be much more useful to him than anything else’.
Bruce then cabled Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, to say that ‘It is obvious
that, in [Wilson’s] view, a meeting with the President would aid him in domes-
tic-political terms’. Though himself unhappy with Wilson’s proposal, the Am-
bassador said that he could ‘not judge whether it would be undesirable from
our standpoint’ for a visit to take place. No one could challenge Wilson ‘for the
Party leadership, but his own colleagues could conceivably force him into an-
other stance on Vietnam’. If a General Election was held ‘under the present
circumstances, my guess is that the Conservatives would win easily’. Bruce
understood ‘thoroughly why the President would not at this time wish to see
him: the Prime Minister has only half a loaf to offer, but his continued though
limited support seems to me desirable’.9 Bruce telephoned Rusk as well as ca-
bling him, finding him unsympathetic. Rusk was in ‘a dour mood … caustic,
even bitter, about the British “reneging” on their SEATO commitments and not
sending troops to help us in Vietnam’. The Secretary ‘got in touch with the
President’, who, as Bruce put it politely, proved to be ‘entirely disdainful of the
idea of receiving the Prime Minister’.10 Later that day Rusk complained to Patrick
Dean about the Prime Minister’s effort to inveigle a trip to the White House.
The Secretary noted that Wilson, ‘facing a Labour Party revolt over his support
for the US in Vietnam … had suggested to Ambassador Bruce the possibility of
a quick visit to the United States to talk with President Johnson’, but the White
House ‘would take a very negative view of a quick visit for this purpose at this
time’. It was ‘hard to see how the visit could help the Prime Minister at home
unless he could be seen to be putting pressure on the US – a situation which we
would not welcome’.11
Wilson expressed some of his own concerns in a letter intended for Johnson.
The letter confirms that the Prime Minister sought to threaten immediate mili-
tary withdrawals in Europe and Asia unless the White House orchestrated an-
other bail-out for sterling. Wilson said that in talks he and Johnson ‘could dispose
of’ the topic of Vietnam ‘in a few minutes, on a basis that would help me to hold
the House of Commons and public opinion’. Wilson noted, though, that he had
‘mentioned to David Bruce the urgency of my seeing you on another matter,
namely the economic and financial sphere’. Britain faced a ‘most critical situa-
tion where decisions of a very fundamental character will … have to be taken
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within three or four days’. If ‘we have to take the decisions without top-level
consultation it can only have the most far-reaching consequences for us, for you,
for Europe, not only economically but in other ways’. There would be ‘strong and
possibly irresistible pressure for decisions on defence which could have the
most grave consequences for the alliance and our common purpose’. Wilson would
be ‘loth to be forced to take these decisions, with all the possible consequences,
without a consultation with you’. The issues were so grave that that ‘they cannot
be adequately dealt with at Treasury Minister level despite our great confidence
in both of them and the constructive partnership between them’. But ‘equally if
we are to discuss this it is impossible for me to give this as the reason for my
journey’, as ‘People would draw immediate conclusions and the effect on for-
eign exchange markets would be disastrous within hours’. Wilson again expressed
his desire to see Johnson, saying that ‘decisions will have to be taken which could
affect all we have discussed and our common purposes for years to come. We
could agree a cover story’, such as Vietnam or the Middle East.12 But the Prime
Minister withheld his letter, probably because he now recognised that his chances
of securing an audience with the President were not promising.
There were few suspicions that Wilson was concerned less about discussing
Vietnam with Johnson than with raising the question of help for sterling, not
least because of the secrecy under which Wilson was operating. Even George
Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, was told only belatedly of the Prime
Minister’s desire to go to Washington. Wilson said later that he was ‘very con-
scious that George, who knew nothing about our plans but had a rough idea
that sterling was dicky, knew nothing either of my sending for Bruce’. On 9
November, Wilson enlightened him about the idea of seeing Johnson to secure
financial help. Brown ‘had some doubts’, Wilson noted, ‘whether anyone would
believe the Vietnam story’.13 In the absence of a Prime Ministerial trip to Wash-
ington, the Americans were kept informed about Britain’s economic situation
via the British Treasury. On 12 November, the US Secretary to the Treasury,
Henry Fowler, advised Johnson that the British were now ‘at the end of the line,
unless they have assurance of long-term credit soon’. The British had ‘come in
for help before, but they have never indicated so clearly that without help, they
will be forced to take the plunge’. They were ‘now scraping the bottom of the
barrel’. Fowler suggested that ‘it might be tempting to settle this perennial prob-
lem now and let sterling go’.14 This policy would be acceptable only:
If the devaluation were modest (10–15 per cent).
If everybody cooperated (the Common Market, Japan, Canada, and Australia held
– and few devalued).
If Wilson were able to hold his foreign commitments – Germany and East of Suez.
If, and this is the big if, Wilson can maintain his government and the movement were
not wasted because of internal British pressures.15
Fowler suggested, though, that even if these ‘worked out … the world might not
believe a “modest” devaluation would be adequate and pressure on sterling
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could continue’. He recommended a $3 billion multilateral ‘support package’,
orchestrated by the United States through the IMF, governments and private
banks.16 Rostow supported this position, telling the President on 13 November
that without an ‘assurance of long-term credit’ the British ‘may have to devalue
– perhaps within a week’.17
Though denied his visit to Washington, Wilson persisted with his veiled threat
about a bail-out for sterling or immediate troop withdrawals across the world.
On 13 November, Denis Rickett, a senior Treasury minister, arrived in Wash-
ington ‘armed with instructions’ – undoubtedly from Wilson – ‘to make their
flesh creep with talk of pulling out of Singapore (to keep control of the party)
and [out] of Germany’.18 Yet this talk had less effect on the White House than
Wilson anticipated. For a start, the British plans – announced in July 1967 – to
withdraw from East of Suez by the mid-1970s seemed to have strained the White
House’s sympathies for London to the extent that there was little sustained de-
bate about the idea of another rescue of the pound. At the time of the September
1965 bail-out, the Americans had intimated that further assistance would be less
likely in a situation where the British were cutting back on their international
commitments, and Wilson had in turn made it clear that Britain intended to
remain a world power. Now, economic and political difficulties meant that
whatever his personal feelings, Wilson’s dedication to the East of Suez role
could have little impact. Furthermore, although Johnson believed that devalua-
tion had to be handled carefully to avoid an international financial crisis, he
was more concerned to mitigate the aftershock of the measure than to dispense
another bail-out.19
Philip Kaiser of the US Embassy noted in his memoirs that in 1964–67 Wilson’s
‘determination not to devalue the pound fitted nicely with his desire to strengthen
Anglo-American ties, and to develop close personal relations with President
Johnson’.20 Consequently the Prime Minister was especially sensitive to the im-
pact of devaluation on his ties with Johnson. On 17 November, Wilson sent
Johnson a lengthy, candid, and ‘very secret message’ to say that ‘the Govern-
ment have decided to devalue the pound this weekend’. The President knew
‘how resolutely I have sought to avoid taking this step’, and of the ‘hard and
unpopular decisions we have had to take since we came to office, landed with a
£800,000,000 debt’. These measures were designed ‘not only to hold the pound,
but also, more fundamentally, to transform the economy and the technological
and industrial base of British society’. Great progress had been made, said Wil-
son, until ‘the ground was cut from under us by events in the Middle East’,
which ‘disrupted our trade and surcharged our imports’. There was also ‘a
continuous wave of speculation against the pound, which was aggravated by
the disproportionate impact of the dock strikes here and the general rise in
world interest rates’. Wilson continued to say that ‘I wanted you, who have
been so generous in your help and encouragement over these last few years and
who yourself face such immense difficulties and problems, to have the full picture
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of the political decisions we have been obliged to make’. The Prime Minister
felt optimistic about the likely effect of devaluation: ‘providing that, as we
confidently believe, the pound can now again become a strong currency and our
economy forge ahead in the new circumstances, I can assure you that, while we
shall inevitably be making some reductions in defence expenditure, we shall
nevertheless be able to maintain, both in Europe and East of Suez, the policies
set out in the Defence White Paper, as I explained them to you at our last
meeting’, in June 1967.21
Wilson’s office asked Patrick Dean to give the Prime Minister’s message to
the President ‘at 1300 hours Washington time on Friday November 17’. The
timing would ensure that it did ‘not … appear that the President was hearing the
news’ of devaluation later than did the IMF.22 The Johnson Administration knew
that Wilson had resisted devaluation as long as possible, and reacted with equa-
nimity: according to the President, the news was merely ‘like hearing that an
old friend who has been ill has to undergo a serious operation’.23 At just 15 per
cent the devaluation was a relatively modest one – a CIA analysis noted that it
would have taken a devaluation of 25–30 per cent to remove any lingering
doubts about the competiveness of British goods.24 Johnson told Dean sympa-
thetically that he was ‘putting his stack behind the Prime Minister’.25 On 18
November, Wilson thanked Johnson for the ‘open-hearted way in which you
responded to my message’.26 The President’s cable of 23 November was another
tonic for Wilson: ‘my faith is deep that the British people have the will and the
means both to pay their way and to continue to play the part they must in the
world’.27 Wilson also thanked Dean for ‘his handling of the President … a model
of what I hoped it would be’.28 Dean responded that ‘One of the most satisfac-
tory features of the whole business was the friendly and helpful attitude of the
President, Joe Fowler, Dean Rusk and others from the very beginning’. The
Ambassador knew ‘of course that they had a very keen interest in the outcome,
but even so they seem all to me to have gone out of their way to be as helpful as
possible’.29 Similarly, on 20 November Dean had told Michael Palliser, Wilson’s
Foreign Office assistant, that although the diplomacy of the British economic
crisis had meant ‘a pretty tiresome time’ for the Embassy, ‘One great thing to
come out of it well is Anglo-American relations’. Regardless of the fate of Britain’s
application to join the EEC, an optimistic Dean could not ‘help feeling that …
our ties with the Americans can and should grow stronger’.30
Yet economic troubles did little for Britain’s standing in Washington. A CIA
analysis reported on 28 November that the devaluation of sterling had ‘induced
at least 20 smaller countries to devalue their currencies and set the stage for a
run on the London gold market that by 24 November had reached panic propor-
tions’.31 On 12 December another CIA analysis noted that ‘The British Govern-
ment is reported to consider its recent devaluation of the pound a failure and
may adopt a floating exchange rate, perhaps within a few days’. If this were
done, ‘sterling could move downward in response to market forces until it
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stabilised, probably at a rate much lower than $2.40’. This would ‘disrupt the
international financial system, possibly causing an upheaval in world trade and
economic recession in many countries’.32 On 4 June, Bruce wrote that devalua-
tion had greatly undermined Wilson’s political position: the Labour government’s
‘three-year effort to maintain parity of sterling – at the sacrifice of cherished
socialist principles and promises – was a failure’. Wilson’s ‘subsequent bland
refusal to admit failure has deepened mistrust and sapped public support, and
the struggle with the unions over compulsory incomes policy has alienated many
Labour Party loyalists’.33 A State Department analysis from the same time con-
tended that Britain’s ‘post-devaluation economic programme’ could well prove
inadequate, because of:
a history of repeated crises; organised labour’s reluctance, if not unwillingness, to
accept wage restraint; archaic labour and management practices; a stubbornly high
level of import demand; high interest rates in the US and in Europe; Britain’s precari-
ous liquidity position; continuing nervousness about sterling; and the generally pre-
carious international monetary situation.34
Sterling was not devalued again, but as late as November 1968 Johnson and
Wilson were corresponding about the problems faced by the pound.35
East of Suez
British plans to withdraw from East of Suez by the mid-1970s, announced on 18
July 1967, had distressed Johnson and his colleagues to the degree that they were
less inclined even to keep Wilson informed of developments in Vietnam – even
though there were more than 400,000 US troops there in 1967.36 On 15 August
1967, Michael Palliser complained to Philip Kaiser that Wilson’s ‘difficulties’
with public opinion and the Labour left over Vietnam ‘should be rather better
appreciated’ in the White House. There was much ‘public concern’ in Britain,
expressed frequently ‘in the press, radio, etc., to say nothing of the immediate and
sharp reaction by a number of … backbenchers’. American policy seemed to be
moving ‘towards a more hawk-like and potentially very dangerous form of esca-
lation; and all this without any subsequent consultation’ between the President
and Wilson. The White House should not doubt Wilson’s concern and his ‘need
for much fuller information about the President’s current intentions and policy’.
Kaiser retorted that there had been ‘no fundamental change in US policy, and that
the recent escalation of US bombing was merely part of the long-standing process
of ‘continuing to hit supply lines’. But ‘however friendly’ Johnson’s ‘personal
feelings’ for Wilson, the President might react ‘sharply to any more formal ap-
proaches’ for information ‘in view of our recent decisions in the context of the
Defence Review “East of Suez”’. Kaiser said that the ‘East of Suez decisions caused
deep resentment in Washington’, and that this resentment ‘might … be responsible
for the President’s failure to keep in touch’ with Wilson about Vietnam.37
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The planned withdrawals from East of Suez and President de Gaulle’s veto in
December 1967 of the British application to join the EEC meant that Britain
lacked a distinct role in world affairs. De Gaulle had alleged that Britain’s
apparently close connections with Washington would mean ‘continued US domi-
nation of Europe’ if the British were permitted to join the Common Market.
Britain ‘would have to totally change its traditions, outlook and commitments
abroad (such as Hong Kong and Singapore)’.38 Yet British defence cuts had
already undermined Anglo-American ties and seemed likely to do so further –
Jeffrey Pickering has observed that ‘the shock of enforced devaluation initiated
a process which would eventually bring Britain’s overseas role to an ignomini-
ous end. The change in sterling’s parity … instantly added £50,000,000 to de-
fence costs annually’, with the effect that further defence cuts would soon be
necessary.39 On 20 December 1967, Denis Healey, Minister of Defence, advised
Wilson to be honest with Johnson when they next met, at a memorial service in
Melbourne for the Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt (Holt had drowned
on 17 December). Healey told Wilson that ‘that no attempt should be made to
disguise the fact that if there were to be large defence cuts arising out of the
Government’s present review, these were bound to affect the speed of our with-
drawal from present positions and commitments outside Europe’. Wilson should
not ‘suggest that we were not really contemplating anything very substantial’,
and ‘a firm warning of this kind should be conveyed to our allies and partners,
since there would in practice be very little time for any real consultation with
them about such measures as might be found necessary’. Healey suggested that
Wilson ‘should simply have to tell them, when the time came, what we pro-
posed to do’. The Prime Minister agreed, saying that ‘in his talk with President
Johnson’ he would ‘put down a firm marker about the likely effect of the current
review’.40
Wilson failed to do so, though, and the two leaders merely discussed events
in Vietnam.41 Anthony Howard of the Observer reported from Washington on
31 December that Johnson had originally ‘hoped that Wilson would divulge his
policy intentions – and lay himself open to the famous LBJ treatment of persua-
sion – on his … visit to Washington, at one time expected to take place this
weekend’. Instead, Wilson ‘startled the President when they met in Australia by
insisting that the trip he himself had suggested would not now be convenient
until February’. This ‘aroused White House suspicions that the Prime Minister
was determined to present a fait accompli, both in arms contract cancellations
and in a final British withdrawal from the Far East by 1971’. As a result of this
‘draining of confidence’ in Wilson, ‘very little hope is now felt here … of … the
$750 million F–111 contract … remaining unscathed’ (the British had ordered
fifty of these American-made jet fighters in January 1966). Moreover, ‘the im-
pression had rapidly gained ground’ in Washington ‘that the Prime Minister is
more than willing to sacrifice Singapore as a sop to his left-wing rather than to
make unpopular social welfare cutbacks at home’.42 Howard was mistaken to
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suggest that Wilson preferred reducing defence commitments to making cuts in
domestic programmes, but Washington’s disapproval of the former meant that
the Prime Minister was unwilling to face the Americans himself – not least
because at the time of devaluation he had told Johnson that the British would
maintain the remaining commitments outlined in the Defence White Paper of 18
July 1967.
The British Embassy’s Annual Review for 1967 suggested that ‘the with-
drawal of a major part of our forces East of Suez and our announced intentions
for Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s’ meant that the White House ‘will be liable
to consult with us less and take us less into their confidence about areas of the
world from which we are consciously opting out’. The United States would
‘behave increasingly in a manner which reflects the fundamental inequality’ of
its relationship with Britain.43 On 1 January 1968, Patrick Dean informed the
Foreign Office of Washington’s concern ‘that we shall dispose with dangerous
haste of the unique political and strategic assets which they regard us as holding
in trust for the West through our presence, reduced though it is, in Europe, the
Middle East, and in Asia’. Britain’s demise, said Dean, as ‘a leading financial
and military power would create more than just a vacuum which they do not
feel able or willing to fill themselves’. The White House understood its ‘interest
in Britain’s redressment’ and ‘the psychological need for cuts overseas if domes-
tic cuts are to be made effective’. However, Congress, which embodied ‘Ameri-
can Puritanism’ as well as ‘hypocrisy’, might think that the US was ‘subsidising
the British Welfare State while we are shifting more of our defence burden on to
American shoulders’. Congressmen ‘could make it very difficult for the Admin-
istration to provide the financial support we need when sterling is in trouble’.
Dean also believed that further British defence withdrawals could encourage the
United States to ‘slide rapidly into neo-isolationism … they will go their own
way with less and less regard for the concerns and interests of other nations’. It
would be a mistake ‘to underrate the underlying strength of this mood in Con-
gress and in the country at large and its inhibiting effect on the Administration
notwithstanding the reassuringly close and friendly relations which exist be-
tween the President and the Prime Minister and the two Secretaries of State’. It
was the mood of neo-isolationism ‘rather than the loss of the physical contribu-
tions which we can make to the defence of American and free world objectives
in the broadest sense that makes the Administration so sensitive to our actions’.
Against the background ‘of the reassessments which we have given in the past
two years, and more recently in the context of devaluation, it will be essential
and by no means easy to convince’ Washington ‘that there is still a distinction to
be drawn between contraction and contracting out’.44
Rather than face the Americans himself, Wilson sent George Brown to Wash-
ington to outline British plans. Brown told Dean Rusk on 11 January that ‘Brit-
ain had lost the battle to avoid devaluation … because they had been trying to
do too much at home and abroad with too slender resources’. Since then the
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Government had been considering ‘what cuts in spending must be made to as-
sure confidence and to avoid further devaluation’, concluding that ‘this required
a switch of £1 billion, including substantial cuts at home’. A predominance of
domestic cuts would be ‘unpalatable’, as it ‘would involve an attack on some
cherished social programmes, such as health and education’. Therefore the Labour
government was ‘forced again to look at defence expenditures overseas’, and
specifically to ‘accelerate the rundown in the Far East … there would be no
bases on mainland Asia by March 31 1971, instead of by the mid-70s’. British
forces would also ‘leave the Persian Gulf by the same time’. Rusk expressed
‘profound dismay’ at the news, and he was ‘particularly disturbed by the inten-
tion to announce these decisions’. If, ‘pending its entry into Europe, the UK
dropped back to a little England he could not help but feel that this would
generate a descending spiral across the board’. If the ‘teacher abandon[ed] the
field, Americans would ask if no-one else was interested, why should they be?’
Isolationism was ‘growing in the US because of the feeling that Americans were
carrying the problem alone’.45
On 2 February, Dean noted the ‘marked’ impact on Rusk of the planned
British measures: ‘As a man with such close links with and deep feeling for
Britain, he feels that he has seen the end of an era, and that as a result of our
decisions the world will be the poorer and a more dangerous place to live in’.
The Ambassador added that advance news ‘mainly from the Malaysians, of
what was in the wind had already reached the Administration and indeed public
opinion, and the atmosphere was anything but good’. Brown’s account ‘only
confirmed and deepened the mood of depression and even worse in the Admin-
istration’. Dean believed that the Americans ‘realised that they were not so
much being consulted as presented with a virtual fait accompli, and were in a
gloomy way resigned to the outcome’. They ‘pulled out as many stops as they
could in order to deter us, but felt all along that they were probably wasting
their breath’.46 Johnson was among those who had sought to ‘deter’ the British
from their course of action. He told Wilson on 11 January that he had ‘just
learned from Dean Rusk of your plans for total British withdrawal from the Far
East and the Persian Gulf by 1971’. This was ‘profoundly discouraging’, as it
amounted to a ‘British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for
the future safety and health of the free world’. The ‘structure of peacekeeping
will be shaken to its foundations’, and the United States’s own ‘capability and
political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all
alone’. The President urged Wilson and his colleagues ‘to review the alternative
before you take these irrevocable steps’. Even ‘a prolongation of your presence
in the Far East and the Persian Gulf until other stable arrangements can be put
in place would be of help at this very difficult time’.47
On 15 January, Johnson reiterated to Wilson that ‘the announcement of an
accelerated British withdrawal both from its Far Eastern bases and from the
Persian Gulf would create most serious problems for the United States Government
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and for the security of the entire free world’. Americans would ‘find great diffi-
culty in supporting the idea that we must move in to secure areas which the
United Kingdom has abandoned’. In particular, Johnson expressed concern about
reports in the London press that ‘the Cabinet has in fact decided to cancel the F–
111’. The jet, ‘because of its range and overall capability’, would permit the
forces of the United Kingdom to deploy to the Far East and the Persian Gulf
‘from its own bases’. This might ‘alleviate somewhat the strong reaction which
will inevitably take place’. However, if Britain  ‘decided to forego the acquisi-
tion of the F-111, everyone here will regard this as a total disengagement from
any commitments whichsoever to the security of areas outside Europe, and to a
considerable extent in Europe as well’. It would also ‘be viewed here as a strong
indication of British isolation which would be fatal to the chances of coopera-
tion between our two countries in the field of defence’.48
Wilson responded at length to the President the same day: the ‘heavy sacri-
fices at home would have been pointless without drastic retrenchment abroad’.
This was not ‘simply a matter of party politics – of keeping some kind of “bal-
ance” to force the unpleasant home medicine down the throats of our party
supporters’. The issue was much ‘wider than party politics – the politics of the
nation and the sense of purpose of the British people as a whole’. The British
were ‘sick and tired of being thought willing to eke out a comfortable existence
on borrowed money’. Recent weeks had seen ‘an astonishing assertion of this
kind of spirit throughout the nation and irrespective of party’. There was still a
‘confused groping for the real role that Britain ought to be playing in the world;
and it has been striking to observe … not only the extent to which people are
prepared to accept drastic sacrifice at home but also their demand that we must
no longer over-strain our real resources and capabilities in the military field
abroad’. But this did not mean ‘a British withdrawal from the world’, as the
‘spirit that has been running through this nation in recent weeks is not that of
“Little England”.’ It was instead ‘a blend of exasperation at our inability to
weather the successive storms of the past twenty years and determination, once
and for all to hew out a new role for Britain in the world at once commensurate
with her real resources yet worthy of her past’. This could not be done ‘on
borrowed time and borrowed money’, said Wilson.49
In the Far East and the Persian Gulf, Wilson continued, ‘our present political
commitments are too great for the military capability of the forces that we can
reasonably afford, if the economy is to be restored quickly and decisively’.
Britain  ‘must now take certain major foreign policy decisions as the prerequi-
site of economies in our defence expenditure’. By setting ‘realistic priorities’,
Britain could strengthen its ‘influence and power for peace in the world’. This
idea underlaid ‘the intention, conveyed to Dean Rusk by George Brown, to
withdraw our forces from the Far East and the Middle East by the end of the
financial year 1970/71’. But ‘in the light of’ concerns from the United States and
other allies, ‘we have decided to defer our withdrawal for a further nine months,
158 A ‘special relationship’?
i.e. to the end of 1971’. This would ‘still seem too soon’ for Johnson, but it was
‘a significant contribution to the time needed to help those in the areas con-
cerned prepare for the day when we shall no longer have a military presence
there’. So far as the F–111 was concerned, ‘the only way we can achieve the
really decisive economies that are essential in the hardware budget of the Royal
Air Force, while still keeping effective and sophisticated capabilities in all three
services, is to cancel the order for the 50 F–111 aircraft’. Wilson hoped that
Johnson was ‘wrong in assessing that this decision will be interpreted abroad as
a disengagement from any commitments to the security of areas outside Europe
or indeed largely in Europe as well’. The decision was not an ‘indication of
British isolation’, as Britain would ‘not be withdrawing from our three major
alliances; and the general capability we shall retain in this country and on the
continent can also be deployed overseas’. Wilson ended on a personal note:
‘Believe me, Lyndon, the decisions we are having to take now have been the
most difficult and heaviest of any that I, and I think all of my colleagues, can
remember in our public life’. Those decisions were not taken ‘in a narrow or
partisan spirit’, but because ‘in the longer term, only thus can Britain find the
new place on the world stage that I firmly believe the British people ardently
desire’.50
On 16 January, the Wilson government announced ‘heavy cuts in public
expenditure’, including the accelerated withdrawal from East of Suez and the
Persian Gulf. The cuts ‘fell hardest on defence spending and military commit-
ments abroad but they also hit some sacred socialist programmes, such as free
medical prescriptions, education and housing’.51 On 17 January, Michael Palliser
told Wilson of a conversation with Edward Tomkins, a minister at the British
Embassy in Washington, who said that the White House felt ‘double-crossed by
the British Government in terms of the assurances given to them both in July
and at the time of devaluation that the decisions then taken were not in conflict
with basic foreign policy objectives and represented final decisions on our force
commitments East of Suez’.52 On 31 January, Dean, lamenting the recent British
announcement, asked Rusk ‘if the President would ask Wilson to reconsider the
decision to withdraw by the end of 1971 from Singapore/Malaysia and the
Persian Gulf’. Rusk responded that ‘there was nothing new to add to what the
Secretary had told George Brown or to what the President had written in his two
messages to Wilson, especially as none of these representations had been very
successful’.53 On 2 February, Dean noted that the defence cuts had ‘without
question been a watershed in Anglo-American relations’, and that ‘the Americans
will with some justice be disposed to make their own dispositions without con-
sulting or considering us’.54
On 5 February, Dean reflected that although Anglo-American relations were
‘not in the forefront’ of American minds, there was still a degree of ‘resentment,
including on the President’s part, that they were not really consulted but pre-
sented with faits accomplis’. This had ‘hurt them deeply’. However, they accepted
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that ‘a new situation exists and there is no disposition to wish to express resent-
ment in any practical way just for the sake of doing so’. Johnson would be ‘less
interested in detailed justification of why our decisions were necessary than in
the positive aspects of our future policies which will be of help to him’.55 That
day the President expressed to the Sunday Times’s Washington correspondent
Henry Brandon his regret towards the British East of Suez decisions. Britain and
the United States would ‘always remain friends’, but ‘when our common inter-
ests shrink, the flow of communications and common business shrinks, too.
What Britain did was unnecessary, unwise and not in the British interest’.56 In
June 1968 the State Department reflected that the Labour government had ‘ac-
celerated curtailment of world-wide commitments and clarification of its policy
towards Europe’, but the process was ‘far from complete’. Continued ‘frustra-
tion of Britain’s new European vocation nourishes traditional British parochial-
ism, resentment toward France, and suspicion of Germany’. The Conservatives
had attacked the government’s ‘retreat from East of Suez’, but before they could
assume power ‘the cutbacks will probably have gone so far as to be irrepa-
rable’. Britain’s future was ‘at best, a middle-sized European power, albeit one
with a nuclear capability, a residual sense of extra-European responsibility and
a continuing, if diminished, status as a favoured partner of the US’.57
The last summit
Although on 8 November David Bruce had discouraged Wilson’s efforts to visit
Washington, the Ambassador soon became more sympathetic – probably be-
cause of the fortitude with which the Prime Minister was dealing with the critics
of the US position in Vietnam. On 16 November, while discussing the possibil-
ity of a visit to Britain of Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, Bruce told the State
Department that Wilson had ‘obviously anticipated using a conversation with
the Vice-President as a lever to pry open for himself an opening for a trip to the
United States to see the President’. Bruce recommended that ‘simultaneously
with a notification to the Prime Minister … of the Vice-President’s inability to
accept the engagement, the President [should] agree to receive him in Washing-
ton for a short conversation in December’. Bruce ‘emphatically divorce[d]’ him-
self ‘from any charge of being influenced by the PM’s representations on this
account’. Seldom, ‘if ever in recent times have the domestic pressures in Britain
been as great as they now are against the Government’s various actions which
involve close cooperation with the United States in support for the most part of
our major policies’. Wilson had so far restrained the situation by his ‘firmness
… in resisting proposals for drastic changes’. Newspaper accounts and ‘politi-
cal gossip have been rampant for months here to the effect that Wilson has
forfeited the confidence of President Johnson’. Bruce was ‘convinced that it would
be salutary, and in our national interest, if this meeting so ardently desired by
the Prime Minister could take place’. Neither a Conservative government nor a
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Labour one could ‘quickly remedy present ills, and we must, perhaps for a long
time, rely as far as we are concerned in these affairs on cooperation with us by
the present Prime Minister’. It would ‘be productive and helpful to have him
personally explain to the President the nature of his problems, and how he
proposes to deal with them’. Certainly, ‘the President’s views would be of great
importance in shaping his tactics’.58
On 4 December, Bruce told Wilson that Johnson ‘would be glad to welcome
him at any time’.59 Wilson’s sixth and, as it turned out, last visit to see President
Johnson was arranged for 8 February. The idea prevailed among the Americans
that the Prime Minister was using his trip not primarily as a means of settling
any Anglo-American matters – for the key issues concerning Britain’s role in the
world had lapsed – but as a respite from his difficulties at home. Rusk informed
Johnson on 3 February that Wilson’s visit ‘takes place against a background of
increasing troubles … at home’. A ‘Cabinet battle in January over the cuts in
governmental expenditure deepened the divisions in the Labour Party and fur-
ther weakened Wilson’s standing in the country’.60 On 6 February, Bruce, while
helping to draft the after-dinner toast for Wilson, said that he wanted the Presi-
dent to indicate that the visit had first been mooted some months ago. This
approach would help to ‘blunt British-US criticism of Wilson’s visit as a “patch
job to divert attention from domestic problems”’.61 On 7 February, Walt Rostow
advised Johnson that ‘Wilson is in trouble at home. His visit here is designed to
boost his prestige in Britain’. The Prime Minister still commanded ‘a comfort-
able majority in Parliament’, but ‘his failure to deal decisively with Britain’s
economic problems has lost him the confidence of much of his party and most of
his countrymen’.62 A State Department analysis on 7 February continued this
theme by stating that Wilson’s visit:
comes at a time when he is under increasing pressure and criticism at home – from
some members of his own Labour Party who are upset at the cutbacks in the planned
level of domestic spending, especially in education and welfare programmes; from the
Tory opposition, which is unhappy about the government’s plans to accelerate with-
drawals of military forces from the Persian Gulf and East of Suez, and from most of
the press and public which have discovered a Wilson ‘credibility gap’.63
The analysis also noted that ‘The public in general and Labourites in particular
feel that Wilson has broken promise after promise’. Much of the national press
was ‘currently portraying Wilson as a discredited, broken, pathetic little man’.64
Bruce, in Washington for the Prime Minister’s visit, wrote in his diary on 8
February that Wilson ‘and his train arrived from London last night’. The entou-
rage included ‘Mrs Wilson, Burke Trend, Denis Greenhill, Michael Halls,
Michael Palliser, Gerald Kaufman (Public Relations Adviser), T. D. Lloyd-Hughes
(Press Secretary), and Donald Murray (Head of Southeast Asia Department,
Foreign Office)’. The ‘road from the White House Northwest Gate to the Diplo-
matic entrance was lined with Army, Navy, and Air Force men, standing at
attention with fixed bayonets’. Bruce said that ‘I trailed along behind the President
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as he met his guests in front of a battery of cameramen’. Wilson and Johnson
‘disappeared into the Oval Office, unattended, from which they emerged two
and a half hours later (2 o’clock)’.65 Their discussions, though cordial in tone,
could hardly claim great significance, with the two leaders discussing economic
affairs and the war in Vietnam. Johnson ‘made no attempt … to go over the
ground of British withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, still less the Gulf’.66
Bruce noted that the press ‘made merry about the selections chosen by the or-
chestra for this evening’s State Dinner’. Included was the song ‘Road to Mandalay,
and one or two other examples that seemed especially inapposite’ in the light of
Britain’s declining world status (Wilson himself noted that Road to Mandalay,
‘words by Kipling, contained the first formulation of the phrase “east of Suez”’.)67
On 1 March, Dean told Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under Secretary of the
Foreign Office, that Wilson’s latest trip did not excite much attention in Wash-
ington, but ‘taken in low-key it was an undoubted success’ – Wilson and Johnson
had ‘refurbished their personal relationship without any arid arguments about
the British role in the world’. The President and his advisers were not ‘really
reconciled at heart to our latest decisions on Defence; all the evidence, though it
is admittedly indirect, suggests that they are not’. However, the Administration
preferred to ‘see how they can work together with us in the new situation rather
than merely raking over the coals’. Comment on the Prime Minister’s visit ‘in
the country at large reflected generally the attitudes shown towards the defence
cuts in the previous month’. It was ‘friendly, sympathetic, and grateful for sup-
port, but inclined to question whether the relationship could be seen in the same
terms as that of the Churchill–Roosevelt era’.68
Although Wilson’s meetings with Johnson had seemed to go well, a minor
controversy soon arose. On 26 February, Michael Palliser informed Wilson of a
recent Times article by Louis Heren, which intimated that Johnson did not hold
the Prime Minister in high regard.69 Palliser had asked David Bruce whether
Heren’s talk with Johnson had been ‘preceded or followed by a talk with Rostow’,
who was especially unsympathetic towards the British, ‘and whether the latter
had in any way coloured what Heren had said’. Bruce ‘concluded on the basis
of his own knowledge of the President’s point of view, that this must be the
outcome of a personal talk with the President’. The Ambassador had ‘himself
heard the President express, in one form or another, most of the views set out in
the Heren article’. Bruce was especially struck by the reference in the article to
‘the “narrow gap” to be bridged over Vietnam’, a phrase which Wilson had
used in his speech at the White House. Bruce recalled Johnson’s belief that ‘talk
of “narrow gaps” was superficial in the context of the present military situation
and of the likely political difficulties in any eventual negotiations’. Palliser told
Wilson that Bruce had ‘conveyed a gentle warning that, so far as LBJ was
concerned, too much continuing talk of “the narrow gap” could come to be
equated with “Cuban buses” as a personal obsession directed against yourself’.
Bruce had ‘had a long talk with the President’ before the British visit, and ‘the
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President had expressed the firm intention of expressing his grave concern at the
accelerated British withdrawal from East of Suez’. Johnson had ‘intended to do
this privately to you and that he might well not say to anyone afterwards that he
had done so’. The Ambassador ‘had therefore been very surprised when you
said that this matter had hardly come up in your talk with the President’. In
short, Bruce believed that the Heren article was ‘faithfully reflecting the President’s
views’ when it presented the idea that ‘the accelerated withdrawal’ of British
forces in Asia was ‘mistaken’.70
On 28 February, John Killick of the British Embassy in Washington also
confirmed the veracity of Heren’s article. The journalist had told Killick that in
the interview Johnson had ‘deliberately decided that he wanted to put across his
line about the defence cuts in order to dispel any idea there might have been
following his talk with the Prime Minister that he had not been worried by
them’. Heren also said that ‘although the President had throughout referred in
perfectly respectful terms to the Prime Minister, he had the strong impression
that in fact Mr Wilson’s standing with him had markedly declined’. Killick
concluded that Heren’s article was ‘without doubt based entirely on the President’s
own remarks and is not an amalgam of things the President said with remarks
of others in the White House’. Heren affirmed that the President had actually
said that ‘if there is always to be an Anglo-American special relationship, the
Prime Minister really ought to stop talking about “narrow gaps” to be bridged’.71
The matter soon subsided, though, and in July 1968 a Foreign Office analysis
commented that ‘Relations between the President and the Prime Minister are
very cordial. Meetings which take place in Washington once or twice a year in
Washington are valuable and should be maintained. The discussion is private,
frank and uninhibited’.72 Yet for all the apparent congeniality ‘at the summit’,
Britain’s ties with the United States were in some ways unremarkable. On 1
July, Dean noted that the Americans, ‘with so much else to think about … have
little time or inclination at present to remember their friends or to consider their
worth to themselves’. British news rarely received ‘many inches in the press
today, but I believe we are holding our own quite well’. The ‘shock’ of the
January defence decisions had ‘largely worn off’, and recent ‘problems of the
dollar have given thinking Americans more sympathy for the vicissitudes of the
pound and the British economy’. British society appeared to be a ‘rock of stabil-
ity by comparison with France today, and some other European countries’.
Britain’s ‘manifest support for NATO is a real encouragement at a time when
voices are raised in Congress for the withdrawal of troops from Europe’.73
Exit Lyndon Johnson, enter Richard Nixon
On 31 March 1968, Johnson, buffeted by domestic dissent and a mounting
death toll in Vietnam, announced that he would not seek another term in of-
fice,74 and the Republican contender, Richard Nixon, won the presidential election
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on 5 November that year. On 13 January 1969, Johnson asked Dean to tell
Wilson that ‘one of his great comforts had been that he could always count on
the UK during any crisis’. He was ‘personally grateful for the warm and effec-
tive relations he had always had with the Prime Minister and other British
officials’.75 On 17 January, Wilson in turn thanked the outgoing President for
the ‘warmth of your welcome on each of my six visits to Washington and the
depth and frankness of our talks’, which had been ‘of inestimable value to me,
and I hope to you also’.76 At the same time Wilson wanted to forge strong ties
with Nixon, extolling to him on 5 February the need ‘for a close and confident
relationship between our two governments’.77 Wilson had first met Nixon soon
after assuming the leadership of the Labour Party in February 1963. Looking to
the future, in January 1967 Wilson had also accepted his invitation to meet
again – ‘Of such are political relationships born’, the Prime Minister noted.
Nixon decided that he would visit Europe in the first few weeks of his adminis-
tration, to ‘demonstrate the importance he attached to the European link – in
contrast to his predecessor, who gave the impression that all his interests were in
the Pacific’.78 The new President visited London on 24–25 February 1969. Wil-
son met him at London Airport, telling him on the way to 10 Downing Street
that:
right at the outset of our relationship, I wanted to say to him what I had said to his
predecessor at my first Prime Minister/President meeting with him, namely that I
would not say anything about him or our relationships outside the conference room
that had not been said inside, but that I would say a great deal inside that would not
be repeated outside. Further, I would not feel it my duty to tell the outside what I had
said to him – and to him only.79
Wilson told the President about when he had ‘said this to LBJ in December 1964
and briefly described the Cuban buses episode of the previous spring which had
led to the acute suspicion which LBJ had voiced before my own visit’. Nixon
‘roared with laughter at the story’. Wilson said that Johnson could reflect ‘that
there had been the fullest confidence in all our dealings and I had never at any
point embarrassed him by statements or briefings outside’. On ‘the one occa-
sion’ when Britain ‘took a different line’ to that held in Washington, ‘namely the
“dissociation” on the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong’ in June 1966, ‘not only
had I told him on my previous visit that I would have to do this if the bombing
occurred – which he accepted – but that when the occasion arose we had several
exchanges before our statement was made’.80 Wilson’s effort to establish a close
relationship with Nixon enjoyed only limited success, because no real rapport
ever emerged between the two leaders. For example, Wilson suggested after their
first handshake that they should address each other by their first names. Nixon’s
National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, noted that ‘A fishy-eyed stare from
Nixon squelched this idea’.81 Moreover, Britain was less and less regarded as a
major power. Kissinger wrote that Wilson ‘greeted Nixon with the avuncular
goodwill of the head of an ancient family that has seen better times’.82
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Conclusion
Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson:
a ‘special relationship’?
This work has examined the question of Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and
Anglo-American relations ‘at the summit’, 1964–68. By exploring the mutual
dealings of the two leaders, it seeks to examine their respective attitudes to the
Anglo-American relationship and to one another; how they approached the
matters of mutual interest and the extent to which their personal relationship
was in any sense a ‘special’ one, and to evaluate broader developments in the
ties between Britain and the United States. The introduction examined the lit-
erature and outlined the structures of the Anglo-American relationship, gave
brief biographies of Wilson and Johnson and indicated the main content of the
study. In the period October–November 1964, Wilson was quick to solicit Ameri-
can help in the economic crisis that befell the new Labour government. At the
Washington summit of 7–9 December 1964, Wilson spoke of cementing a ‘close’
Anglo-American relationship, but Johnson regarded the conference as little more
than a chore, and a means of dealing with the lingering NATO matter of the
MLF. The months January–April 1965 saw Wilson’s over-ambitious and poorly-
received telephone call to the White House on 11 February to try to moderate
American conduct in Vietnam, and the renewal of his relationship with the
President when they met again in Washington on 1 April. The period May–
December 1965 saw Wilson and Johnson strike an informal, secret ‘deal’ whereby
the United States would support sterling in return for a British commitment to
preserve the international role. Between January and July 1966 there was Wilson’s
reluctant but, given the feelings of the Labour left and an increasing proportion
of the general public, politically necessary ‘dissociation’ from the American
bombing of North Vietnam. The dissociation caused the most serious strain yet
in the relationship, but the rift was overcome by the efforts of Ambassadors
Bruce and Dean and by Wilson’s affirmations of support for the UK’s continued
‘great power’ role when he visited Washington on 29 July. The period August
1966–September 1967 saw Wilson’s abortive ‘phase A–phase B’ Vietnam peace
initiative, during which Washington’s sharp reversal of position caused him to
doubt the value of close ties with the White House. This phase also saw a more
general decline in the Anglo-American relationship precipitated by British de-
fence cuts East of Suez, and by the UK’s increasingly pro-European orientation.
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The year or so from late 1967 to the end of 1968 also had important implica-
tions for the Johnson–Wilson relationship, as it saw the devaluation of sterling
and the demise of the remaining British commitment East of Suez. As 1968
ended, the White House was more inclined to regard Britain simply as one ally
among many, rather than a state with whom there was some kind of ‘special’
relationship.
The Anglo-American relationship, 1964–68
There has been the suggestion that the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’
died or at least went into some form of diplomatic hibernation with the end of
the Kennedy–Macmillan era in 1963, reemerging with the close personal bonds
between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.1 Certainly, in the
years of Wilson and Johnson the ties between Britain and the United States did
undergo significant change. In February 1964, a Foreign Office assessment noted
that ‘Anglo-American relations are fundamentally good … there is close consul-
tation and cooperation over a wide field’.2 In August 1964, the Foreign Office
wrote that the Americans ‘look to us as their major partner and as a world
power with world-wide interests for practical cooperation in a wide variety of
fields, from the development of joint defence facilities to the conduct of eco-
nomic policy’.3 Yet the closeness of the Anglo-American relationship was not
taken for granted. The February 1964 analysis had suggested that ‘In the last
analysis our influence on American policy depends on our practical contribu-
tion to the Western Alliance rather any particular feeling of United Kingdom/
United States interdependence’.4 The British Embassy’s Annual Review for 1964
warned that Britain would ‘be increasingly treated on [its] merits and shall be
regarded not so much for who we are as for how we perform’. Britain’s ‘influ-
ence will depend on our ability to solve our own economic problems and to
bring an end to what seems to the Americans to be a position of chronic insol-
vency’.5 In March 1965, the valedictory despatch of Lord Harlech, the British
Ambassador to Washington since 1961, warned that although ‘We have a closer
and more intimate relationship with the United States Government than any
other country and our views are listened to with greater attention … we … will
be judged increasingly by our performance.’ For one thing, ‘the myriad of close
personal friendships built up at all levels during the war and immediate postwar
years are a diminishing asset and nationals of other countries, if they care to
make the effort, can establish almost equally close contacts’.6
Throughout 1964–68, Britain suffered from chronic economic difficulties,
generated by an overvalued pound, uncompetitive industrial practices and lead-
ing to an inability to pay its way in the world. Economic troubles, alongside
Labour Party opposition, prompted a retrenchment from the traditional role as
a global power to one with strategic interests focused primarily on Europe. In
the light of Vietnam, this process of retrenchment distressed the Americans. In
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May 1967, US Ambassador David Bruce, ruing Britain’s planned relinquish-
ment of its East of Suez commitments, wrote bitterly that the ‘so-called Anglo-
American special relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology’.7
The British Embassy reflected in its Annual Review for 1967 that ‘the with-
drawal of a major part of our forces East of Suez and our announced intentions
for Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s’ meant that the White House ‘will be liable
to consult with us less and take us less into their confidence about areas of the
world from which we are consciously opting out’. The United States would
‘behave increasingly in a manner which reflects the fundamental inequality’ of
its ties with the UK.8 In February 1968, the British Ambassador, Patrick Dean,
noted that the defence cuts had ‘without question been a watershed in Anglo-
American relations’, and that ‘the Americans will with some justice be disposed
to make their own dispositions without consulting or considering us’.9 In June
1968, a State Department analysis reflected that Britain’s future was ‘at best, a
middle-sized European power, albeit one with a nuclear capability, a residual
sense of extra-European responsibility and a continuing, if diminished, status as
a favoured partner of the US’.10 Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that ‘Opera-
tionally, the US and UK are working on fewer real problems. The concept of
Atlantic cooperation could replace the special relationship.’11
The devaluation of the pound and the retreat from East of Suez did not,
however, mean that Britain suddenly disappeared below Washington’s horizon;
Patrick Dean noted in October 1967 that ‘the Americans have no intention of
dispensing with us nor have any wish to do so’. That was not to say that ‘they
are always satisfied with our performance (e.g. our defence policy East of Suez)
nor we with theirs (the present anti-British mood of the Congress)’, but it was
‘extremely dangerous to conclude that the relationship is coming to an end’.
There had been ‘such developments in the past which at the time have seemed
no less serious and perhaps even more so, and yet the relationship has persisted
and survived’. Examples included ‘Suez in 1956 and Skybolt in 1962’.12 Dean
noted that there was in Washington a degree of:
discontent or displeasure with certain aspects of our policies where we differ with the
United States Government. Defence policy East of Suez has been the main cause of
such expressions of view recently. But such things are a measure of the distress it
causes the Americans when we, of whom this is expected so much less than of other
countries, find ourselves out of line with them and leave out of account the very large
and important positive factor of the many important areas in which we can and do
still work with them on the basis of a very close identity of view.13
Apart from ‘the working links between Ministers in these fields, which are nec-
essarily less frequent and continuing’, these ‘important factors’ were ‘perhaps
most manifest in the day-to-day work of this Embassy with its American oppo-
site numbers at all levels from my own down to desk officers’.14 Rajarishi Roy
has noted that during the international financial crisis of October 1967–March
1968 the two countries worked closely with one another to bolster the
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international monetary system.15 In February 1968, soon after London’s an-
nouncement of the hastened withdrawal from East of Suez, the State Depart-
ment noted that Britain still had much to offer – Britain was ‘still the third
largest nuclear power in the world’, with ‘a small but high quality naval and air
nuclear capability’, plus a ‘not inconsiderable 55,000 man British Army of the
Rhine … the third largest national force that is unquestionably committed to
NATO’.16 In sum:
the UK will still have the capacity to be highly useful to the US. Britain still has a
greater variety of responsibilities than will any other US ally. Its interests will still
converge with ours more than will those of any other ally. At least for the next few
years, it will continue to spend about £2 billion a year on its armed forces and to be
the world’s no. 3 nuclear power. It will still have unparalleled experience, expertise,
and entree and will therefore be able to carry out undertakings of benefit to the US in
diplomacy, intelligence and technology.17
Yet the British withdrawal from East of Suez did represent the end of an era in
the post-war Anglo-American relationship, as the global system of military bases
that had helped to make Britain such an attractive ally in the Cold War would
soon be no more. The State Department analysis quoted above also noted that
‘the defence cutbacks announced by Prime Minister Wilson on January 16 sig-
nalled the eventual end of Britain as a world power’.18 In June 1968, US Secre-
tary of Defence Clark Clifford asserted that ‘the British do not have the resources,
the back-up, or the hardware to deal with any big world problem … they are no
longer a powerful ally of ours because they cannot afford the cost of an ad-
equate defence effort’.19 It is evident that by 1968 Washington felt less regard for
Britain’s capabilities than it did four years earlier, and in that sense the ‘special
relationship’ suffered a major blow. In July that year, the Foreign Office noted
‘a recent tendency in the United States regretfully to write Britain off because we
seem to them to be failing to fulfil our part in maintaining world stability in the
defence and monetary fields’.20 There was little evidence of such a tendency in
1964. Notably, this development substantiates the argument of C. J. Bartlett,
who has suggested that ‘British standing in Washington plummeted in the win-
ter of 1967–1968’21 mainly as a result of the East of Suez decisions – although it
must be added that previously there were doubts in Washington about the Brit-
ish capacity to maintain the world role. Saki Dockrill’s observation that ‘a close
relationship with the USA did not necessarily mean that the other country had to
have equal power and strength to the USA’22 is a plausible generalisation, but
the fact remains that in the years 1964–68 American regard for Britain fell as
British decline became all the more apparent.
Despite the evident and widening asymmetry of power there was a high degree
of interdependence between Britain and the United States in 1964–68 – Thomas
Schwartz refers aptly to ‘an extraordinary degree of interaction, involvement,
and influence between the US and British governments’.23 This interdependence is
confirmed, for example, by the frequent expressions of concern on the part of the
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President and his advisers about the shaky British economy; Johnson told
Chancellor James Callaghan in 1965 that economically ‘when you have headaches,
we have headaches, too’.24 To Washington, the devaluation of the pound threatened
a major dislocation of the trading relations between the Western powers, while
Britain had an interest in securing American support for sterling in order to counter
speculative attacks. American policymakers also needed British support over
Vietnam, preferably to include a contingent of troops, and they sought a continued
British presence East of Suez. Both aims were very useful as a way of legitimising
and underpinning American policy in Southeast Asia. In some ways, therefore, it
seems that Washington was more dependent on London than vice-versa.
It is worth adding in this context that British economic troubles were probably
the most fundamental of the key issues between Britain and the United States, as
they placed Britain in the position of a petitioner for American largesse and
undermined the likelihood of remaining a ‘world power’. For the United States,
Vietnam was the most prominent foreign policy issue of the period, while for
British policymakers it was an issue only so far as it generated domestic discord
and led to strains in the Anglo-American relationship. East of Suez was of key
importance to the British, as it was a question of their long-term orientation in
world affairs. For Washington, the issue of British commitments in Asia was
important so far as withdrawal from the region would lead to further attacks on
the United States’s stance in Vietnam.
Wilson and Johnson: approaches to the Anglo-American relationship
As Philip Ziegler has commented, Wilson was keenly interested in world affairs
and intended from the outset of his time in office to play ‘a large part in all the
most important international problems’.25 Commenting on prime ministerial domi-
nance of foreign affairs, David H. Dunn has noted that the common tendency for
‘prime ministers to try to be their own foreign secretaries has … resulted in less
able ministers being appointed to these posts’.26 While Wilson’s foreign secretar-
ies – Patrick Gordon Walker, Michael Stewart and George Brown – were not
necessarily lacking in ability, they were generally overshadowed by the Prime
Minister. Gordon Walker, Stewart and Brown all supported the idea of close ties
between Britain and the United States, but Wilson’s input was such that, as
Richard Crossman commented, British foreign policy was characterised above
all by the ‘peculiarly Wilsonian touch’ of a ‘personal reliance on LBJ’.27 The
Foreign Office backed up Wilson’s support for the continued close relationship
with Washington and for the British ‘great power’ role, but independent of these
factors the Prime Minister had his own, deep-seated commitment to the United
States. David Bruce noted in mid-1966 that Wilson accepted the principle of
continuity in post-war British foreign policy, central to which was ‘the long
established friendly relationship with the US’.28 Around the time of Bruce’s analy-
sis, London was canvassing its prospects of joining the EEC, but Europe held
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less attraction for Wilson than did the established close relationship with
Washington. On a practical level, a close Anglo-American association would
further his standing as a global statesman, enhance British prestige, and offer a
source of economic help for Britain to maintain its status as a world power.
Wilson’s commitment to the American connection was also entwined with his
reluctance to devalue sterling. There were other reasons for his intransigence in
this regard – not least of which was the idea that within Britain Labour would
be tagged the party of devaluation – but American opposition to the measure
certainly influenced him.
His approach to the United States also had a distinctly personal element. He
felt, as White House adviser Richard Neustadt pointed out in 1965, an ‘emo-
tional commitment to the US’, which he ‘personified … in LBJ’.29 At times Wil-
son seemed to take a naive pleasure in his dealings with the Johnson
Administration, shown, for example, by his delight at the President’s message of
congratulation soon after Labour gained power and his excited anticipation of
the summit meeting a few weeks later. For Wilson, the latter represented the
consummate affirmation that Britain under Labour still had a seat at the ‘top
table’ of international affairs. Clive Ponting’s verdict that Wilson’s enjoyment
of political power was captured especially in ‘the protocol of receptions in Wash-
ington’ and ‘meetings with President Johnson’ certainly rings true.30
Wilson was constrained by a notable degree of pressure with regard to the
conduct of British foreign policy, including pressure from within the Labour
Party. The Labour left was deeply unimpressed by Wilson’s dedication to the
White House and by the official government policy of support for the American
position in Vietnam, and even if he had so wanted it would have been practi-
cally impossible to have committed troops without bringing down his govern-
ment. Agitation within the Labour Party contributed to the ‘dissociation’ of
1966, and also helps to explain the Prime Minister’s zeal for high-profile peace-
making initiatives. There was also pressure from Labour politicians to bring an
end to Britain’s position as a global power, not least because the overseas spend-
ing that this entailed might instead be deployed at home to bring the country
more into line with socialist ideals.
The Foreign Office was also a notable influence. As well as favouring
Wilson’s personal commitment to Washington, it supported the official policy
of support for the American position in Vietnam; the United States was, after
all, Britain’s most important ally. There was, however, no desire to commit
troops, as Britain had few direct interests in the region and the outcome of the
war was, to say the least, always very uncertain. There was among the rep-
resentatives of the Foreign Office a reluctance to see the end of Britain’s glo-
bal role, as this undermined the country’s international standing especially in
relation to the United States. Thus, Wilson’s policies had to take into account
the various influences – some subtle, some less so – emanating from the United
States and the Foreign Office on one hand, and the Labour left on the other
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hand. Nor could he easily escape the pressure of a declining economy when
framing his policies.
Given the anti-Americanism of the Labour left and Conservative jibes that
Wilson was making Britain the ‘51st state’, it would surely have been expedient
for him to have adopted a more independent position towards the White House.
Roy argues that Wilson’s ‘willingness to consider the attitude of the United
States in framing his policies … earned him little tangible reward from the
President’.31 There is much truth in this comment, but it must be remembered
that Wilson was not entirely supine towards the Americans – opposition to the
MLF, ‘dissociation’, the planned withdrawal from East of Suez, and the devalu-
ation of sterling contravened American wishes. The Prime Minister was ca-
pable of a hard-headed, even cynical approach to the United States, as
demonstrated by his attempt in November 1967 to threaten the White House
with immediate, large-scale defence cuts both in Europe and in Asia in return
for economic assistance to avoid devaluing sterling. Consciously or otherwise,
this stance represented an attempt to redirect the mid-1965 American efforts to
emphasise that American help for sterling would be less forthcoming if the Brit-
ish were to reduce their defence commitments.
For his part, Johnson was no novice in foreign affairs. As Senate Majority
Leader in the 1950s, he oversaw the passage of major legislation in this field,
and, as Kennedy’s vice-president (1961–63), he made numerous trips abroad.
However, with his vision of creating a ‘Great Society’ – helping to heal the
racial divide and to eradicate poverty – the President was more interested in
domestic politics than international affairs, and certainly had little commitment
to close ties with London. As a Foreign Office analysis noted in May 1965,
Johnson did not have ‘any instinctive feel for Britain. As a Texan there is noth-
ing in his background that suggests he should’.32 Although the Second World
War engaged in Johnson a lasting respect for Winston Churchill, no other Brit-
ish prime minister seemed to win his admiration. So far as American policy was
concerned, the President generally concurred with advisers such as McGeorge
Bundy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, who believed that
American interests required the parity of the pound to remain at $2.80 and that
Britain must retain its international role. There were exceptions to this outlook,
though, including the views of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler who
advised Johnson in 1966 that if Washington continued to pressure Britain to
remain a world power, then British economic weakness would simply be exac-
erbated and prolonged: a ‘weak ally is of no use to us East of Suez or anywhere
else … we must leave it to the UK government to decide what it must do, short
of devaluation, to save its national position’.33
Similarly, Undersecretary of State George Ball tried to persuade the President
to try to discourage British claims of a ‘special relationship’ with the United
States, by easing the pressure for a continued world role, refusing any further
short-term financial assistance, and encouraging British membership of the EEC.34
conclusion.p65 08/06/2004, 14:43173
174 A ‘special relationship’?
Johnson offered token support for the idea of British membership of the Com-
mon Market when in 1966 Wilson announced the intention to seek membership,
but in truth he felt little real engagement in the matter. He was more concerned
about the situation in South-east Asia, disregarding the advice of Fowler and
Ball and continuing to press upon Wilson the idea that Britain should maintain
the parity of the pound and above all that it should uphold its foreign policy
commitments. After the 1965 commitment of US combat troops to Vietnam, the
region was necessarily the centre of American diplomacy, and Johnson wanted
a ‘special’ relationship with Britain only to the extent to which British policy
suited American strategic and economic interests. By contrast, it seems that the
linguistic and historical links between Britain and the United States led Wilson
to anticipate something more intimate; as Anthony Wedgwood Benn put it in
May 1964, he hoped to be able to ‘telephone and fly over’ to Washington ‘as
and when necessary’.35 But Johnson disdained the idea of a relationship of this
nature, dismissing the Prime Minister’s telephone call over Vietnam in February
1965 and frequently expressing hostility to Wilson’s visits, which were of scant
practical value to the United States. The President’s unsentimental attitude to
Britain was shown by his concurrence with the view of advisers such as Bundy
in the summer of 1965 that American support for sterling would be less forth-
coming if the British were retreating from their global commitments, and his
statement in 1968 in the light of the accelerated withdrawal from East of Suez
that ‘when our common interests shrink, the flow of communications and com-
mon business shrinks, too’36 indicates his basic disinterest towards the British. If
there was no clear and practical reason for doing so then the White House
would have little inclination to remain in close contact with London.
The Wilson–Johnson relationship, 1964–68
Ambassadors Bruce and Dean both shaped Anglo-American relations ‘at the
summit’, 1964–68. As the Foreign Office noted in July 1965, Bruce was ‘a man
of very considerable stature, and, of course, has the advantage of at least part of
one ear of the President’.37 Wilson described him as ‘a giant among diplomats,
with more experience and wise judgment than possibly anyone else in the diplo-
matic profession of any country’.38 He also noted that Washington’s ‘confidence’
in Bruce, ‘both White House and Foggy Bottom level’, was ‘total’, and doubted
‘if in modern times any Prime Minister and American Ambassador have been
closer’.38 The Prime Minister frequently used Bruce as a medium of communica-
tion with the White House, and Bruce’s eloquent and perspicacious telegrams
helped to foster an understanding in Washington of Britain and its Labour gov-
ernment. The Ambassador was especially effective, for example, in helping
Washington to appreciate the reluctance with which in June 1966 Wilson had
‘dissociated’ Britain from American actions in Vietnam, by conveying the deli-
cacy of the Prime Minister’s position between an increasingly fractious and
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anti-American Labour left on the one hand and the White House on the other.
However, Bruce’s analyses were not always flattering; despite his affections for
Britain he was always frank. In particular, there was almost a sense of betrayal
at East of Suez measures,40 deriving from the view that in the context of Ameri-
can troubles in Vietnam the move was ill-timed and irresponsible. Lord Harlech
retired as British Ambassador to the United States in April 1965, and so figured
less prominently in the Wilson–Johnson relationship than did his successor, Patrick
Dean, who Wilson believed had ‘earned the same degree of confidence in the
United States’ as Bruce had in Britain, thereby contributing to the ‘flourishing
and warm relationship, not only between governments but between peoples’.41
However, Roy has argued that Dean had very little ‘cachet’ at the White House.42
While it is true that Johnson showed no disposition to cement the kind of close
relationship with Dean that Wilson cultivated with Bruce, Dean’s role did prove
significant in mid-1966 when, like Bruce, he helped communicate the depth of
Washington’s distress over ‘dissociation’, and helped convey the fact of Wilson’s
essential reluctance to upset the White House. Much to Wilson’s relief, Dean
also helped mollify American reactions to the devaluation of sterling in Novem-
ber 1967 (although the devaluation was relatively modest in scale and was not
entirely unexpected to the White House). In 1967–68, many of the Ambassador’s
reports to London predicted that the Anglo-American relationship would suffer
greatly as a result of the withdrawal from East of Suez, although in his hand-
wringing he seemed more sympathetic to American concerns than with the prob-
lems of a struggling Britain.
Contacts between Wilson and Johnson included few telephone conversations.
This was partly because Johnson showed little interest in telephoning Downing
Street and because he discouraged Wilson from telephoning the White House.
Johnson would use the telephone as an offensive tool in dealing with fellow poli-
ticians in the United States, and he therefore resented being ‘put on the spot’ when
people turned the tables and called him. This attitude was shown by his response
to Wilson’s telephone call about Vietnam on 11 February 1965, when, as Wilson
puts it, the President ‘shouted and ranted at me at the top of his voice’.43 Wilson
and Johnson corresponded often, on issues that included Vietnam, East of Suez,
economic matters, plus numerous miscellaneous topics. While Wilson’s letters
were candid and sometimes suggested that he needed a confidant, Johnson’s were
less personal and more frequently drafted by his staff. The two men met regularly.
As well as his visit to Johnson’s White House in March 1964 as leader of the
Labour opposition, Wilson saw Johnson at six more bilateral summits in Wash-
ington: in December 1964, April 1965, December 1965, July 1966, June 1967 and
February 1968, as well as (briefly) at the funeral of Konrad Adenauer in Bonn in
January 1967 and at the memorial service for Harold Holt in Melbourne in
December 1967. The Washington meetings would usually include an hour or
two during which the two leaders would speak privately – often about domes-
tic politics – with further discussions held in the company of advisers.
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Due to his personal commitment to Washington and to fears of the political
impact in Britain if it ever seemed that he had lost the President’s confidence,
Wilson sometimes appeared preoccupied by a desire to see Johnson. This was
especially the case when the Prime Minister wanted to repair the personal rela-
tionship after ‘dissociation’ in 1966. The White House initiated only two of
Wilson’s six prime ministerial visits: the summit of December 1964 and that of
June 1967. In 1964, the Americans had wanted to bring the MLF to a conclu-
sion, and two and a half years later they sought to bolster the moribund British
commitment to the world role.
According to Wilson, meetings between prime ministers and presidents ‘are
essential and should be frequent. There is a great deal to be said for the growing
informality which has been developed, so that they tend to be regarded as rou-
tine and not symbolising any great crisis or turn of events.’44 David H. Dunn
has pointed out that summit conferences often possess a ‘symbolic importance’.45
It was symbolic of the relationship between Wilson and Johnson that Wilson
always had to go to Washington while Johnson never stirred himself to visit
London. As well as enjoying the publicity of the summits and the relief they
afforded from problems at home, Wilson used the meetings to try to educate
Johnson on the rationale behind British policies such as those concerning Viet-
nam; this situation supports Dunn’s assertion that leaders can use summits to
perform an ‘educative’ role.46 Wilson managed to deploy his political skills so
that the President was usually inclined to voice a positive verdict of him after
the meetings. Even after the summit of July 1966 – soon after ‘dissociation’ –
Johnson expressed a more favourable opinion of the British leader. This was a
notable triumph, given his reservations towards summit diplomacy and towards
Wilson (so far as the British were concerned, there is not much evidence to
support Elmer Plischke’s view that Johnson ‘apparently enjoyed his role as dip-
lomat-in-chief’).47 Henry Brandon of the Sunday Times noted that Johnson felt
that little was ‘to be learned, even from informal personal contact’ with foreign
leaders ‘that cannot be learned from reading diplomatic cables or the newspa-
pers’.48 While Johnson did not enjoy summit meetings, it is clear that he liked
dealing with some foreign leaders more than others. There was, for example, a
genuine and consistent affinity for German chancellors. Chancellor Erhard of
West Germany was his favourite among the European leaders with whom he
dealt.49 In summer 1965, very soon after a visit from Wilson, Johnson told him
that Germany was the most ‘trustworthy’ of the United States’s allies.50 As Johnson
said himself in 1967, he was ‘descended from German stock and lived in a
German community in Texas. If he did not have the deep respect and love for
the German people that he possessed, he would have moved long ago’.51
Johnson’s reservations towards Wilson derived considerably from the idea
that British leaders were especially inclined to visit the White House mainly to
‘play to the gallery’ at home; the public comments in Washington of Alec Dou-
glas-Home early in 1964 over the British bus trade with communist Cuba were
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seared into his mind. In April 1965 Johnson’s sheer antipathy towards the pros-
pect of seeing Wilson – exacerbated on this occasion by the memory of Wilson’s
telephone call on 11 February – was such that he even threatened in private to
feign illness so that he could avoid seeing the Prime Minister. However, in the
meetings Wilson did provide an especially sympathetic ear for Johnson. Al-
though seemingly unappreciated, this aspect of the relationship surely provided
some respite for a President increasingly assailed by domestic and international
controversy over Vietnam. But in terms of substance, the Wilson–Johnson sum-
mits achieved little, apart from the negative result of ‘sinking’ the lingering and
troublesome matter of the MLF in December 1964.
Johnson’s Undersecretary of State, George Ball, argued that there is ‘nothing
more dangerous than to rest the relations between states too heavily on the
capricious interaction of diverse personalities’.52 The President’s regard for Wil-
son ranged from lauding him as a latter-day Winston Churchill to dispensing
what might be described as contemptuous ‘rough treatment’. This included ef-
forts in March 1964 to browbeat him over British trade with Cuba; at the Wash-
ington summit in December 1964 over Wilson’s handling of the British economy;
the hostile response when Wilson telephoned the White House on 11 February
1965; and the general disdain for the Prime Minister during the period of ‘disso-
ciation’ in mid-1966 and over the abortive ‘phase A–phase B’ initiative in
February 1967. Wilson claimed that his dealings with Johnson were ‘very friendly
and productive’.53 By contrast, George Ball has argued that ‘Anglo-American
relations were seriously impeded by the fact that President Johnson and Prime
Minister Wilson were temperamentally poles apart and did not basically like
each other’.54 Unsurprisingly, historians have tended to focus on the strains of
the relationship.55 Jeremy Fielding, for example, has commented that Johnson
‘did not hold a particularly positive view of his British counterpart. John Dumbrell
refers to Johnson’s apocryphal description of Wilson as “a little creep camping
on my doorstep”, which Dumbrell claims had a “ring of authenticity”.’56 Field-
ing agrees that Johnson had ‘an antipathy’ towards Wilson, but comments like
this beg the question of whether the ambivalence of the personal relationship
shaped the way the two leaders handled the issues of mutual concern, and the
extent to which this personal ambivalence generated the decline in closeness
between Britain and America, 1964–68.
Thomas Schwartz has suggested that Johnson and Wilson managed to
‘compartmentalise’ their relationship, learning to live with their differences over
Vietnam in particular and cooperating on issues in which their views coin-
cided.57 Given Johnson’s tendency to measure the value of allies in terms of their
overall contribution to American interests, this thesis is less persuasive than at
first it might seem. In the eyes of the President, the British were failing to pull
their weight in the world, with the result that he was inclined to treat Wilson in
a less than respectful manner whatever the issue. However, most of the ‘rough
treatment’ thus meted out seemed to have little impact on the Prime Minister.
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The White House’s brusqueness with regard to phase A–phase B did anger him,
but his disquiet was focused more on Johnson’s advisers – especially the ‘hawk-
ish’ Walt Rostow – than on the President himself. Wilson was consistently
favourable in his attitude towards Johnson, although he was less willing to deal
with him when bad news had to be dispensed – for example, he sent George
Brown to Washington early in January 1968 to confirm the accelerated with-
drawal from East of Suez.
So far as Vietnam was concerned, Wilson noted that ‘From time to time,
almost half-jokingly, hoping I would say yes, [Johnson] would ask me if I could
not just put in a platoon of Highlanders in their kilts with bagpipes, despite their
relatively limited military value.’58 Wilson resisted these blandishments for a
British troop commitment, however symbolic and small-scale, alongside the
forces of the United States and allies such as Australia and New Zealand. The
idea of committing troops had little support in Britain, and would jeopardise the
country’s ‘neutrality’ stemming from the Geneva Conference of 1954. More-
over, the political controversy in Britain that would no doubt have erupted had
Wilson attempted to send British soldiers could well have damaged the Anglo-
American relationship more than did his rejection of the American request.
Wilson’s peacemaking efforts such as the Commonwealth Peace Mission and
the phase A–phase B initiative would help him overcome the anti-Americanism
of the Labour left, obviate American pressures for British troops, and would
boost his status as a diplomat. Johnson often doubted the likelihood of success of
Wilson’s peace moves, but he concurred because the United States’s apparent
willingness to participate in talks would help ease allegations of US-led ‘aggres-
sion’ in Vietnam. Notwithstanding the President’s reservations towards negotia-
tions ‘by proxy’, the British initiatives failed because neither adversary made
any concessions that might have suggested a real likelihood of fruitful talks and
because Britain’s close links with the United States – and in particular Wilson’s
association with Johnson – meant that British neutrality was at best merely
nominal.
Wilson and Johnson both supported the idea that Britain should remain a
world power, but the country’s economic troubles were so intractable that pro-
longing the role was simply not feasible. Partly to uphold the British global
position, in November 1964, September 1965 and July 1966 the United States
helped to bail-out sterling. Yet Johnson – and most of his advisers – seemed
unwilling to accept that Britain’s strategic over-extension exacerbated its eco-
nomic troubles, and the President was unconcerned about the severity of the
economic measures that Britain would have to adopt at home in order to pre-
serve the foreign commitments. Furthermore, Johnson’s pressures on Britain to
retain the global role no doubt strengthened Wilson’s already considerable com-
mitment in this respect.
From the beginning of his time in office, Wilson realised the economic strain
imposed by high defence spending abroad, but only reluctantly and belatedly
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did he come to accept the necessity of a more modest strategic role centred on
Europe if Britain was ever to attain lasting economic health. Even during the
severe crisis of sterling in July 1966, he told Johnson that Britain had every
intention of retaining its world power position. Additionally, when sterling was
devalued in November 1967, Wilson stressed to the White House that there
would be no acceleration of the timetable for withdrawal East of Suez. Both
Wilson and Johnson helped to prolong what was in essence a played-out as well
as expensive role for Britain. The ultimately less traumatic course would have
been to accept sooner that the British world role was no longer viable, thereby
reducing the need for the Labour government to resort to ever-harsher budget-
ary measures at home. The personal relationship between Wilson and Johnson
cannot be described as ‘special’, although their mutual dealings were unlikely
to prosper when British weakness was felt so painfully in Washington.
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